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 ABSTRACT 
 
Community Choice Aggregation: Technologies, Institutions, and Values 
 
by 
 
Mariah Brennan Clegg 
 
  Over the past decade, community choice aggregation (CCA) has emerged in 
California as a means to shift energy procurement decisions from investor-owned utilities to 
locally-controlled public agencies. In this way, CCAs use local control and the possibility of 
public participation to achieve substantive goals such as local renewable generation and 
cost-savings. While many policy documents and academic works have taken a wide view of 
the CCA policy movement, in this work I pursue a focused, grounded theory study of the 
CCA movement in Santa Barbara County to explore the following questions: What are the 
promises of community choice aggregation in Santa Barbara County, and under what 
conditions might they be met? I argue that those actors who have the most ambitious and 
full-fledged understanding of the promises of the movement are committed to generating 
positive socio-technical change in the energy system through energy democracy principles. I 
show how CCA policy is currently a disorderly bundle of contradictions, reaching toward 
energy democracy yet hobbled by structural and ideological eco-modernist constraints. 
Conceits to customer choice and cost competitiveness that are built into the structure of 
CCA policy itself serve to undermine the viability of CCA programs and, most importantly, 
limit the extent to which CCA can engage in local renewable generation. If CCAs are to be 
used to pursue radical energy system transformations, their advocates must confront the 
contradictions residing in the core of CCA policy. As such, I argue that in order for the 
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energy democracy aims of the CCA to be met, advocates must use insights from the energy 
democracy framework to move through eco-modernist constraints, especially by engaging 
in strategic planning to build local renewable generation early in program design and by 
cultivating meaningful public participation in energy questions. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
ACRONYMS OF SOME IMPORTANT GROUPS AND ENTITIES 
 
CACE: California Alliance for Community Energy 
CAISO: California Independent System Operator 
CEC: Community Environmental Council 
CPUC: California Public Utilities Commission 
FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
IBEW: International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
PEA: Pacific Energy Advisors 
PG&E: Pacific Gas and Electric 
PUC: Public Utilities Commission 
SCE: Southern California Edison 
 
 
 
KEY TECHNICAL TERMS REGARDING ENERGY SYSTEMS 
 
Base Load Power Plants: plants that provide power continuously and are only turned off 
during maintenance; most typically generating power from non-intermittent sources such 
as natural gas, nuclear, coal, and large hydroelectric. 
 
Built Environments: human-made surroundings, especially buildings and parking lots. 
 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs): localized electricity units that comprise 
microgrids; typically involving decentralized generation (localized renewables), system 
balancing (storage and load sharing systems), and demand reduction (energy efficiency) 
components. 
  ix 
 
Energy Service Provider (ESP): a private company that provides a range of energy 
services, including power generation and energy infrastructure outsourcing. 
 
Investor-Owned Utility (IOU): a private entity acting as a publicly-regulated utility. 
 
Joint Power Authority (JPA): an entity comprised of two or more public authorities 
permitted to jointly exercise power common to all components; here, a typical governing 
body of a CCA. 
 
Load Profile: an illustration of the variation in demand and electrical load over time; used 
to plan how much power must be generated or purchased. 
 
Net Energy Metering (NEM): a billing system that gives credit to small customers for 
excess electricity that is generated on-site, typically by solar photovoltaic panels, and 
transmitted back to the grid. 
 
Peaker Plant: plants that provide power only when there is high or “peak” demand for 
electricity; most typically generating power from on-demand sources such as natural gas. 
 
Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA): a charge assessed by IOUs, 
approved by the CPUC, and leveled on CCA customers, to cover generation costs acquired 
prior to severance of contracts. 
 
Power Content Label: information regarding energy resources used to generate 
electricity. 
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Renewable Energy Credit (REC): a tradable, non-tangible energy commodity 
corresponding to the environmental attributes of energy produced from renewable sources; 
when unbundled, the renewable credit becomes separated from the actual energy produced. 
 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS): regulation requiring that a set proportion of 
power must be generated from renewable sources. 
 
Substation: a node of an energy system where energy is transformed in voltage, typically 
from high to low. 
 
Utility-Scale Power: power generated at facilities capable of generating 4 megawatts of 
power, though the cut-off is unclear; for reference, 1 megawatt of solar requires 
approximately 4 acres of photovoltaic panel (Narasimhan 2019). 
 
 
KEY NON-TECHNICAL TERMS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE 
 
Capitalism: economic liberalism, which structurally mobilizes bureaucracy to depoliticize 
questions of public concern and ideologically mobilizes formal liberty to flatten questions of 
justice. 
 
Democracy: governance by and for the people, with essential commitments to equality 
and consensus, enacted through participation in matters of public concern.  
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Ecological Modernization, Eco-Modernism: frame for approaching the 
environmental problematique that acknowledges its institutional origins but argues that 
solutions must come through institutional reform, ultimately to maintain “business-as-
usual” and enable regular market functioning. 
 
Energy Democracy: frame for approaching the environmental and energy problematique 
that acknowledges its structural origins and argues that transcendence of injustices must 
come through a repoliticization of energy questions through decentralized, democratized, 
and fully participatory socio-technical reorganization. 
 
Technoregion: a geographic region defined through physical connections of a single 
technological and infrastructural network, such as an electrical grid, highway system, or 
even a computer network. 
 
 
USEFUL DISTINCTIONS AND COMPARISONS 
 
Bureaucracy vs. Technocracy: bureaucracy is formal rule by a system of offices inclined 
toward centralization, while technocracy is rule by technicians, whether formal or informal, 
such as in corporatist or neocorporatist arrangements. 
 
Community Choice Aggregation (CCA) vs. Community Choice Energy (CCE): 
CCA is a policy that shifts decision-making power over how energy is procured from 
investor-owned utilities to locally-controlled public agencies, while CCE is the particular 
CCA program name as proposed in Santa Barbara County. 
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Curtailment vs. Intermittency: curtailment is a response to overabundance of 
renewable energy, while intermittency refers to renewable energy’s irregularly alternating 
phases of availability. 
 
Macrogrid vs. Microgrid: a macrogrid (neologism) is a centralized grid typically 
characterized by uni-directional flows of power, while a microgrid is a network of 
interconnected loads and distributed energy resources (DERs) with the ability to connect 
and disconnect from the larger grid and, often, share loads. 
 
Reliability vs. Resilience: reliability is a system’s capacity to fulfill basic consumer 
demand for electricity, while resilience is a system’s ability to withstand disruptive events. 
 
Renewable Power vs. Greenhouse Gas- (GHG-) Free Power: renewable power is 
derived from resources that are naturally replenished on a human timescale, inclusive of 
biomass, while GHG-free power does not emit greenhouse gases in its consumption, 
inclusive of nuclear power and large hydroelectric. 
 
Transmission vs. Distribution: transmission is the process of carrying electricity from 
sites of generation to substations, while distribution is the process of carrying electricity 
from substations to sites of end-use.
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I. Introduction 
We are in a period of excessive centralization. In this book I shall try to demonstrate that 
in many functions this style is economically inefficient, technologically unnecessary, and 
humanly damaging. Therefore we might adopt a political maxim: to decentralize where, 
how, and how much is expedient. But where, how, and how much are empirical questions. 
They require research and experiment. In the existing overcentralized climate of opinion, 
it is just this research and experiment that we are not getting. [...] Therefore, I urge 
students who are going on to graduate work to choose their theses in this field.  
 
Paul Goodman, People or Personnel?, 1965, 27. 
 
This project begins with an epigram by Paul Goodman, wherein he presents the reader 
with a challenge. He argues that decentralization is good for enacting social experiments, 
good for organizing social action, good for cultivating democratic subjectivities, and good 
for pursuing human flourishing. He next suggests that graduate students should test how 
much decentralization is appropriate within the particular area of their expertise, and how 
it can be achieved. My work is inspired by this challenge. I consider community choice 
aggregation as a possible avenue for such decentralization and ask, What are the promises 
of community choice aggregation in Santa Barbara County, and under what conditions 
can they be met? 
In 2002, California passed AB 117, which enabled the establishment of community 
choice aggregation (CCA), a mechanism by which energy procurement can be shifted from 
investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to locally-controlled public agencies. Through 
decentralization and the possibility for democratization, substantive commitments to 
environmental concerns and local generation may be pursued. In this work, I will explore 
the CCA movement in Santa Barbara County, identifying its principal aims, promises, and 
pitfalls. The future of the CCA in Santa Barbara County is far from written, and what follows 
is an intermediate account. There are, however, certain claims that can be made, and should 
be made, if the movement is to succeed in delivering on its stated goals. 
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The specific problems with California’s existing energy system that CCAs are designed to 
address vary according to the actors who articulate them. For state policymakers, the 
prevailing system prior to the passage of CCA policy was first highly monopolized, then 
ruinously deregulated; many policymakers saw CCA as a way to deregulate and introduce 
competition, generating cost-savings, but this time with more safeguards against the 
mayhem of the market. Meanwhile, environmental advocates sought ways to devolve 
control over energy systems to local levels so that more ambitious strides could be made 
toward cleaner energy. While these concerns were front-and-center among key institutional 
actors during the emergence of CCA policy, a suite of other problems abound with the 
existing system that have drawn the criticism of energy justice and energy democracy 
advocates. Centralization of energy production leaves certain areas vulnerable to outages, 
and possibilities for local green energy jobs go unrealized. Energy generated far away in 
disenfranchised communities is inefficiently transmitted over hundreds of miles to sites of 
consumption. Citizens are unable to directly influence the procurement and distribution of 
energy, such that important questions about our energy systems are removed from the 
arena of public debate. People are incapable of negotiating the terms of their service or 
advocating for more equitable or progressive pricing arrangements. In short, the existing 
energy system keeps those key questions about how to source energy, from where, and for 
how much out of the hands of the public. CCAs could be a way to bring those questions back 
to the people. 
To understand the aims and opportunities of CCA, focusing on the movement in Santa 
Barbara County, I adopted methods of data collection and analysis resonant with grounded 
theory. Through in-depth interviews1 and participation at meetings, I was able to gain an 
understanding of this emergent phenomenon. In my field research, I was also able to 
                                                
1 In most cases my participants consented to my use of their full names in my research, though I 
have chosen to use pseudonyms in most cases. 
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engage in participatory action research, wherein researchers participate in while studying 
an on-going intervention (Herr and Anderson 2005), which had three main benefits. I was 
able to gain the trust of my participants, I was able to test my emergent theories by checking 
with participants as events unfolded, and I was able to act and write about what I knew as I 
learned. It became my responsibility to demonstrate my knowledge, and this work is a 
manifestation of that commitment to scholar-activism. 
My literature review argues for the use of the energy democracy framework in analyzing 
the CCA in Santa Barbara County. The energy democracy framework acknowledges 
inequalities in production, distribution, and consumption of energy; it then advocates the 
resolution of those justice concerns by repoliticizing energy questions through the 
cultivation of robust public participation (Weinrub 2017). The literature review then turns 
to substantiate three claims on which the energy democracy framework is grounded. First, 
the energy democracy framework is critical of existing bureaucratic systems of energy 
management; here, bureaucratic governance and the technocracies they bear disempower 
and depoliticize publics while enabling the collusion of state and capital (Marx [1871] 2000; 
Habermas 1962; Offe 1984; Landa 2009). In this work, capitalism is understood principally 
as economic liberalism, an economic system grounded in private ownership of the means of 
production; further, economic liberalism structurally mobilizes bureaucracy to depoliticize 
questions of public concern and ideologically mobilizes formal liberty to flatten questions of 
justice (Landa 2009). When oriented toward the environmental problematique, such 
bureaucratic management manifests as ecological modernization (Huber 1985), known on 
the ground as eco-modernism, which acknowledges the institutional origins of 
environmental problems, but argues that solutions must come through institutional reform 
(Spaargaren and Mol 1992). In a word, solutions are won through (bureaucratic) 
management rather than through (democratic) participation, and institutions are mobilized 
to make the playing field work for capital.  
  4 
Beyond these critiques of the existing system, the energy democracy framework calls on 
literatures that strive to manifest a positive democratic project. As a second claim, the 
energy democracy framework calls for decentralization as a necessary though insufficient 
condition for democracy. Here, democracy is understood not as a set of practices and 
dictums — going to the polls, rule by majority, electing representatives — but as governance 
by and for the people, with essential commitments to equality and consensus (Woodruff 
2006). The connection between decentralization and democratization is analyzed, 
recognizing as well the practical and subjective benefits of the kinds of participation made 
possible by decentralization (Goodman 1965; Flacks 1988). Third, an energy democracy 
framework relies on a new socio-technics that enables decentralized and participatory 
democracy, and so I turn next to fleshing out on what theoretical underpinnings these new 
ecological socio-technics can be built (Bookchin 2005). Finally, I explore how science and 
technology may be mobilized to serve the common good, both to clarify that energy systems 
do indeed require expert knowledge and to explore the connections between science and 
democracy. In sum, this section articulates an energy democracy framework as an 
important way to understand CCA as transformational policy that can be used to 
decentralize, democratize, and repoliticize our energy system, and to grapple with the 
challenges CCAs face. 
If energy democracy occupies one polar solution to ecological and social problems, eco-
modernism’s enduring bureaucratization of public matters occupies the opposite pole. 
These tendencies find themselves opposed in the movement for community choice 
aggregation. In this work, I do not attempt to chart a middle way between the two. While 
energy democratic and eco-modernist outcomes constitute termini of a continuum such 
that outcomes will fall somewhere between the two, purposefully aiming for such middling 
outcomes has no clear normative merit given the conclusions reached about the practical 
and ideational benefits of democracy. If eco-modernism is appealing because it is perceived 
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to be expedient, we should ask, Expedient in doing what? If democracy is eschewed, we 
should ask, On what normative grounds do we cast it aside? 
Still, returning to an evaluation of present circumstances, community choice 
aggregation exists at the intersection of energy democracy aspirations and eco-modernist 
policy constraints. In Chapter One, I identify the creation of local renewable generation 
through distributed energy resources (DERs), or microgrids, to be the most central and 
most ambitious aim of CCAs. Decentralized generation is an infrastructural technology 
achieved through the novel organizational technology of the CCA. Together, CCA and DERs 
democratize energy by putting decision-making powers in the hands of communities. 
Moreover, CCAs and DERs bring our energy system in line with communities’ substantive 
commitments to local economic and ecological resilience. Most profoundly, this is done by 
reversing the polarity of energy systems so that one-time consumers may now also be 
producers and managers of energy. According to energy democracy-aligned CCA advocates, 
this kind of energy insurrection requires community engagement and strategic planning of 
CCA programs. 
Hindering these energy democracy aspirations are a host of eco-modernist policy 
constraints that serve incumbent IOUs. Ecological modernization, the theoretical 
foundation of eco-modernism, emerges from a longue durée of bureaucratization and 
rationalization of matters of public concern, but it also manifests in particular ways in the 
context of California energy policy. In Chapter Two I chart these features and lay the 
foundation for the bulk of my work by showing how eco-modernist policy constraints stifle 
the radical potential of CCAs as conceived of in the eyes of energy democracy advocates. In 
this context, eco-modernism is a loose discursive bundle of commitments designed to 
address ecological concerns through strategies that protect existing business interests. 
Doing so requires the flattening of community members to consumers and weaponizing free 
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market ideologies that privilege cost competitiveness — supposedly for the ratepayer’s sake 
— to keep CCAs anemic and incapable of developing local renewable generation. 
In Chapter Three, I explore the specific eco-modernist constraints of CCA policy. The 
crux of the issue here is that, according to prevailing market logics that privilege economies 
of scale, DERs remain expensive, and so long as CCA policy includes “customer choice” to 
opt out of CCAs and rejoin IOUs, CCAs must be committed to low rates, stacking the deck in 
favor of IOUs and against decentralized energy. This contradiction between energy 
democracy and eco-modernism yields two distinct policy positions within the CCA 
movement: those who are staunch energy democracy advocates and those who are more 
willing to cleave toward eco-modernist policy constraints. In Santa Barbara, the energy 
democracy advocates have tended to work “outside” of CCA program design and have 
advocated designing the program from the ground up, especially with local renewable 
generation projects, to cultivate meaningful community participation. The latter, 
structurally and ideologically more adherent to eco-modernist policy constraints, occupy 
government staff and other “inside” positions. In Santa Barbara they pursued a technical 
feasibility study to assess the simple economics of the program without addressing what 
kinds of local projects and programs they would engage in. Moreover, they elected to hire 
consultants who, in the words of energy democracy advocates, had no structural interest in 
building a successful program and thus had no “skin in the game.” In short, Santa Barbara 
had started by vying for approval for the project on strictly fiscal grounds and had excluded 
strategists and stakeholders who wanted to focus on specific projects to gain support from 
the community. 
The results of the first such technical feasibility study were unfavorable. In Chapter 
Four, I examine the feasibility study, itself a product of “insider” negotiations undertaken 
without considering the advocacy of those who wanted to push for strategic planning and 
at-risk consultant work. I explicate how it was presented before the Santa Barbara County 
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Board of Supervisors and how key stakeholders in the CCA advocacy community discussed 
it. The feasibility study provided an opportunity to see how actors responded when the plan 
to achieve environmental ends through a democratized process encountered challenges, 
which themselves can be understood in light of IOU maneuvers against CCAs. I also explore 
how little the actual results of the feasibility study seemed to matter politically: though the 
program was deemed infeasible, the County still voted to continue pursuit of the CCA 
through more feasibility studies. Likewise, when a second feasibility study was conducted 
and returned favorably in the months following, the County voted to pursue the formation 
of a CCA by the same margin and with the same politicians on each side of the issue. In both 
cases, the resolve of the Board challenges the assumption that CCAs will sink or swim 
purely on their perceived economic feasibility. Instead, the feasibility study is framed as a 
boundary object (Owens 2015) used to help make claims, but its capacity to do so is limited 
by the lack of consensus built up around CCA advocacy between North and South County 
actors. The principal take-away of this section is that greater commitment to negotiation 
and consensus-building, as well as greater efforts at strategic planning, could have helped 
manifest expert consensus and could help the CCA movement in the future. 
In Chapter Five, I consider the role of IOUs vis-à-vis CCAs. CCAs do not operate to the 
exclusion of IOUs, and because IOUs continue to maintain and operate transmission lines, 
they actually help make CCAs a relatively easy first step toward publicly-owned power. 
Moreover, so long as customers are allowed to opt out of CCAs and remain with incumbent 
IOUs, CCA advocates may argue for CCAs on the grounds of “customer choice,” a key 
element of free market ideology. In this way, IOUs are kept at the table on material and 
ideological grounds. But so long as they remain at the table, CCAs are required to make 
concessions to IOUs to ensure they remain financially solvent, such as through power 
charge indifference adjustments (PCIA). PCIA costs in turn keep CCAs financially starved 
and limit the extent to which they can engage in local renewable generation. Thus, through 
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a corporatist arrangement, framed in discourses of the free market and customer choice, the 
existing business interests of IOUs are maintained and community demands are flattened to 
simple consumer demands. Finally, I suggest that corporatist leanings even within CCA 
advocacy groups effectively weakens opposition to IOUs, whose dominance is rarely 
challenged fundamentally. 
I conclude the work with a series of suggestions as to how the aims of community choice 
aggregation may be met in Santa Barbara County. These solutions center participation, 
engagement, and strategizing to design programs that can inspire public concern: in a word, 
solutions are realized through the energy democracy framework. In this way, the energy 
democracy framework is not simply a dreamy aspiration, but a real strategy for working 
through the contradictions inherent in CCA policy and manifesting workable programs. The 
goal here is to repoliticize our energy systems so that energy may be produced, distributed, 
and consumed more equally and in a way that advances community goals. The case that I 
engage with in this work is narrow spatially and temporally, and its primary purpose is to be 
useful to local advocates as they struggle for energy democracy, local resilience, and 
habitable futures. At the same time, while my research question asks specifically under what 
conditions the promises of community choice aggregation might be met, as CCA is 
understood within the context of democracy, bureaucracy, and capitalism, this modest 
question soon begets larger ones: Can democracy and capitalism coexist? Can public power 
flourish under conditions of business-oriented solutions? Or do these two tendencies 
manifest such a contradiction that one must be cast aside in favor of the other? My analysis 
suggests the latter, and asserts a strategic and moral demand that we fight for democracy 
against the constraints of existing business interests. The resilience of our communities and 
our planet depend on it. 
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A. Methods 
1. The First Forum 
Across the atrium to the downtown branch of the Santa Barbara Public Library is a 
room called the Faulkner Gallery. The ceilings are high, and local art covers the walls — an 
exposition of Santa Barbara’s fondest imagery. A sunset on Butterfly Beach, a girl in a pink 
straw hat, a dragonfly’s wing iridescent in midday sun. If Santa Barbara had a community 
refrigerator, this would be it. There’s standing room only, a panel with name cards, a 
friendly woman filling paper bowls with peanuts, rice crackers, and tiny cookies to be served 
with plastic spoons onto Chinet plates. The projector is on, and an older man wheels out 
another rack of chairs and places one before me. As I settle with paper and pen at the forum 
on June 7th, 2017, I look around for the familiar faces. The Greens are out in droves. The 
regular cast of grey-haireds, newly “woke.” I’m encouraged to see a younger showing as 
well, and others I’ve never seen before. 
The Community Environmental Council had been working on building the movement 
for community choice aggregation (CCA) in Santa Barbara County for a decade. CCA 
promised to use local control over energy procurement to achieve higher renewable 
standards, at rates competitive with utilities, with reinvestments into local generation and 
efficiency programs. In June 2015, $50,000 was granted for a feasibility study to determine 
if a CCA spanning Santa Barbara County, with parts of San Luis Obispo and Ventura 
Counties, would be “right for us,” in the words of Amy Parker, the Renewable Energy and 
Efficiency Specialist for Santa Barbara’s Community Environmental Council (CEC).2  The 
results of the study, the audience was informed, would be out any day now. Surrounded by 
so many earnest supporters, inhabiting a planet that is dying, I had to ask who this plan 
would not be right for. Which “us” were we trying to appease? Were they here in this room? 
                                                
2 Community Choice Energy Forum. Faulkner Gallery, Santa Barbara, CA. June 7th, 2017. 
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After a short, eager introduction from Parker, a slew of speakers representing CCA 
initiatives across California took the podium. Five bright, succinct, and indomitably peppy 
orations from speakers who started their talks with zeal (“I’ve got a really amazing story to 
tell you...”), with flattery (“This is an amazing crowd!”), with innocuous humor (“I know I’m 
from NorCal, but...”). And it truly was inspiring. It seemed so within reach. Jennifer Cregar, 
project supervisor at Santa Barbara Community Services’ Energy and Sustainability 
Initiatives, heralded as the “Beyoncé” of the city council chambers of the South Coast, 
emphasized local control as the path toward our renewable energy goals, local energy 
production, economic development, energy security — and most people wouldn’t even see a 
difference. J.R. Killigrew, our delegate from Marin County, site of California’s oldest CCA 
dating back to 2010, had a lot to say about quality of life concerns like clean air and 
emphasized community control and union jobs. Mary Romano had come from Lancaster, 
the dark horse municipal CCA powering a conservative desert town under the command of 
notoriously autocratic Mayor Rex Parris. She focused on how the benefits from the CCA had 
flowed back into the community as economic resilience and energy security. She too 
stressed how consumers wouldn’t even be able to tell the difference on their energy bills. 
Gary Gero from L.A. talked strategically about diversifying the energy economy, and Joe 
Galliani from the South Bay, using energy justice language, framed the CCA as a moral 
obligation. Community action was needed, he insisted, in light of the “failings of the federal 
government.” The room murmured knowingly.  
Over the course of the next year, from summer 2017 to summer 2018, I would engage in 
a series of in-depth interviews and participant observation field studies to gain an 
understanding of the chief goals of community choice aggregation and how those goals 
could be hindered by external pressures from outside actors and internal policy 
contradictions, as well as how they might be helped. My work has been grounded in trying 
to grapple with and faithfully fathom how actors within the Santa Barbara CCA advocacy 
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community understand the movement, and how their decisions have been informed by 
ideology and by structure. My efforts here have been to construct grounded theory by 
meeting with key players, showing up at meetings, and becoming an advocate for the 
movement myself. 
Because I embarked on a study of an ongoing movement, surprising ethical 
considerations quickly came into play. My research does not deal directly with marginalized 
groups, and for the most part my participants have shared views that they have indeed 
elsewhere shared publicly. To be sure, if analyzed incorrectly or released without care, my 
work could damage their careers, but for the most part my study has remained ethically 
low-risk vis-a-vis my participants. Instead, a key site of ethical consideration became the 
movement itself. My focus on CCAs emerges not from academic interest or opportunism, 
but from my dedication to the environmental justice movement and eco-decentralism as a 
tactic to achieve just, sustainable futures. As such, I see myself as using participatory action 
research while engaged in a scholar-activism project, and I feel obligated to my subjects and 
to my own political and normative commitments to help the movement for CCAs. At the 
same time, my research has revealed serious flaws and complications that CCAs face in 
attempting to articulate clean public power. At times, it has been difficult to navigate how to 
support CCAs while undertaking their rigorous study. My hope is that this work will provide 
constructive criticism. To this end, this work concludes with a variety of suggestions for how 
the movement might best move forward.  
As I proceed with my research, I look forward to being able to return to my subjects 
having developed some insights that can serve their movement. Not only do I owe it to my 
subjects to offer something back to them for their generous cooperation, but their insights 
on my work will be invaluable in testing the rigor of my concepts and will help me 
iteratively co-create the robust analysis worthy of scholar-activism. 
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2. Why Sociology? Why Qualitative Methods? 
As it stands, much of the literature surrounding community choice aggregation ushers 
from either political science or urban planning departments. The former approach is well-
suited to analyses of distributional power, while contributions from the latter school usually 
privilege technical solutions. Both a rigorous analysis of power and a focus on solutions will 
be essential to my work, especially because I hope that my work will inform activism 
reflecting an energy democracy framework. At the same time, I argue that a sociological 
approach, especially one emphasizing qualitative methods, has much to offer the 
conversations surrounding CCA.  
Sociology sometimes occupies an awkward position among other disciplines: it both 
tries to stretch across too many fields and scrambles to keep its footing among emerging 
disciplines with narrower empirical focuses. These tensions prompt something of an 
identity crisis for sociology, and as such, it might be useful to develop a working definition 
of sociology. Sociology arises historically with modernity, and especially with its critics. The 
work of Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Dubois in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries called attention to the particular problematiques of the modern age, which 
witnessed a sundering of traditional social ties. Newly individuated subjects were thrust 
into a newly heterogeneous social field of state, capital, and civil society, which emerged 
from the fracturing of feudal systems of power. Sociology responds by trying to make sense 
of how these new individuals position themselves in society, and how tensions among 
different blocs continuously reshape the social. Sociology is also interested in developing 
general theories and working at high levels of abstraction. In sum, sociology is a modern 
discipline that attempts to grapple with the relationships among novel assemblages of the 
state, capital, and civil society, and attempts to develop broad theories of power and change. 
As Samuel Jung’s work on community choice aggregation shows, CCAs and energy 
procurement policy more broadly engages with political motivations, capital demands, and 
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social needs (Jung 2017). Because sociology engages with the breadth of problem areas 
involved with energy procurement debates, it is well-suited to developing a rich analysis of 
the promises and problems of securing public power through CCA. Jung’s analysis, rooted 
in urban planning frameworks, can be extended through a deeper engagement with areas of 
interest important to sociology, such as civil society, as well as more theoretical 
engagements with concepts of state and capital. 
My research question inquires, What are the promises of community choice 
aggregation, and under what conditions can they be met?; as such, my study necessitates a 
qualitative approach. Qualitative research addresses how and why questions, including 
perhaps the underlying question, How do we create new futures, and why do we fail? 
Further, actors involved with CCAs express ideas and act in relation to institutions, 
discourses, and other actors. Much of my research will explore these network effects, which 
qualitative research is (still) uniquely suited to. Most importantly, qualitative research 
attunes to complex, emergent phenomena. Assessing CCAs requires that we understand the 
friction between ideals and the reality of their application, that we explore fugitive 
motivations, that we inhabit different epistemes, that we stay nimble. In these early, 
exploratory stages of CCA studies, qualitative methods are essential. 
At the same time, later stages of analysis will surely require quantitative methods. Once 
preliminary theories develop through my engagement with the field, I will be able to get a 
sense of the kinds of quantitative questions I can pose. For example, I anticipate using 
quantitative methods to provide empirical answers to questions such as whether ratepayers 
would be willing to pay more for local renewable generation, whether public participation in 
decision-making processes is associated with greater dedication to substantive 
commitments, and if in other CCA programs formal models of such public participation is 
associated with higher levels of corporatism or deliberation in those programs. With these 
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quantitative projects on the far horizon, I commence with more flexible, qualitative 
questions. 
3. Prismatic and Dialectic Knowledge 
Broadly, my methodology is based on Michael Burawoy’s ethnographic work, which 
centers the co-constitutive relationship between the researcher and the case. For Burawoy, 
the researcher goes into the field not as an outside observer, but with the intention to 
embed themselves in the environment of the case study. Here, we are invited to imagine 
“engagement as the road to knowledge” (1998, 5). The researcher is expected to cultivate 
their own knowledge through continued engagement with their case. As such, there is no 
clean separation between researcher and subject, and instead the subject and object are co-
emergent. The work of the researcher, then, is integrative. This approach requires that the 
researcher be reflexive about what notions they bring to the table. 
Expanding on Burawoy, two broad theoretical commitments have shaped my approach 
to qualitative methods, which I will term the prismatic and the dialectic. A prismatic 
orientation simply means that research is most useful when it engages subjects and fields 
from a range of different perspectives. In Kantian terms, the position of the phenomenon 
encounters only a piece of the noumenon: each perspective is capable of revealing only 
partial knowledges of a common reality, while none can tell the whole story. In some 
postmodern discourses, this destabilization of objective knowledge prompts a crisis of 
representation wherein all researchers become authors of equally valid texts (Lofland 
2006). Still, there are other — and surely much more satisfying — ways to respond to the 
very real problem that different perspectives bring different ready-made insights to bear on 
knowledge production. Lofland recommends that this insight regarding partial knowledges 
should quicken us to the task of more critically and rigorously working through our data 
and inviting those we study to talk back, contributing to the dialectical, iterative practice of 
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research explicated more fully below (2006). In a word, the postmodern turn should 
prompt us to be diligent researchers, not hopeless or indifferent ones. 
Much feminist epistemology takes seriously the task of recognizing difference among 
situated knowledges while affirming social realism against relativism. Donna Haraway 
argues, “[t]he alternative to relativism is partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining 
the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations 
in epistemology” (Haraway 1988, 584). In this way, the recognition of a plurality of situated 
knowledges leads not to the evacuation of knowledge, but its resilience. The kinds of 
situated knowledges favored by feminist researchers are not charitable nods to 
disempowered groups. Instead, we should attend to situated knowledges because they are 
in fact the only forms of knowledge (Haraway 1988; Taylor 1998; Charmaz 2014). The 
objective, decontextualized, indifferent gaze, the “god trick” Haraway rejects as “signify[ing] 
a perverse capacity...to distance the knowing subject from everybody and everything in the 
interests of unfettered power” (1988, 581), is an epistemology of domination that “eye fucks 
the world to make techno-monsters” (1988, 581). Put simply, prismatic knowledge should 
not reduce our world to a flattened difference, but should instead be used to create a richer 
image of the real, and thus allow us to better challenge the false universal of our mutual 
oppression.  
In my own research, a prismatic epistemology has been important thus far in directing 
my choice of which subjects to research. I engage actors from a range of different positions, 
including grassroots activists, leaders in more institutionalized movements, government 
workers, and a union organizer. As my research progresses, I plan to study with less elite 
actors, though my analysis thus far has centered around key informants. I also visited a 
range of different field sites, including local governance meetings, grassroots activist 
meetings, sustainability summits, and clean energy strategizing meetings.  
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The flip side of some postmodern theories’ panicked suggestion that the crisis of 
representation renders all truth empty is the condescension that each viewpoint exists 
somehow as its own essential truth, immutable and beyond reproach. Again, navigating 
epistemological questions should prompt rigor, not defeat. What actors say about 
themselves should never be taken at face value (Haraway 1988), nor should inaccurate data 
be thrown aside (Charmaz 2014). It will be most useful to not attempt to see through the 
dirty glasses of qualitative inquiry, but instead try to see how our vision is distorted. 
Ultimately, achieving objectivity is not the goal here. Instead, knowledge must be 
understood relationally, as part a dialogue, a point to which I will return shortly. A 
prismatic approach to methods also entails a study of what actors say, what they do, and 
what they say about what they do. Perhaps the most important contribution of qualitative 
methods to any research project is that it allows us to better triangulate knowledge and map 
the complex and often contradictory behavior of our subjects.  
In my work, I have tried to understand my participants’ statements themselves as 
amalgamations and sometimes conflicted assertions about their commitments to ideology, 
feelings of structural constraints, efforts to smooth contradictions in messaging, and desires 
to convince, teach, and assert authority. I also became aware that different participants 
were able to speak with full conviction, while others planned their statements more 
strategically. Some participants, such as the participant from the California Alliance for 
Community Energy, knew me from previous campaigns and occupied an “outside” position 
to policy formation. As such, they were able to state bluntly their ideological commitments. 
Figureheads in institutional environmental groups and county positions played their cards 
closer to the chest and often gave canned responses to difficult questions, while intimating 
points of contention with more subtlety, sometimes directing me to other sources of 
information so that I could put the pieces together myself and on my own time. Still others, 
including the participants from the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
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Southern California Edison, and the retired participant from the American Public Power 
Association took the opportunity of the interview to teach and convince, often through 
repetition of key terms. The statements gathered from my interview subjects were thus 
never simple, faithful communications, but came as bundles of commitments, anxieties, 
performances, and aspirations.  
From here, a dialectical approach to knowledge production has been essential for 
understanding how participants and researchers create knowledge together, as well as for 
the development of theory through what Burawoy has termed the extended case method 
(1998). In the dialectical tradition of Hegel, Marx, DuBois, and many others since, subjects 
only exist in relation to one another. If subjects are knowledge bearers, it stands to reason 
that epistemology also exists as a mutual construction among actors. If it is indeed 
reasonable to make this leap from ontology to epistemology, we might reasonably develop a 
methodology of knowledge creation that takes intersubjectivity as a starting point.  
To this end, I have pursued participant observation and in-depth interviewing so that I 
can center this relationship between researcher and subject as a source of knowledge 
(Lofland 2006). This approach to data collection must be brought to bear on later stages of 
analysis as well. To approach plausible development of theories and address issues of 
validation, researchers can engage in iterative work, relaying their findings back to subjects 
as a check on observational and interpretive errors (Charmaz 2014; Lofland 2006). As a 
student of social movements, I find resonance between this dialectical, iterative approach 
and the Maoist tactic of the mass line (Mao 1965). In the Maoist tradition, vanguardism is 
subordinated to popular and organic knowledge, which emerges from praxis.  
In one illustrative case of dialectical research, I was able to engage in a series of email 
communications with the participant from the IBEW to clarify the union’s support of the 
CCA so that I could better craft a presentation I was working on in collaboration with 
members of 350 Santa Barbara. The opportunity to reflect back my impressions of our 
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meeting revealed gaps in my knowledge that otherwise may have gone unchecked. 
Moreover, I found that the more engaged I became with my field sites, and the more of my 
own thoughts and motivations I shared during interviews, the more my participants opened 
up to me and shared their core values. Toward the end of my data collection, I gained the 
appreciation of Jennifer Cregar, the participant who, I had felt, regarded me with great 
suspicion. Upon leaving a city council meeting in Buellton, California, after I’d read a letter 
from the IBEW participant, Cregar patted my shoulder and commended me for my 
messaging. To put it lightly, this was a gratifying moment for me. At the same time, I found 
that my analytic codes often outstripped my immic codes, and it is likely that many of the 
insights I have developed in this work might meet resistance by my participants. While I 
consider it my duty as a scholar-activist to make my work legible and important to the 
communities I intend to serve, simply because some of my analysis might not be welcome 
by some actors should not suggest that my analysis is incorrect. 
A dialectical approach contributes positively to methodology, and it can also help in 
developing theory. My work is based in the grounded theory tradition, a set of methods that 
“consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to 
construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves,” with an emphasis on staying close to 
data and attempting to understand our participants’ experiences holistically (Charmaz 
2014, 2). While grounded theory might begin with sensitizing concepts (Charmaz 2014), I 
have found that staying close to my data and resisting easy assimilation of new concepts 
into more entrenched patterns of analysis has yielded new codes and concepts. In this way, 
grounded theory does not test existing theory, but works to extend it (Burawoy 1998). Here, 
researchers can take up anomalous, complex, or emergent cases to understand fugitive or 
fringe phenomena. Studying Santa Barbara as it managed the turmoil of a failed feasibility 
study constituted an extended case study, since at the time of my data collection, no other 
CCA venture had been dealt so bad a hand by their feasibility study. As such, the case 
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provides an important opportunity to examine the contradictions between eco-modernism 
and energy democracy in full light. Studying this case allowed me to examine, for example, 
how different advocates who were all committed to the CCA’s success responded to the bad 
news, and how political formations accommodated the results. The extended case method 
approach asks, What happens on the borderlands of known experience, and when can our 
existing theories no longer hold? In a sense, then, we can see this emergence of theory as 
akin to the dialectic of negativity (Hegel [1807] 1977). Here, history moves through working 
out contradictions such that those contradictions are never fully resolved, nor pasts wiped 
clean. Similarly, in extended case methods, older theories are never tested and disproved, 
but only complicated and extended. The shape of extended case method is the shape of the 
dialectic. 
4. Data Collection 
Because my research engages complex, emergent phenomena and amorphous social 
experiences, I elected to conduct the bulk of my study through intensive interviews (Lofland 
2006). At this stage in my work, I have focused on semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
with key informants to obtain descriptive information most efficiently while leaving room 
for open-ended discussion and reflection (Blee and Taylor 2002). In selecting subjects, I 
have privileged completedness over representativeness, understanding that theoretical 
sampling is the best way to achieve theoretical saturation (Blee and Taylor 2002; Charmaz 
2014). For my work, this has meant purposively sampling subjects from a range of different 
positions in the CCA movement, including an anti-institutionalist environmental 
organization founder, a more well-established environmental organization leader, a policy-
oriented environmental advocate, a city government worker guiding a prospective CCA 
movement, a city government appointee specializing in an active CCA, and an electrical 
union leader. I met some of my interview participants in the field at community and 
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government meetings, though many were also recommended to me by participants as I 
interviewed them.  
One important limitation of my study is that I only conducted interviews with CCA 
advocates, save for my interview with a SCE representative who claimed to be neutral on the 
subject. During my work in the field, I encountered an array of CCA detractors, but I did not 
solicit interviews with them. I decided to focus my work on CCA advocates because my 
interest has been in conflicts and contradictions within the movement for CCAs. At the 
same time, detractors and critics would certainly have important insights regarding the 
movement from outside the fray. As I continue my study, I will engage these critics as well.  
Another important limitation of my work is that I have focused my analysis in Santa 
Barbara County. Due to that limited geographic and cultural scope, my findings should not 
be too liberally transferred. This limitation is not overly vexing, since I am principally 
interested in using my scholarship to help the movement in Santa Barbara County, and 
because I intend to venture farther afield in my subsequent work.  
I conducted fourteen interviews, including ten in-depth interviews, two informal 
interviews of around twenty-five minutes, and two informal focus-group style interviews 
where the intention was to collaborate on presentations about the CCA and strategize about 
how to help build the movement. After gaining consent from my participants, I recorded 
and transcribed the in-depth interviews.  During the informal interviews, I took notes by 
hand. I conducted my first interview with a few structuring questions hoping to begin by 
roughly charting the terrain. Mostly I wanted to get a sense of the promises and pitfalls of 
CCAs from an environmental leader’s perspective. I quickly realized the importance of 
doing my homework and found myself quite over my head regarding the intricacies of 
energy policy. In later interviews, I retained some preliminary questions while building a 
larger repertoire of questions that (a) I needed technical answers to, (b) would have 
particular salience or relevance to particular actors, and (c) spoke to new codes that I had  
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Figure 1. Timeline of Data Collection 
 
developed through my preliminary coding of previous interviews. In this sense, my method 
for compiling new interview questions was iterative, requiring that I pivot between existing 
interview data and new subjects (Lofland 2006). The Appendix contains more information 
about the people I interviewed, why I decided to interview them, and important insights 
gathered from each. 
While intensive interviews proved best for charting amorphous social experiences, 
participant observation proved crucial for gathering temporally and spatially bounded 
information (Lofland 2006). I conducted sixteen participant observations, lasting around 
two to three hours each, to study public government meetings such as city council meetings 
and county board of supervisors’ meetings, as well as public forums such as the Central 
Coast Sustainability Summit and Clean Energy Community Meetings. I took field notes 
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during these observations and, when they were available, watched publicly available video 
recordings later so that I could take more precise notes. Where interviews gave me insights 
as to what my subjects said, and said about they did, participant observation allowed me to 
see what subjects actually do and how they negotiate conflict as it unfolds (Lofland 2006). 
For example, while the focus of this work lies elsewhere, attending a wide variety of public 
and semi-public events allowed me insights as to which settings preclude participatory 
deliberation, which foster only directionless communication, and which are actually 
conducive to productive dialogue. Further, I could get a sense of how these matters were 
discussed publicly and engaged with by the public, as well as how actors managed new 
information as it was brought to light. Here, observations of governmental meetings were 
most telling. My field observations also gave me the opportunity to conduct analyses of talk 
in action, such as when my interview participants made public comment, and informal 
interviews before and after meetings as alternative methods to prismatically understand my 
area of research (Lofland 2006).  
Gaining access to field sites and interviews was relatively easy for me both because of 
the nature of my field and my own biography. My field research has been conducted solely 
in public spaces such as city council meetings and sustainability events open to the public, 
so no special permissions were required. At the same time, these nominally public spaces 
are not actually made to be accessible to all members of the public. Santa Barbara City 
Council Meetings are held from 2 PM to 5 PM on Tuesdays, and they are conducted 
according to strict procedures that might seem byzantine or unintelligible to many, 
especially those of marginalized communities. The Central Coast Sustainability Summit 
required a $20 admission fee, ostensibly to pay for the complimentary lunch buffet. 
Because I am educated and enjoy some financial stability, my field sites were easy to gain 
access to. Still, this ease of entry perhaps says more about my own biography than the 
accessibility of those field sites. At the same time, because my activist work is considerably 
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more radical than my current project, I remain concerned that my biography might have 
turned some actors off to my scholarly work. In part because of these concerns, in my early 
observations, I abstained from participating too vocally in public meetings, and I quieted 
my radicalism while conducting interviews. The Appendix also includes is a brief account of 
each field site I visited and what I was able to learn there. 
5. Data Analysis 
To ensure the soundness of my qualitative research, I have used a four-part construct 
for assessing trustworthiness of data collection and analysis developed by Andrew Shenton 
(2004). This construct includes credibility (How congruent are the findings with reality?), 
transferability (How far can readers be confident in transferring to other situations the 
results and conclusions presented?), dependability (If this work were done again, would 
we receive the same results?), and confirmability (Are the findings the result of experiences 
and ideas of the participants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the 
researcher?) (2004). I have attempted to satisfy these four constructs, taking Shenton’s 
work as a guide, as explicated below. 
In pursuit of credibility, I engaged in purposive sampling of participants with whom I 
came into contact by gaining familiarity with the culture of participating organizations, and 
by triangulating data through consulting transcripts, field notes, and video logs of 
interviews and participant observation (Shenton 2004). I helped ensure honesty of 
participants by soliciting their voluntary participation, by giving them the option to remain 
confidential, and by making it clear that my own purpose of study is to better understand 
the policy and the movement so that I can help make the movement more effective. In each 
interview, I sought to build and confirm a faithful account of the participant’s thoughts and 
feelings about CCAs. Throughout my data collection phase, I used member checking (asking 
for clarification and additional insights on my interpretations of participants’ statements) to 
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test my insights both with new participants and through emails with past participants. Most 
of all, my data are trustworthy because I am a cultural insider of the community of CCA 
advocates (Shenton 2004). 
Because of the extremely local nature of my work, and because the purpose of this work 
is to develop some theories for use specifically by local actors, I am not overly concerned 
with transferability. Later in my work, it would contribute to the transferability of my 
findings to use similar interview protocols with similar populations to test whether I find 
similar results. In my ongoing research into CCAs in other communities, I have uncovered 
similar dynamics, themes, and problems as those I found in Santa Barbara. While each 
community confronts a highly specific set of circumstances, the insights gained from a close 
analysis of Santa Barbara CCAs are highly useful for understanding these other 
communities. This comparison will be explored in my forthcoming work on CCAs. Analysis 
from this case can help me understand other cases. Here, transferability is addressed not by 
attempting one massive study in isolation, but in gaining a sense of a phenomenon 
gradually, progressively extending the case study (Burawoy 1998). Moreover, the aim of 
research should be to respect the context of each particular case rather than pruning unruly 
cases in service of broad application. 
Dependability has necessitated a careful record of my research protocol such that the 
reader may “assess the extent to which proper research practices have been followed” 
(Shenton 2004, 71). To that end, I have included a detailed account of my research design 
and its implementation, including why certain decisions were made, the operational detail 
of data gathering, and reflective appraisals of the project throughout. This detailing will 
provide the reader with an account of my “progressive subjectivity,” or how my ideas have 
developed throughout the project (Shenton 2004, 68). 
Confirmability here has required constant attention to be sure that the claims I make 
regarding my participants’ statements are “responsible to reality” (Putnam, page 4 of 
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Threefold Cord). I have used triangulation to reduce investigator bias. Moreover, I have 
endeavored to be as explicit as possible in divulging my coding schemes, as well as which 
ideas emerged directly from my conversations with participants and which were inspired by 
outside research. The aim here is to make available an “audit trail” so that other researchers 
may check my work.  
In addition to Shenton’s guidance, Charmaz’s work on grounded theory has helped 
discipline my data analysis. Charmaz offers ways to analyze data that do justice to actually 
existing phenomena by coding actions and processes rather than themes and structures 
(2014). While theoretical codes become important, and we should not disregard our 
preconceptions entirely, they must earn their way into our analysis (2014). Speaking to a 
similar approach, Alexander Davis suggests “balanc[ing] theoretically informed codes with 
inductive codes driven by recurrent themes” (Davis 2015, 965). In my experience thus far, I 
have found his insights have helped me keep my analysis close to the data. I used content 
analysis to interpret my data and began generating codes through an open-coding system as 
I proceeded with my work, which steadily deepened my interaction with my data and 
proved essential for researching this emergent phenomenon. I found overlaps and 
distinctions in those initial codes, and through this process, I began to discern that several 
more or less distinct camps had developed among CCA advocates in Santa Barbara County. 
 I began my analysis with several key theoretical concerns in mind. First, I wanted to 
explore the relationship between process and substance. As such, I was intrigued early on 
by my participants’ suggestion that the process of locally-controlled public agencies could 
enable the pursuit of substantive commitments to local renewable generation. Next, since 
the first forum held in June 2017, I had recognized that two dramatically different 
discourses were wrapped up in public communications about the CCA. CCAs promised local 
control, which fit well with energy justice discourses, but it was also grounded in customer 
choice and cost-savings. Because I did not hear my participants refer to energy justice 
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explicitly, I decided to describe those commitments to local control of renewable generation 
as a commitment to “energy democracy.” I later began to explore the literature on energy 
democracy at the suggestion of one of my participants. In this work, I use the energy 
democracy framework as a term to denote an analytic tool, and energy democracy 
simpliciter to denote its on-the-ground practice, though the two concepts are connected. 
 As the literature review will demonstrate, the energy democracy framework is 
grounded in insights issuing from energy justice discourse. Energy justice is concerned with 
inequalities in how energy is generated, how it is distributed, and how it is consumed 
(Partridge et al., 2018); the energy democracy framework presents just one pathway toward 
a solution through public reclamation of energy questions, emphasizing participation and 
the interaction of economic and environmental resilience (Weinrub 2017). In this work I 
have emphasized the energy democracy framework over energy justice because the former 
framework was more salient to my participants. I heard much mention of energy democracy 
commitments such as local energy resilience, local generation, distributed energy resources, 
and open democratic decision-making procedures. On the other side, concerns more 
resonant with an energy justice approach — problems of pollution at sites of extraction and 
generation, regressive energy pricing, as well as a myriad of oppressions breaking down 
along lines of race, gender, class, and nationality — were not central to my participants’ 
remarks or understanding of the CCA movement. This is not to say that energy justice and 
energy democracy are oriented toward entirely different problematiques, simply that they 
have slightly different emphases. In this work I have centered energy democracy, though I 
anticipate future work will explore the energy justice challenges in Santa Barbara County 
more fully. 
 As I began to study more in the field of environmental policy, I became more 
familiar with ecological modernization, which has been used alternatively in the literature 
both as the culmination of a long history of bureaucratic and corporatist problem-solving 
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and as a loose discursive bundle of commitments to sustainability through “business-as-
usual” institutional reforms and market devices. Seeing important resonances between on-
the-ground references to customer choice and cost-savings and academic explications of 
ecological modernization, I began to code certain statements as being more or less 
committed to “eco-modernism,” or at least more or less adherent to the constraints of eco-
modernist policy. I use the term “eco-modernism” to denote on-the-ground practices, 
discourses, and constraints, while I use the term “ecological modernization” to refer to a 
theoretical framework that bears a relationship to eco-modernism analogous to the 
relationship between the energy democracy framework and energy democracy simpliciter. 
Eco-modernism became a sensitizing concept in my work (Charmaz 2014).  
I began to see several topics where these concepts of energy democracy and eco-
modernism were especially salient and variable, including participants’ orientation toward 
IOUs, the importance of local control and participation, emphasis on local build-out, and 
emphasis on customer choice. A rough schema of these codes and their topics can be found 
in Table 1, with specific clarifying subtopics in parentheses.  
I also recognized that aspirations toward energy democracy and recognition of certain 
eco-modernist constraints were not mutually exclusive, nor were they conditioned simply 
by ideology. Rather, I found that ideology and a participant’s positionality within the 
movement interacted to condition their commitments to energy democracy and eco-
modernism. Some participants, for example, were perhaps more constrained by their role in 
the movement, especially if their work required exchanging information with investor-
owned utilities or convincing more conservative politicians to pursue the policy. Others had 
more of an outsider position in program building, and were thus perhaps more able to make 
radical statements supporting energy democracy. 
From there, I started to see other contradictions and conflicts emerging around two 
distinct ways that participants tried to manage the contradiction between aspirations 
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Table 1. Key Codes and Sensitizing Topics 
Topic Eco-Modernist Moderate Energy Democracy 
Orientation 
Toward IOUs 
Cooperative  
(regarding IOUs as 
partners) 
Suspicious  
(desiring more 
transparency with 
PCIA calculations) 
Oppositional 
(suggesting IOUs are 
working to undermine 
CCA feasibility) 
Importance of 
Local Control 
and 
Participation 
Just a Tool to Get 
More Renewables  
(willing to abandon 
CCA to try different 
tactics) 
Promising 
Mechanism  
(worth fighting for, 
but mostly in service 
of greater 
renewables) 
Strategic and Intrinsic 
Good  
(explicit interest in 
cultivating participation) 
Emphasis on 
Local Build-
Out 
Not Important at 
Early Stages  
(far-off goals) 
Could be Feasible 
(interest in 
exploring) 
Necessary to a 
Functioning Program 
(possibility of changing 
distribution entirely) 
Emphasis on 
Choice 
Program 
Essential 
(presented as a core 
value) 
Strategic Utility  
(use post-2001 crisis 
policy carve-out to 
achieve community 
choice) 
Not Important  
(did not come up in 
interview) 
 
toward energy democracy and eco-modernist constraints. Some favored strategic planning 
among stakeholders with “skin in the game” who were committed to local benefits from day 
one (Taleb 2017, 3). Others favored separating the technical feasibility study from the 
program planning process, effectively putting energy democracy commitments on the back-
burner while they managed purely fiscal issues. It occurred to me that these two strategies 
were related to participants’ commitments to energy democracy versus eco-modernism, 
though I recognized that there was no necessary equality between ideology and strategy. 
Instead, I began to regard my participants’ statements as falling on three different scales 
that were related, but not easily collapsed. A sketch of these characterizations, along scales 
of commitment, positionality, and focus, can be found in Figure 2. 
I wrote continuously throughout my data collection, producing a number of 
presentations, papers, workshops, and zines. My research has included not just in-depth 
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interviews, participant observations, and a few scattered email correspondences, but also a 
series of presentations and pamphlets I created to help the movement. I coached the 350SB 
100% Renewable team on their understanding of CCA, presented the emergent CCA as a 
possible topic for the Blue Horizons film class during the summer of 2018, wrote a zine on 
CCAs that my media collective now carries, and developed a workshop concerning CCAs, 
IOUs, DERs, and the wildfires that I hosted at a housing cooperative in Isla Vista. I hope 
that this work that I have generated has increased public awareness of CCAs, and I know 
Figure 2. Participant and Statement Characteristic Scales 
 
that sharing information has helped me develop my own understanding. I look forward to 
many more opportunities to share what I’ve learned in more accessible formats than the 
document now before you. These multiple outputs prompted me to return iteratively to my 
transcripts, audio files, and field notes until I approached coding saturation.  
  30 
B. Literature Review 
1. Energy Democracy 
Community choice aggregation enables a transformation from a corporate, centrally 
regulated energy system to one controlled by locally-controlled public agencies. Through 
such decentralization and democratization, substantive commitments to local renewable 
generation can be made, with the added possibility of cost-savings. As I have studied the 
CCA movement in Santa Barbara County, I have found the energy democracy framework 
most useful in understanding the aims of the movement, elucidating its potential pitfalls, 
and discerning under what conditions it may succeed. Here, I refer to the energy democracy 
framework, rather than energy democracy simpliciter, to denote the method of analysis that 
I use to make sense of the challenges and fissures of the CCA policy and movement. In a 
word, I am not simply aligning my analysis with the set of tools, goals, and discourses taken 
up by some of my more radical participants; I am using the energy democracy framework as 
a set of critiques aimed at challenging the bureaucratized and centralized energy 
management system in favor of democratized systems capable of speaking to justice 
concerns and cultivating public participation. These two forms of energy democracy are not 
disconnected, but it is the latter meaning — as framework for critical renewal —that will be 
relevant in this literature review. In this literature review, I argue the merits of the energy 
democracy framework, first by presenting the framework as an important response to 
energy justice concerns, and then by substantiating some of its claims through reference to 
other literatures on bureaucracy, democracy, and social ecology.  
Before turning to a fuller explication of energy democracy, the problems of the energy 
system prior to the emergence of CCAs must be explored. While there is only marginal 
consensus among actors on the problems of California’s existing energy system, a suite of 
economic, environmental, and justice concerns surfaced regularly in my work. Before the 
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emergence of CCAs, three IOUs and a smattering of municipal utilities dominated the 
state’s energy system, thus suspending competition. Renewable standards were set at the 
state level such that communities had no means by which to take more ambitious strides 
toward cleaner energy. While these concerns — for competitive pricing and cleaner energy 
— were the driving force behind CCA policy development, my participants also shared 
concerns resonant with energy justice scholarship. Energy justice addresses “inequalities in 
how energy is produced, distributed or consumed” (Partridge et al., 2018), and such 
inequalities are endemic to California’s existing energy infrastructure. Principally, the 
existing energy system has privileged large centralized projects far from sites of end use. 
Thus, energy generated must be inefficiently transmitted over vast distances, leaving 
geographically isolated areas vulnerable to outages. Meanwhile, centralized generation both 
diminishes possibilities for local green energy and creates sacrifice zones where energy is 
produced at massive and noisome scale.   
The problems brought to light in energy justice scholarship require more nuanced 
solutions than demands for cost-savings and cleaner energy. As Dustin Mulvaney 
demonstrates, renewable energy pursued uncritically could prove disastrous from a justice 
standpoint. In his work on solar energy, Mulvaney explores how innovations in photovoltaic 
technology can expose workers to heavy metals like cadmium, and how innovations in 
supply chains can obscure poor factory conditions and environmental standards (Mulvaney 
2013).  Because this work is limited to an exploration of energy generation and does not 
trace renewable energy to extraction of raw materials and manufacture of technologies, 
Mulvaney’s criticism of land acquisition and centralized production is most relevant here. 
Mulvaney criticizes those institutional innovations designed to incentivize renewable 
generation, such as renewable portfolio standards, which have “focused on rapid, large-
scale solar deployment, often to the detriment of public participation and stakeholder 
involvement that could minimize those conflicts [between solar development and ecological 
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and cultural resources]” (Mulvaney 2013, 232). Without addressing key justice questions of 
“‘who wins, who loses, how and why’ as they relate to the existing distribution of energy, 
who lives with the side effects of its sites of extraction, production, and generation, and who 
will bear the social costs of decarbonizing energy sources and economies,” strides toward 
renewable energy will run afoul of justice concerns (Newell and Mulvaney 2013, 133). 
Solutions to these issues with the existing energy system in California must involve social 
and organization changes in how energy is produced, distributed, and consumed. 
In their work, Noah Healy and John Barry present energy democracy as a method of 
developing solutions to the energy justice problematique. They make this connection 
manifest by widening the aperture of the energy injustice problematique to include 
upstream politico-economic systems that condition and create energy injustice. When 
questions of how decisions about energy are made, by whom, and for whom, new avenues 
for fruitfully addressing these problems open up. Healy and Barry emphasize that a 
“political economy focus produces [...] a more directly political and politicizing framing of 
energy (in)justice and a just energy transition” (2017, 452). In a word, a politico-economic 
approach to the energy justice problematique encourages us to find solutions through the 
repoliticization of energy questions. On the other side, a politico-economic approach also 
brings much-needed focus on how to build a Just Transition, or a movement away from an 
extractive economy while centering economic resilience and creating “decent work and 
quality jobs” (2017, 454). In this way, the energy democracy framework presents a positive 
project for addressing the energy justice problematique and building economic and 
environmental resilience. 
In recent years, scholars have endeavored to flesh out what energy democracy might 
look like on the ground as a framework for transformation. Like Healy and Barry, Denise 
Fairchild and Al Weinrub present energy democracy as a newly emergent movement built to 
address justice concerns (2017). Fairchild and Weinrub recognize that livable and liberated 
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worlds require strategies designed to address ecological crisis through upending underlying 
systems of domination. Here, their struggle is “not simply to decarbonize the economic 
system, but to transform it” through the realization of a democratic order (2017, 5). In 
particular, this transformation would require “working people, low-income communities, 
and communities of color to take control of energy resources to empower their 
communities” (2017, 6). This shift in literal power “from private hands to a democratically 
controlled public sector” would constitute energy democracy (2017, 6). 
Fairchild and Weinrub seek to invoke three new paradigms that speak directly to the 
principal issues with the existing energy system as identified by CCA advocates: 
environmental, social justice, and economic problems. A new environmental paradigm 
would “reframe energy from being a commodity that is commercially exploited to being a 
part of the commons” (2017, 8). A new social justice paradigm would emphasize “the 
importance of building community resilience among the most vulnerable” and “those most 
negatively impacted by the fossil fuel economy” (2017, 10). To that end, “it stresses equity 
and the need to redress historical harm in finding solutions that achieve social justice” 
(2017, 10). Finally, a new economic paradigm “is characterized by community-based 
development, nonexploitative forms of production, socialized capital, ecological use of 
natural resources, and sustainable economic relationships” (2017, 10). Democratic 
management of public goods is a practical requirement of these new paradigms.  
Moreover, energy democracy necessitates a decentralized energy model. As the 
historical review of this project has demonstrated, centralization and regulation by far-away 
bureaucratic entities has largely benefitted private utilities. Fairchild and Weinrub concur 
that “in most cases, centralized energy development represents the interests of powerful 
economic forces aided by a corporate state apparatus unfettered by democratic restraints” 
(2017, 12). In opposition to centralized models, “the decentralized renewable energy model 
enables community-based renewable energy development” by allowing for “new economic 
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and ecologically sound relationships needed to address the current economic and climate 
crisis” (2017, 13). Renewable technologies have a special place in this plan for 
decentralization and democratization. Not only does democratic ownership enable the 
development of safe, sustainable, and equitably distributed energy such as renewables, but 
renewables are also materially more suited to decentralized, democratic control (2017). 
Here, distributed energy systems such as “solar energy, wind, geothermal energy, energy 
conservation, energy efficiency, energy storage, and demand response systems are 
resources that can be found and developed in all communities” (2017, 13). While 
decentralized management enables democratic control, renewables materially enable 
decentralization.  
Given the importance of decentralization, and particularly distributed energy systems, 
as a practical requirement of energy democracy, it is worth clarifying the concept more 
precisely through the work of Lorenzo Kristov. Kristov has worked with the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO), which is regulated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), and has overseen electricity operations in California since 
deregulation in 1998. In his work on distributed energy systems, Lorenzo Kristov suggests a 
model wherein distribution brings not only decentralization, but a reimagining of centers 
that corresponds with models of ecological hierarchies (2018).3 His model of distributed 
energy systems imagines the creation of energy system centers at the level of the building. 
These building centers are the most local level of consensual interaction wherein subjects 
can collectively decide such crucial ecological matters as energy and water use, how waste is 
disposed of, and extremely localized best practices of design. From here, concentric circles 
of geographically larger systems ripple outward: the block, the neighborhood, the city, the 
county, the state.  
                                                
3 For Kristov, these ecological hierarchies are ecological because they resemble biological models of 
organization, but they are also ecological in that they enable unity in diversity and natural 
spontaneity, characteristics of ecology explicated by Bookchin (2005) and elucidated further in the 
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In this model, the building remains at the center of the ecological hierarchy, though 
larger networks can be mobilized insofar as they have emergent properties that can be used 
to address more complex needs. In some cases, “concerns facing a city are actually concerns 
for a broader geographic area and are best addressed through an inter-government 
collaborative approach” (2018, 5). Kristov’s insight here is essential, as it anticipates the 
need to look beyond the strictly local and establish governing protocols for those issues that 
impact watersheds and other important bioregions. But rather than allow concerns for the 
universalized “other” living just downstream initiate and legitimize paternalistic rule by 
centralized power structures, regional concerns are approached when and only when they 
materially assert themselves, and their functions are oriented toward the needs of localized 
centers. Creating energy systems tailored to localized centers is essential to community 
resilience. He states, “Resilience is fundamentally a local capacity: no matter how 
geographically widespread a disruptive event may be, people in each affected locale have to 
deal with immediate, on-the-ground, possibly life-threatening impacts where they live” 
(2018, 6). For Kristov, this principle holds for long-term issues like economic resilience as 
well as immediate issues such as increasingly common natural disasters (2018). Further, 
local resilience is built on strong community bonds, and as such, active participation in 
community works by members of communities is the bread and butter of security. In sum, 
Kristov advocates for building communities from distributed, ecologically reimagined 
centers that affirm the autonomy of local actors while providing a framework for how to 
scale-out through coordination, rather than through coercion.  
In manifesting an ecological hierarchy wherein the centers are many and everywhere, 
Kristov uncovers the extent to which the existing energy system disempowers local actors. 
In the existing system, power is generated at a central location, and its transmission and 
distribution is managed entirely by massively wealthy utilities and protected by natural 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Social Ecology” section of this literature review. 
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monopolies. When end-users flip a switch, they are empowered to do so only by the good 
graces of those centers of power — the generation plant, the owners of the grid. Insofar as 
energy systems are managed by centralized state actors and IOUs, citizens are unable to 
directly influence the procurement and distribution of energy, such that important 
questions about our energy systems are removed from the arena of public debate. People 
are incapable of negotiating the terms of their service or advocating for more equitable or 
progressive pricing arrangements. In contrast to Kristov’s ecological hierarchy, the existing 
energy system is thus structured as a bureaucratic hierarchy, with power concentrated at 
the top and flowing uni-directionally to the base. The centers of centralized systems are 
always elsewhere in government offices or corporate headquarters, such that functions are 
oriented toward the needs of non-local actors. As such, key questions about how to source 
energy, from where, and for how much are kept out of the public’s hands. 
Phenomenologically, in bureaucratic hierarchies, the center is always elsewhere.  
Kristov’s ecological reimagining of the center offers a chance to make an important 
point about localism. When centers are made local, community members are empowered, 
though not guaranteed, to participate in important decision-making processes. Still, as 
many concerned scholars have recognized, while necessary to democratization, 
decentralization is insufficient on its own in solving issues of oppression within those 
distributed centers. Indeed, the concept of localism can be unnerving because localism can 
sometimes mean othering or repression. Localism might mean liberation for a particular 
geographic region, but it might also legitimize the domination of particular local actors, 
especially those in marginalized communities. This is the case when we fail to understand 
localism as a commitment to a different kind of hierarchy that upends hierarchies of 
domination and affirms liberation at the granularity of the individual. Thinking of 
decentralization as the creation of multiple local hierarchies is an ethical dead end. 
Understanding decentralization as an ecological transformation of hierarchy and a 
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reimagining of the center as the autonomous individual gets us much closer to manifesting 
liberatory futures. In short, an ecological center is always here.  
The energy democracy framework allows us to understand and critique the centralized 
hierarchy of our existing energy system, which enables domination and by definition 
removes power and opportunities for meaningful participation from local actors. 
Community choice aggregation speaks to this energy democracy approach of reimagining of 
the center in three important ways. First, CCA devolves decision-making powers from 
corporate bureaucracies to local governing bodies, thereby decentralizing and relocalizing 
control. This creates conditions for self-direction, but is still insufficient. Second, it allows 
the participation of community members and local stakeholders in decisions regarding 
procurement. Insofar as CCA governing entities are set up in a truly democratic fashion, a 
question that will be engaged in my subsequent work, they can thus enable democratic 
engagement of individuals as centers. Finally, community choice aggregation takes as its 
starting point the notion that democratic, local control over decision-making processes can 
enable autonomous centers to make substantive commitments to sustainability and 
resilience that are precluded by bureaucratic decision-making practices, as will be explored 
in the next sections. In this way, CCAs can pursue novel technologies that allow for 
decentralized, local renewable generation, such as distributed energy resources (DERs). 
These technologies, centered by Fairchild and Weinrub, as well as many of my own 
participants, enable local resilience and local control over energy resources that subvert the 
bureaucratic hierarchy of the existing macrogrid and assert in its place locally-situated 
microgrids that can be owned and managed by communities. These are the aspirations 
toward energy democracy borne within community choice aggregation. 
The energy democracy framework manifested by Healy and Barry, Fairchild and 
Weinrub, and Kristov rests on several claims with rich intellectual traditions that deserve 
further elucidation. First, the energy democracy framework rests on a critique of existing 
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bureaucratic systems of governance and management, and so energy democracy framework 
claims that bureaucratic governance disempowers publics and flattens their demands to 
basic consumer interests by depoliticizing matters of public concern. Second, the energy 
democracy framework calls for decentralization, and so we must fully understand the 
importance of decentralization to democratization and recognize the practical and 
subjective benefits of the kinds of participation it makes possible. Third, the energy 
democracy framework relies on a new socio-technics that enables decentralized and 
participatory democracy, and so we must flesh out how these new ecological socio-technics 
must be built. The remainder of this literature review will turn to these claims. Finally, I 
explore under what conditions science and expertise can be mobilized in service of public 
concerns. The intention here is to distance my argument for energy democracy from naive 
claims that energy systems may be managed outside of technical expertise while exploring 
the fruitful connections between science and democracy. In sum, this section articulates the 
energy democracy framework as an important way to understand CCA as transformational 
policy that can be used to decentralize, democratize, and repoliticize our energy system, and 
to grapple with the challenges CCAs face. 
2. Bureaucracy and Ecological Modernization 
In making a positive argument for democratized and decentralized energy systems 
capable of speaking to justice concerns and enabling greater participation in public matters, 
the energy democracy framework levels a critique of the bureaucratic systems of governance 
and management that characterize the existing energy system. In this way, the energy 
democracy framework stands on the shoulders of a long intellectual tradition claiming that 
bureaucratic governance disempowers publics and flattens their demands to basic 
consumer interests by depoliticizing matters of public concern. In this section, I will begin 
to address that tradition, assessing, What are the principal characteristics and 
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dysfunctions of the existing energy system, and how does it condition the emergence of 
ecological modernization-style solutions to energy issues and the environmental 
problematique?  
I first draw from early literature that frames bureaucratic processes such as regulation 
as a method of domination, common to both state and capital formations, that resolves 
conflict by depoliticizing contradictions between private and public entities. This 
depoliticization occurs in particular through corporatist relations, of which regulation is 
itself an important manifestation, and through the reduction of homo politicus to homo 
economicus. I argue that ecological modernization is best understood genealogically as a 
liberal bureaucratic resolution of contradictions between environmental concerns and 
capitalism, and that archaeologically ecological modernization is known through policy 
maneuvers that seek to maintain existing corporatist business relations and flatten 
individuals as political agents to mere consumers. Such depoliticization and 
disempowerment is of central concern to the energy democracy framework. I conclude by 
demonstrating how, despite these machinations, citizens learn to forge alternative strategies 
to reassert their political agency. 
The prevailing California energy system exists at the intersection of centralized 
corporate and state management. Presently, the principal regulatory body for electrical 
utilities in California is the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and its 
jurisdiction spans the state’s three large IOUs: Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), Southern 
California Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) (Stokes 2015). Despite a 
weakening of utility dominance in the years following the electricity crisis of 2000-2001, 
“private utilities remain the dominant actors” in energy policy (Stokes 2015, 115), and IOUs 
and the CPUC share a history of incestuous relations that have long enabled regulatory 
capture (Stokes 2015). They are well-resourced, and they still enjoy a privileged place in 
CPUC proceedings given the history of utility consensus (Stokes 2015). Moreover, CPUC 
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resembles in certain fundamental ways the IOUs it is designed to regulate: risk averse, slow 
to change, and generally in favor of centralization. Finally, because of the complexity of 
modern policy problems, particularly in regard to energy policy, “bureaucrats are 
increasingly specialized and potentially able to dominate the policy agenda” (Stokes 2015, 
68). In many cases, bureaucrats know more about policies than legislators, meaning that 
“bureaucrats are able to use ambiguities in laws, combined with their autonomy and 
discretion, to develop rules and institutions in line with their interests” (2015, 68). In a 
word, the complexity of our energy policy system means that it practically must be governed 
by bureaucrats, the very class of actors who are most capable of manipulating law and 
removed from democratic checks. While appointments to the CPUC are made by the 
California governor and confirmed by the California Senate (Stokes 2015), normal citizens 
have little interaction with its functioning, and electoral pressures can have only secondary 
or tertiary effects on its process.  
Insofar as the energy democracy framework is concerned with making matters of public 
concern open to public critique with decentralized and democratic procedures, it stands at 
odds with the existing bureaucratic structure. Best explicated by Max Weber, bureaucracy is 
a form of rational domination founded on a consistent system of abstract rules applied to a 
given jurisdiction and driven by formal rationality ([1922] 2013). Because fundamentally 
rational domination is rule by law, the staff’s relationship to dominant structures is 
impersonal, objective, and resilient to the whims of fickle sovereigns. Because individuals 
are secure only insofar as they maintain control over their sphere of competence, the 
acquisition of increasingly specialized knowledge becomes paramount ([1922] 2013). There 
is thus a tendency for bureaucratic structures to become siloed, which in the context of 
California electricity regulation manifests as a “regulatory maze” of slow and uncoordinated 
commissions and boards (Jung 2017, 20). From here, bureaucracies also generate their own 
hierarchies based on claims to specialized knowledge, and uninitiated individuals become 
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dependent on those actors who possess greater knowledge and who can create, interpret, 
and enact law. The resultant form of domination is marked by hierarchy and relationships 
of dependence. 
Bureaucracy’s most important dysfunction vis-à-vis the energy democracy framework is 
how it enables the depoliticization of matters of public concern in favor of capital. 
Bureaucracy accomplishes this feat by becoming critical to the function of both capital and 
the state (Weber [1922] 2013), then by entwining the two. In The Civil War in France, his 
eulogy for the Paris Commune, Marx argues that in France the modern state grew to serve 
the bourgeoisie in overcoming feudalism and absolute monarchy during the French 
Revolution ([1871] 2000). At this transformative moment, “the state power assumed more 
and more the character of the national power of capital over labor, of a public force 
organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism” ([1871] 2000, 584-858). 
Here, the state served as an important mechanism for capital to enact exploitation against 
the people. More specifically, state and capital became newly entwined on an administrative 
level, and new bureaucracies were developed to aid the growth of markets abroad. Like 
Marx, Jürgen Habermas recognizes that market exchange required “strong political 
guarantees” secured through military actions and government taxation (1962, 17). Here, 
bureaucracies were fundamentally tasked with raising taxes to abet the growth of capital. 
This task required greater centralization of that administrative apparatus, and so “local 
administrations were brought under the control of the state” (1962, 18). Habermas thus 
explains that state functions were bureaucratized and centralized to aggrandize capital.  
As a mechanism for state and capital collusion, historian Ishay Landa argues that 
bureaucracy was then mobilized to crush claims for democracy by managing new 
contradictions between political and economic manifestations of liberalism (2009). Political 
liberalism concerns democracy, freedom, and equality, while economic liberalism is the 
ideological underpinning of capitalism (2009). At its start, political liberalism was essential 
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to the rise of capitalism because it asserted parliamentarianism against monarchism, or law 
against order (2009). However, insofar as those arguing for popular representation might 
want to ensure material security or rights in the workplace, for example, political liberalism 
contradicts absolute economic liberalism. From here, Landa argues that “In order to defend 
the liberal socioeconomic order from democracy and/or revolution, the bourgeoisie was 
thus driven to demote — to a lesser or greater extent — political liberalism” (Landa 2009, 
37). This contradiction between two dueling notions of liberalism is resolved by placing 
capitalism beyond the reach of political intervention (Landa 2009). This feat is 
accomplished structurally through bureaucracy. 
It is useful to put Landa’s analysis of political and economic liberalism in conversation 
with Weber’s characterization of bureaucracy. Political liberalism is attuned to democratic 
demands, while economic liberalism operates on bureaucratic logic, which for Weber is 
oriented toward procedural or formal rationality over substantive justice ([1922] 2013). 
Methods, processes, and abstract laws applied universally are the focus here, and 
“[b]ureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized,’ the more 
completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation” ([1922] 2013, 975). 
Here, such calculation “means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and 
‘without regard for persons’” ([1922] 2013, 975). This logic is fundamentally at odds with 
substantive justice, which is necessarily ethically rather than formally derived ([1922] 
2013). In this way, bureaucracy resolves the contradiction between political liberalism and 
economic liberalism in favor of abstract laws and, effectively, capitalism. And as a system of 
governance, the essence of liberalism is not democracy, but bureaucracy. 
Still, the system of abstract rules characteristic of bureaucracy does not map perfectly 
onto existing energy systems, which are often managed by what Claus Offe might call 
“neocorporatist arrangements” between private and public sector representatives (1984, 
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166). In neocorporatist arrangements, negotiation processes are carried out incestuously by 
state and capital, or public and private, entities; because these processes are incestuous and 
informal, “there is every reason for the participants to keep their delicate exchange of 
proposals, information and threats as remote as possible both from the general public eye 
and from the segmental constituencies which participants represent” (1984, 167). Decisions 
are made behind closed doors, by “selectively screening out certain potential societal 
demands” (1984, 29). Here, matters of substantive justice are resolved through technocratic 
management and concerns cannot be articulated by the public. Where bureaucracy is 
formal rule by a system of offices inclined toward centralization, technocracy is rule by 
technicians, whether formal or informal, such as in corporatist or neocorporatist 
arrangements. This technocratization and depoliticization is done in part by involving 
scientists, who “serve the function of rejecting potential claims of ‘non-experts’ to be heard” 
(1984, 168).4 For Offe, this is precisely the objective, and it is a political calculation: “by 
replacing democratic procedures of consensus building by such other methods of conflict 
resolution, government elites avoid the ‘official’ institutions of politics in a constant search 
for non-political forms of decision-making” (168). Here, matters of public concern are best 
handled behind closed doors by regulators and technocrats. In this way, while 
neocorporatism is not identical to bureaucracy, the former emerges from the incestuous 
relations of the latter, and deepens its most fundamental flaw: the depoliticization of the 
public. Just as monopoly capitalism betrays some of the formal dicta of capitalism, but is a 
logical maturation of it, neocorporatism marks a divergence from ideal bureaucracy, but is 
its consequential rot. 
Thus far, I have focused on depoliticization as accomplished structurally by bureaucracy 
and technocracy; next, I will demonstrate how depoliticization is performed ideologically by 
flattening homo politicus to homo economicus. As bureaucratic and technocratic structures 
                                                
4 This suggestion will be complicated in the “Science and Expertise” section of the literature review. 
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come to resolve contradictions between political and economic liberalism, analogous 
resolutions emerge on the level of human subjectivity as subjects are flattened into simple 
consumers, here homo economicus. While matters of human subjectivity are not yet central 
to the energy democracy framework, these insights are latent. Returning to an earlier point, 
Habermas contends that this flattening is built into the rise of capitalism. With capitalism, 
economics becomes detached from landholdings and thus the court, and as such, political 
governance became autonomous from what Marx might call social reproduction. At the 
same time that privatization of the economy meant that “each family’s individual economy 
had become the center of its existence,” while economic activity was based on a commodity 
market that relied on public, i.e. government, action such as conquest and taxation 
(Habermas 1962, 19). The crucial point here is that the only way that common people could 
understand themselves as a public was through common economic need, and the scope of 
their public-facing decisions became ultimately restricted to the economic. The result for 
Habermas is the rise of “civil society”: a public formation that is alienated from government 
itself and fundamentally economic in character.  
Throughout these transformations, important developments occurred on the level of 
human subjectivity. First, the new relationship between civil society and government 
signaled the demise of homo politico and ascension of homo economicus. While individuals 
may make claims on the public sphere of political governance, and they may use the 
rational-critical capacity of the press to argue for rights (especially to possessions), they are 
fundamentally alienated from the sphere of governance itself. Moreover, a false unity 
emerges in the public sphere from its two diverse parts: the private person, their family, 
their spirit and psychology on the one hand, and their property on the other (Habermas 
1962). Here, the bourgeois subject is a pretended universal riven with particular economic 
interest. Nowhere is this development more striking than John Locke’s dedication to “life, 
liberty, and property,” presented as a tightly-bundled set of concerns, or his 
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characterization of “life, liberty, and estate under the title of ‘possessions’” (Habermas 1962, 
56). On an ideological level, the form of liberal thought epitomized by Locke and explored 
by Habermas ends up both structuring personhood around access to possessions and 
rendering private property sacred (Landa 2009). At the same time, homo economicus 
imbues wealthy citizens with greater political power and enables greater political 
domination of the economically disempowered. In this way, depoliticization through 
economic liberalism is a political assertion. 
As the economic and the political actor are flattened into one, concerns of economic and 
social justice come to the fore and become particularly relevant to the energy democracy 
framework. Economic rights to private property are elevated to the status of political rights 
that must be protected by governments. Of course, because in keeping with economic 
liberalism these economic rights are rooted in capitalism and the formal liberty of open 
markets, economic rights to private property have nothing to do with actual material 
security, and thus these economic rights remain particular. In this way, the contradiction 
between political and economic liberalism is resolved in favor or economic liberalism 
ideologically by making property rights sacred. 
From this analysis, I have charted the emergence of bureaucratic, technocratic, and 
corporatist management practices and the flattening of homo politicus into homo 
economicus. Both strands are important in understanding the genealogy of ecological 
modernization, the dominant form of technocratic management relevant to the 
contemporary environmental problematique. In this work, I use eco-modernism as a term 
to denote on-the-ground practices, discourses, and constraints of what is known in 
scholarly work as ecological modernization. Like the relationship between the energy 
democracy framework and energy democracy simpliciter, ecological modernization informs 
eco-modernism, but has a more scholarly or theoretical orientation. Participants with 
inclinations toward eco-modernism may not be dedicated to or aware of ecological 
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modernization, but ecological modernization as a framework may be used to make sense of 
their practices and discourses. Further, ecological modernization has little salience in the 
United States in theory, but through my work in Santa Barbara, I find that eco-modernism 
is robust in practice.  
Ecological modernization suggests the resolution of environmental concerns through 
“institutional reform within modern society” (Spaargaren and Mol 1992, 323). Ecological 
modernization recognizes the institutional foundations of contemporary environmental 
concerns — in particular the industrial degradation of the sustenance base — and from 
there assume that “looking for the institutional traits that cause environmental problems 
also means investigating possible solutions to those problems via institutional reform” 
(emphasis mine; 1992, 327). Especially as presented by Joseph Huber, though ecological 
modernization critiques industrialization, solutions that depart from modernity, as defined 
as capitalistic and bureaucratic, are not entertained (1992, 336). This narrowness of scope is 
not a problem of oversight. Rather, for ecological modernization theorists, modernization 
actually delivers solutions to environmental concerns, including “the development, 
inauguration, and diffusion of new technologies that are more intelligent than the older 
ones and that benefit the environment,” or the possibility of “economizing ecology by 
placing an economic value on the third force of production: nature” (1992, 335). Spaargaren 
and Mol present an updated theory of ecological modernization that endeavors to mobilize 
state institutions to correct market forces of production and consumption, with important 
arguments in favor of understanding nature as part of everyday life (1992, 338). With these 
adjustments, ecological modernization focuses still more explicitly on using powerful 
bureaucratic institutions of the state to technocratically manage environmental concerns. 
The solutions to environmental concerns proposed by ecological modernization reside 
entirely within existing modern, institutional frameworks. For Richard York and Eugene 
Rosa, ecological modernization depends on “self-referential mechanisms” with “the 
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potential of attaining sustainability from within — a greening of business as usual — thereby 
avoiding such challenging alternatives as radical structural or value changes in society” 
(2003, 274). For Maarten Hajer, these self-referential mechanisms are precisely the point: 
institutional reforms keep the institutions running (1995). Like York and Rosa, Hajer also 
understands ecological modernization as a discourse that “recognizes the structural 
character of the environmental problematique but none the less assumes that existing 
political, economic, and social institutions can internalize the care for the environment” 
(1995, 25). Further, by merging science and finance, ecological modernization casts 
environmental protection as a positive-sum game by merging money and environment 
(1995). Environmental issues are thus depoliticized, and environmental protection becomes 
a management issue capable of resolution by experts. The defining feature of ecological 
modernization is business-as-usual, favoring just enough institutional management to keep 
essentially free market systems working. 
The problem with ecological modernization is much like the problem with using 
bureaucratic and corporatist management styles that depoliticize conflicts in other spheres. 
By relegating environmental problems to experts — scientists and technocrats — it 
disempowers publics and effectively precludes any normative discussion of environmental 
problems and solutions. For more on this, we can turn to the work of James Scott (1998). 
While Scott does not explicitly take up the issue of ecological modernization, he presents 
the same fundamental problem: modern definitions of environmental problems are both 
produced by and (seen to be best) addressed through technocratic, expert-directed bodies. 
For Scott, bureaucratized management of the environment — here through German 
scientific forestry — advances with its commodification and its strategic importance vis-a-
vis the state (1998). As new modern systems for understanding the environment work to 
strip down and simplify that environment, once-complex ecosystems face ruin (1998). 
Scott’s ultimate point is that German scientific forestry failed because it rends ecological 
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relationships. Its gaze is ultimately cycloptic, and in attempt to see all, it actually un-sees 
those webs of interaction required for a functioning ecosystem.  
While Scott’s account of technocratic environmental management ties in well with the 
longue durée of bureaucratization explicated here, Hajer remains more concerned with 
understanding ecological modernization less as a coherent worldview and more as a loose 
discursive bundle of radically distinct convergent ideas brought together through 
argumentation (1995). I argue that these understandings of ecological modernization are 
not necessarily at odds. Rather, Scott’s account provides a genealogy of ecological 
modernization, while Hajer gives us a good sense of what ecological modernization looks 
like as we find it in the world — that is to say, archaeologically. Hajer’s definition of 
ecological modernization thus converges with its on-the-ground manifestation I term eco-
modernism. Here, eco-modernism is a patchwork monster that satisfies a host of demands 
in markedly corporatist fashion and allows institutions to be mobilized to make the playing 
field work for capital. First, it provides governments plausible alternative solutions to 
environmental problems that the remedial solutions of the past failed to resolve (1995). 
Second, it allows businesses to stay solvent while paying lip service to environmental 
demands (1995). Here, maintaining existing business interests is paramount. Third, it 
deflects social contradictions associated with modernity by giving space to the idea that 
consumers need not sacrifice their amenities (1995). This feature speaks precisely to the 
demands of homo economicus explored above. Fourth, it steals the thunder from the Left of 
the environmental movement of the 1970s (1995). Control over environment problem 
framing and possible solutions arise through a longue durée of entangled emergence 
between state and capital, thus government bureaucracy and capitalist commodification — 
and increasingly complex, standardized, and abstract technologies of knowledge production 
— drive decision-making processes and condition possible discourses. Bureaucratic 
governance in contemporary times ushers up ecological modernization-style solutions to 
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environmental concerns while leaving important concerns of the energy democracy 
framework — especially normative commitments to justice and political participation — 
unresolved. 
 We can know eco-modernism on the ground as solutions to environmental problems 
that maintain existing business interests and flatten citizens to simple consumers. An 
understanding of eco-modernism through ecological modernization is essential in grappling 
with contemporary electricity regulation in California. Especially with policies such as 
community choice aggregation, policy solutions are framed as a means to achieve 
environmental ends while remaining committed to free market ideologies of choice, which 
serve to protect existing business interests and appease all actors at the table. In this 
section, I have endeavored to place these eco-modernist commitments in the context of the 
long history of bureaucratization that depoliticizes matters of public concern and flattens 
citizens to consumers, and thus robbing them of political agency. In the body of this work, I 
will show how commitments to eco-modernist tactics of management become so many 
fetters on aspirations toward energy democracy and the substantive commitments to local 
resilience and environmental sustainability to be won therein. 
Energy democracy is opposed to ecological modernization in several important ways. 
First, with eco-modernist solutions state and capital interests endeavor to maintain existing 
business interests, often through the maintenance of regulatory and corporatist relations. 
Energy democracy is oriented instead toward a critique of prevailing state and capital 
powers and seeks to replace them with democratic and local alternatives. Second, where 
eco-modernism protects and privileges the citizen qua consumer while evacuating 
movements of their oppositional edge, energy democracy seeks to cultivate political efficacy 
within communities and community members by creating new structures whereby people 
can advocate for their complex set of interests. The conflict between energy democracy and 
eco-modernism are of particular importance to the study of community choice aggregation, 
  50 
since CCA contains both energy democracy aspirations and eco-modernist policy 
constraints that jeopardize the program’s radical potential. 
3. Participatory Governance 
In California, the CCA movement has the potential to mount another kind of resistance 
against far-off bureaucracy, and the depoliticization of matters of public concern, by 
enabling participation in questions of production, distribution, and consumption of energy. 
Modesty is necessary here, as CCA still submits to the CPUC, and the kinds of governing 
structures implemented by CCAs might prove to be just as byzantine and bureaucratic as 
the current arrangement. At the same time, CCAs are an important opportunity for 
communities to restructure how they engage with some of the most important public 
decisions that are being made in this time of ecological collapse. Reading Habermas now, it 
is painful to think about that rational-critical moment that existed with political liberalism, 
briefly, at the birth of civil society. We saw the light, just as the door was shut and political 
liberalism was overwhelmed by its economic consort. Now, another such door is opening. 
What will we make of this moment?  
The previous section demonstrated the principal dysfunctions with bureaucratic 
governance and traced the connections between bureaucracy and ecological modernization 
while showing how these critiques are relevant to an energy democracy framework. Next, 
this literature review will substantiate the second claim crucial to an energy democracy 
framework: that participation is good, practically and intrinsically, and that 
decentralization is crucial to cultivating democratic participation. Here, democracy is 
understood not as going to the polls, rule by majority, electing representatives, but as 
governance by and for the people, with essential commitments to equality and consensus 
(Woodruff 2006). In this section, I will address, What are the practical and subjective 
benefits of participation, as hindered by bureaucratization, and how does decentralization 
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enable democratic participation? To explore this issue further, the literature review will 
turn to the work of Paul Goodman and Richard Flacks. Here, participatory models of 
governance are necessary normatively and strategically, and the everyday becomes the 
center of oppositional and liberatory political reassertion. Further, decentralized politics 
becomes necessary for participatory models of governance, as demonstrated throughout 
black liberationist, black feminist, and black ecofeminist work.  
Paul Goodman emphasizes decentralized politics as a requirement for social 
experimentation and individual subjective development (1965). Like Habermas, Offe, and 
Scott, Goodman begins his work People or Personnel? by arguing that trends toward 
centralization and bureaucratization has caused a general sense of powerlessness in mid-
century America: “In the political spectrum from the Left to Right, all shades share the 
belief in top-down management” (1965, 28). While conservatives leave public matters up to 
corporations, liberals put their faith in government bureaucracies (1965). Rights are 
secured, while freedoms are eschewed, and problem definitions and solutions are managed 
by centralized organizations.  
Goodman’s next move is to trace the emergence of this contemporary state of 
powerlessness through American history with an eye toward junctures where things might 
not have turned out this way. He brings attention to how the American Revolution was 
preceded by an era marked by “community-anarchy” where matters of public concern were 
determined by bodies “in frequent personal contact with those who initiated and decided” 
(1965, 32). These small government formations were decentralized and participatory. Such 
models benefitted the free development of those communities in two important ways. First, 
because each community was able to manage itself, there was the possibility for social 
experimentation. Goodman quotes James Madison on this point, who wrote, “each 
autonomous unit can experiment; if the experiment fails, only a small community is hurt, 
and the others can help out; if the experiment succeeds, it can be imitated to everybody’s 
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advantage” (1965, 34). Community self-determination opens the possibility that such social 
experiments can be pursued. Second, communities might welcome the advice of experts, 
and those experts might be more honest in their assessments (1965). This point might have 
particular relevance to the matter of CCAs, where communities will still need expert 
opinions in these matters. But here experts could be liberated from bureaucratic structures, 
and their employment and status might not be connected to managing problems within a 
narrow scope of conflict articulation. In a word, free-floating experts might make more 
honest calls, and people might be more inclined to listen.  
Here, Goodman also develops creative individualism as his chief normative concern, 
which for him is assailed in every facet of twentieth century political life as we are 
subordinated to massive administrative bodies. While he does not invoke homo politicus 
and homo economicus, Goodman points to a similar distinction between people and 
personnel, or between the kind of subjectivity that develops, on the one hand, when people 
are able to participate in the political structuring of their lives and, on the other, when that 
possibility is stripped from them. Describing life in community-anarchy, Goodman writes, 
“Historical conditions were for men to act in, and men could act” (1965, 35). This point fits 
well within Hegelian and Marxist conceptions of subjectivity (Marx [1844] 2000; Hegel 
[1807] 1977). For Marx as Hegelian, active engagement and interaction with the world — in 
a word, work — entails the transformation of the subject and the ongoing emergence of 
their subjectivity (Dunayevskaya 1958). Goodman thus brings humanism into his analysis 
of participatory governance. 
Participatory governance promotes the creative expression of individualism through 
collective work, and the loss of selfhood through bureaucracy lies at the heart of Goodman’s 
critique of centralization. Centralization and bureaucratization, working in tandem in the 
history of the California energy system, rend people’s ability to shape their own political 
futures. What has been forestalled is a richer sense of individualism. Now, to achieve this 
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creative individualism, people must break from conventional social life. Looking to 
American intellectual traditions for inspiration, Goodman argues that Transcendentalism 
and Populism both recognize how contemporary political forms do not permit creative 
expression of individualism, and so they seek to break from these forms, either through 
deeper cultivation of self or through oppositional politics.  
For Goodman, once people are taken out of the process of governance, once the 
community meetinghouse is no longer the site of their subjective development, the people 
effectively lose the reins of history: “Trapped in a system, people carry on functions often 
fraught with colossal or catastrophic consequences without being personally engaged in the 
functions at all” (1965, 76). The transformation from agential democratic citizens to simple 
cogs in an administrative apparatus is the denaturation of people to personnel (1965, 76). 
For Goodman, the best means for refashioning ourselves as actors is by seizing action in the 
everyday. He writes, “In my opinion, precisely the simpler matters — housing, shopping, 
being informed, and making a living — are the most important matters, and I set a high 
value on democratic initiative and deciding” (1965, 155). For Goodman, the everyday must 
be the site of self-actualization and the reclamation of participatory politics. 
In his work Making History: The American Left and the American Mind, Flacks argues 
that the project of reclaiming homo politicus must take the everyday as a starting point for 
transformative change (1988). First, political engagement through the standard channels of 
representative government is a nonstarter for many Americans, as the process is often 
alienating (1988). Moreover, like Offe, Flacks recognizes that for most Americans, politics is 
not the dominant arena of conflict articulation, nor is it a necessary part of the American 
conception of freedom (1988). Here, it is a commitment to everyday life — that zenith of 
American liberty — that grounds popular historical intervention (1988). Flacks describes 
two broad categories of popular historical intervention that proceed from the everyday: 
resistance and liberation. Resistance manifests against perceived threats to everyday life, 
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such as against enclosures and foreclosures, wage cuts and plant closings, commodity 
shortages and evictions, police crackdowns and toxic spills (1988). In contrast, liberation 
movements emerge not out of a desire to protect everyday life, but aspirationally to 
establish a new kind of everyday by claiming and achieving rights not now provided (1988). 
Each kind of movement encounters an important paradox: resistance requires that actors 
defer everyday life in its defense, while liberation requires “daily assertiveness” to achieve 
the extraordinary (1988, 82).  
Both resistance and liberation movements cultivate actors’ political consciousness by 
making them aware “that the gap between history making and the everyday can be closed” 
(1988, 86). For Flacks, this is paramount to democracy, the essence of which is nothing 
short of “a social arrangement in which the gap between history and everyday life is 
permanently closed” (1988, 87). Closing this gap occurs when people recognize the power of 
insurrectionary politics and claim the ability to make history “in and through their everyday 
lives” (1988, 87). Flacks’s argument is paradoxical in that “‘commitment to everyday life’ is 
the basis not only of political withdrawal but of mass political participation as well” (1988, 
90). This move is profound because it both acknowledges the concerns of Frankfurt School 
theorists who bemoan the narcissism and one-dimensionality of private consumer life while 
salvaging the ideal of liberty as a legitimate political currency as we consider political 
participation.  
An affirmation of homo politicus necessitates a focus on everyday matters, but it also 
necessitates decentralization and localism. A program of localism would require the power 
to set problem definitions and solutions be devolved on localities, effectively keeping 
centralized bureaucracies off our backs in setting the parameters of social change (1988). In 
this way, like Goodman, Flacks advocates “a politics of decentralization” (1988, 266). Here, 
“the appropriate goal is to build a politics that seeks, over time, to return historical initiative 
to self-organized communities” (1988, 266). Rather than competing for national elites for 
  55 
control over history, or seeing history “controlled by elites whose actions are checked only 
by desperate assemblies of people in the streets,” history-making is moved to the everyday 
(1988, 266). What Flacks calls for here is not some kind of clamoring for recognition from 
far-away and high-up powers, but a fundamental reconfiguration of the political such that 
local, particular actors are actually in positions of political decision-making. In this way, 
Flacks’s work lays the theoretical foundations for the kind of ecological re-centering 
advocated by energy democracy framework scholar Lorenzo Kristov: power structures are 
not just distributed but upended and overturned. 
In his work, Goodman works to draw out and affirm those moments in history when 
decentralization and participation were achingly available, urging us to look to the 
neglected counter-movements, to the powerful who crumbled, to those who seem to have 
dropped out of history. The heroes of the Russian Revolution were not Bolsheviks, but 
“peasants, guerrillas, and mutinous sailors”; the Spanish Civil War was made by “peasants 
and miners, but it was stopped by liberals, communists, and fascists”; provincial towns 
organized society when freed from Paris after the French Revolution; the Articles of 
Confederation need not have been followed by the Constitution (1965, 151). The crucial 
point is, things must not have been this way. By affording our pasts a kind of conscious 
determination, we often trim the wild frays of our pasts so that all strands braid neatly into 
our present moment. But by imbuing history with such inevitability, we lose the sense of 
what other paths may have yielded. There have been times in our past when we were able to 
cultivate participatory models of governance, when we could be powerful as citizens, and we 
could have followed those paths further. Trapped as we are in bureaucratic thinking, 
surrounded by bigness and stripped of our power, Goodman acknowledges the difficulty of 
imagining life without administration. Here, Goodman anticipates Thatcher’s phrase, 
“There is no alternative.” But he also calls back Marx with the line that will remind any 
Marxist of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: “For us, it is only after we have 
  56 
gotten out of the interlocking system that we will be able to see how much of it is 
unnecessary” (1965, 154). Before we can become independent, we need to be able to 
imagine ourselves standing on our own two feet. 
For those on the Left, “there is no alternative” has taken a novel form in the rejection of 
certain participatory movements, especially those that adopt exodus as a tactic of creating 
the conditions for participatory governance, as petit bourgeois or exclusively white and 
middle class. While Goodman writes largely to a white middle class audience as a rhetorical 
strategy to bring anarchist ideas to centrists and conservatives, his work also highlights the 
importance of decentralization and localism to marginalized communities. In Goodman’s 
work, the safety of black communities of the Jim Crow American South becomes an 
argument for local control. Against the clamor of praise for Eisenhower’s heroism in Little 
Rock, Goodman argues that the charity of centralized powers did not create stability or 
democracy in the South — only local control of black communities by black communities 
could achieve that: “If each locality indeed had its option, the counties where Negroes are in 
the majority would have very different rules! And they would provide a meaningful choice 
for other Negroes to move to” (1965, 13). Insofar as marginalized communities strive to 
carve out sites where they can practice autonomy through participatory governance, they 
are often attacked by hegemonic, centralized forces, as has been witnessed in tragic events 
ranging from the destruction of Rosewood, Florida, Black Wall Street, and the headquarters 
of MOVE in Philadelphia. Other exodus movements such as the Kurdish independence 
movement in Rojava and the EZLN in Chiapas assert participatory self-governance and 
models of democratic confederalism (Öcalan 2007) and autonomous municipalism inspired 
by indigenous and anarchist tactics of exodus and localism (Marcos 2006).  
The concept that self-governance is essential to the development of self-consciousness, 
particularly for marginalized communities, is perhaps nowhere more prominent than in 
post-colonial black liberation literature and contemporary movements for the creation of 
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safe spaces for women and queer folx. Frantz Fanon, whose work has been immeasurably 
important to the field of black radicalism, black separatism, post-colonialism, and African 
socialist humanism, argues against the universalizing humanism characteristic of some 
European socialisms and instead advocates that particularism and national self-
determination must precede universal humanism (1963). Recognizing that a history of 
brutal oppression of the African continent and the imposition of a global color line cannot 
be waved away in a flash of goodwill, Fanon argues that one cannot "skip the national 
period," that of "national consciousness” (1963, 179). Instead, “[t]he consciousness of self is 
not the closing of a door to communication. Philosophic thought teaches us, on the 
contrary, that it is its guarantee. National consciousness, which is not nationalism, is the 
only thing that will give us an international dimension.” (1963, 179). In a word, self-
consciousness must be developed on its own terms if the people are to meaningfully govern 
themselves and engage genuinely with broader human struggles.  
A similar point is made by Patricia Hill Collins, who argues that “emancipatory social 
movements have invoked the language of community as a powerful tool to challenge social 
inequalities” (Collins 2009, 10). Moreover, spaces of community — ranging from kitchens to 
Black churches to freedom schools — are not apolitical, but “may lie at the heart of politics 
itself” and “constitute sites of political engagement and contestation” (Collins 2009, 10, 12). 
In a word, communities are an important organizing principle, especially for marginalized 
groups. This point is perhaps nowhere more clear than in the conception of the “safe space,” 
which is essentially a zone where marginalized peoples, especially people of color, women, 
and queer folx, can find refuge so that they may develop their self-consciousness and affirm 
their capacity for self-emancipation. Safe spaces, “represent places where black women 
could freely examine issues that concern us…[and] constitute one mechanism among many 
designed to foster Black women’s empowerment and enhance our ability to participate in 
social justice projects” (Collins 1990, 110). Safe spaces, home to “relatively safe discourse” is 
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“a necessary condition for Black women’s resistance” insofar as “they form prime locations 
for resisting objectification as the Other” (Collins, 1990, 101). Here, finding spaces of 
exodus for the development of self-consciousness actually combats othering as it occurs in 
hegemonic, dominant spaces. Crucially, “as strategies, safe spaces rely on exclusionary 
practices, but their overall purpose most certainly aims for a more inclusionary, just 
society” (Collins 1990 110). Here again, autonomy is essential for the development of 
liberated self-consciousness. 
Exodus movements that creates sites for meaningful participation speak to a broad set 
of problems that marginalized communities have been forced to confront creatively by 
fashioning local alternatives. In her work on women’s black community farms in Detroit, 
Monica White brings ecofeminism into conversation with the literature on safe spaces and 
demonstrates the importance of participatory, interactive spaces to resilience and self-
determination in the context of food security (2011). Here, gardening becomes a “strategy of 
resistance, one that demonstrates self-determination and political agency” (2011, 19). 
Autonomous community control over food sources ensures greater food security, especially 
for marginalized peoples. What’s more, ecological interactions with the rest of the biotic 
community of the earth becomes “an ally in the struggle for liberation because it provides a 
living learning space and refuge for communities that experience racial and economic 
apartheid” (2011, 19). This ecofeminist insight will become even more important as the 
conversation regarding participatory self-governance is brought to bear on people’s 
interaction with ecology, discussed more fully in the next section. 
This section has demonstrated the importance of participatory repoliticization and 
democratization through decentralization as both a practical strategy for enabling social 
experimentation and as essential for human subjective development. I have also shown how 
participation and decentralization can address problems of hierarchy, oppression, and 
othering, against the common assertion that localism facilitates domination. This 
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conversation is critical to a fuller appreciation of the energy democracy framework, which 
rests on the claim that participation is good, strategically and intrinsically, and which 
emphasizes decentralized technological and social-organizational transformations as a 
pathway toward more just futures. 
4. Social Ecology 
As we attend to the construction, in theory and in practice, of participatory 
organizations and communities, it is important to consider how to prevent these new social 
entities from becoming parodies of the centralized, bureaucratic systems that they are 
designed to subvert. This section asks, What are some of the principles that can guide the 
development of decentralized and participatory democratic organizations? To address 
this question, the literature review turns to social ecology, with a particular emphasis on 
Murray Bookchin, and argues that ecological principles of “unity in diversity” and “natural 
spontaneity” may be useful in constructing a libertarian technic, or a new social 
organization that is not founded on domination, that enables human flourishing, and that is 
organized around participatory consociation between human and non-human worlds. 
Bookchin’s work has important resonances with ecofeminism, such as that which inspired 
Monica White’s work on urban gardening. From this vantage point, we can move from 
critiques of prevailing energy systems to considering how, and with what values, new 
systems can be asserted. Here, Robert Thayer, Jr.’s discussion of bioregionally-distributed 
and publicly-owned utilities anticipates community choice aggregation. Here, social ecology 
can deepen our understanding of the energy democracy framework and further sharpen our 
critique of bureaucracy.  
Social ecology begins as a method of analyzing ecological crisis and becomes a project to 
discover more ecological models of social organization. Here, ecology is understood in Ernst 
Haeckel’s meaning, as communicated by Bookchin, as the study of complex interactions 
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between organic and inorganic entities (2004). Social ecology hopes to explain social and 
environmental crises in terms of ecological ruptures (Eiglad 2015). Rather than claiming 
that the ecological crisis is purely a matter of greenhouse gas emissions, or even simply a 
logical manifestation of capitalism, Bookchin understands ecological crisis as the result of a 
ruinous attempt by hierarchical human systems to gain mastery over nature for 
management and extraction. As humans commodify and order nature to their will, “the 
sovereignty of nature” cracks back and instructs that hierarchy cannot be had without 
consequence (2004, 21). It is from here that ecology gains its “critical edge”: the realization 
that environmental problems are ecological problems, having to do with ailing webs of 
interaction, demonstrates that ecological solutions must be found in the reorganization of 
the social world. Bookchin’s principal contribution to social ecology is his argument that 
hierarchy is anti-ecological; his principal aim is to understand the social from an ecological 
perspective and thus arrive at practicable solutions to ecological crises.  
Toward manifesting such solutions, Bookchin argues that social ecological 
reorganization rests on the principles of unity of diversity, which speaks to social freedom, 
and natural spontaneity, oriented toward autonomous self-direction. These principles, 
which speak to two forms of freedom, will be taken up in turn. Bookchin borrows Hegel’s 
phrase “unity of diversity” to describe ecosystems wherein “living things are interdependent 
and play complementary roles in perpetuating the stability of the natural order” (2005, 69). 
These unities are not totalitarian or functionalist, as in Durkheimian organicism, nor do 
they become the “spectral ‘oneness’ that yields cosmic dissolution in a structureless 
nirvana” (2005, 87). Instead, these unities are oriented toward transformation, which 
occurs through interactions within an ecosystem. As diverse actors within unified 
ecosystems interact, those ecosystems develop “through highly complex phases of 
evolution,” making and remaking their subjectivity (2005, 86). Interaction between 
complex and diverse entities is crucial not only for the development and transformation of 
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living things in ecological relations, but is also essential for the stability or resilience of an 
ecosystem. First, diversity enables mutualistic relations that stabilize ecosystems. Next, 
complexity makes for robust ecosystems that are resistance to shifts in population (2005, 
91). Stable, resilient ecological and social systems rely on diversity and interaction. In this 
way, ecology “decisively challenges the very function of hierarchy as a stabilizing or ordering 
principle,” asserting horizontal interactions in its place (2005, 102). 
Natural spontaneity, which forms another ecological tenet, necessitates and speaks to 
autonomy and self-direction (2005, 89). Interaction within an ecosystem requires rich 
articulation of its diverse parts, and it drives toward increasing complexity (2005, 87). 
Diversity is both an output of ecological interaction and its requirement. Autonomy is a 
necessary prerequisite to diversity, since entities must be free to develop in those ways they 
see fit to change and become different. Though somewhat anthropomorphized language is 
used here, consider a non-human case and the same truth emerges. Imperfect genetic 
transmission from parent to offspring provides the building blocks for natural selection. 
And while natural selection is sometimes understood as a harsh discipliner of aberrant 
mutations, what lives and what dies is shaped by natural anarchy as well as by fitness. For 
Bookchin, this spontaneous and self-directed change is the only legitimate form of change, 
for otherwise coercion becomes the motor of transformation. Bookchin warns, for example, 
that “where forced social changes were not nourished by an educated and informed popular 
consciousness, they were eventually enforced by terror” (2005, 101). This critique of 
coercion is crucial to the conversation regarding community choice aggregation, which 
shifts power away from centralized regulators. Centralized regulation at the level of the state 
is necessarily coercive, even when we agree with its substance. Sometimes local actors 
might concur with the commands of centralized authorities, but this convergence will only 
ever be incidental to the machinations of centralized power.  
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Creating social and ecological systems that cultivate interaction through unity of 
diversity and differentiation through natural spontaneity demands a revolutionary social 
transformation of technics. Technics is simply applied knowledge that in turn shapes the 
knower, and can be more or less libertarian, more or less authoritarian. The significant 
concern of technics is “its ties with the ideals and social structures of freedom” (2005, 326). 
In a word, how do our technologies of social organization make or unmake our (social and 
autonomous) freedom? Authoritarian systems bear an “institutional technics” characterized 
by “the effectiveness with which those technics reduced their animate subjects, their vast 
armies of peasants and slaves, to utterly inanimate objects” (2005, 327). Here Bookchin 
speaks to the longue durée of priestly corporations, bureaucracies, monarchies, militaries, 
and public works comprised of coordinated labor: the “megamachine” (2005, 327). Because 
they are essentially hierarchical, institutional technics are incapable of manifesting 
ecological interactions. Thus, technological fixes to ecological problems that do not at once 
transform social structures fail to meaningfully address the basic ecological problematique: 
domination. On this point, Bookchin devastates programs that we might now regard as eco-
modernist: “An environmentalistic technocracy is hierarchy draped in green garments; 
hence it is all the more insidious because it is camouflaged in the color of ecology” (2005, 
409). Elsewhere he writes, “Like flowers in a dreary wasteland, they will provide the colors 
and scents that obscure a clear and honest vision of the ugliness around us, the putrescent 
regression to an increasingly elemental and inorganic world that will no longer be habitable 
for complex forms of life and ecological ensembles” (2005, 355). The purpose of our 
technologies cannot be to mask fundamental problems of domination. 
Against these institutional technics, which should remind the reader of Spaargarden 
and Mol’s insistence on institutional reforms as a salve for environmental concerns, 
Bookchin champions libertarian technics. Achieving a libertarian technics would 
necessitate “a radical inversion of all social and productive relationships” and its 
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reconstitution along ecological lines (2005, 329). They must be crafted according to “the 
social ends that they are meant to serve, the ethics and sensibilities by which they are 
guided and integrated, and the institutional challenges and changes they involve” (2005, 
409). In this sense, the revolutionary promise of libertarian technics is nothing short of the 
richly articulated interaction of ecological communities, teeming with active substance 
seeking and affirming subjectivity (2005, 354). Libertarian technics allow us “to be 
organisms,” “integrated to create highly interactive, animate and inanimate constellation in 
which every component forms a supportive part of the whole” (2005, 354). In a practical 
sense, libertarian technics entail technologies that remain close to local ecosystems, are 
concrete (2005, 402), and affirm the integrity of the human community (2005, 347). 
Moreover, these libertarian technics emphasize principles of participatory governance 
championed by Goodman and Flacks.  
As Bookchin begins to construct a positive vision of libertarian technics, he foregrounds 
the need for consociation against hierarchy built on “cooperation, mutual support, and 
love” that is biologically constituted (2005, 413). To put a finer point on it, we need each 
other to survive. We are social creatures, and we are able to seize our development as 
individuals only insofar as we engage interactively, ecologically, and with mutual trust and 
aid with those around us. As such, Bookchin’s social ecological systems are “peopled” in that 
interactions are humanly scaled, particular, local, and rich with human character (2005, 
435). Communities would form in “culturally distinct neighborhoods,” goods and services 
would be exchanged alongside gossip, the means of subsistence would be close at hand, and 
decisions would be made, carried out, and reexamined reflexively (2005, 433). Moreover, 
these social ecologies would center politics and spirited engagement rather than “the 
delegation of power and spectatorial politics” (435). Human-scale, diverse communities 
that are freely chosen cultivate involvement in decision-making processes. The choice to 
engage in public matters is the benchmark of citizenship and enhances the human spirit.  
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This call for diverse and non-hierarchical, consociative and self-directed communities 
anticipate the energy democracy framework. Such human-scaled technologies would 
require “the need for direct democracy, for urban decentralization, for a high measure of 
self-sufficiency, for self-empowerment based on communal forms of social life — in short, 
the nonauthoritarian Commune composed of communes” (2004, 66). From here, Bookchin 
sketches a blueprint for how locales can work in cooperation and coalition intentionally 
without centralizing authority or obscuring the particular needs of concrete actors. In a 
section that anticipates Kristov’s model of ecological hierarchies of energy system 
organization, Bookchin suggests that communes should be knit together not into states but 
into larger scale Communes, “networked confederally through ecosystems, bioregions, and 
biomes” so that “ethnic parochialism and political exclusivity” may be avoided while 
maintaining communal autonomy (2005, 444). With this basic framework in place, the rest 
should be left up to the arbitration of individual communities in relation to their tastes, 
ecosystems, and active deliberation. Here, consociation is organized around groups chosen 
based on affinity and “consciously cultivated relationships,” rather than on restrictive and 
parochial blood ties (2005, 443). The possibility for people to choose their communities by 
relocating would also be important.  
As people choose communities based on affinity, it is worth engaging the problem of 
othering vis-à-vis outsiders and repression vis-à-vis insiders. These problems 
fundamentally emerge from hierarchy and domination, which communities of consociation 
are designed to avoid. However, it would be naive to suggest that violent exclusion and 
repression do not occur in decentralized communities. At the same time, it is worth noting 
that centralization actually makes problems of othering more dire. In centralized systems, 
such as a state, those who do not find resonance with their communities are not afforded 
the chance to build their own communities outside the orbit of existing powers (Scott 1998; 
Anderson 2006). Moreover, centralized systems bring with them advanced methods of 
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management that enable dominant powers to more effectively repress aberrant individuals 
and communities (Foucault 1977). The insight that oppression requires a coercive apparatus 
dates back at least to Rousseau, who argued in The Social Contract that slavery in the state 
of nature would be impossible without a legal apparatus and police force (Rousseau [1762] 
1947). The repression of people of color, femmes, immigrants, and queers in America was 
made possible not simply through the parochialism of the white-cis-hetero-patriarchy from 
the bottom-up, but more importantly by prisons, the police, housing restrictions, 
inaccessible health care, subsidies to polluting corporations, and many more institutions 
and processes bound up in the centralizing power of state and capital formations. In 
contrast, communities founded on affinity and free of management by centralized 
institutions can be porous, so that community members who seek affinity elsewhere are free 
to do so (Goodman 1965). 
From here, it is also worth considering how Bookchin imagines these consociative 
communities should engage with the non-human world. First, Bookchin is no primitivist. 
This is not because Bookchin does not desire a more naturalistic way of life, but because the 
characterization of nature as primitive gets nature entirely wrong. After all, nature is flux, 
and for Bookchin “we slander the natural world when we deny its activity, striving, 
creativity, and development as well as its subjectivity” (2005, 411). Nature is not something 
to return to, as though nature existed in our past, nor is naturalization about living with less 
than we do now. To the contrary, humanity does not exist in a state of real scarcity, but an 
artificial scarcity created by capitalism (2005, 349). Thus, insofar as Bookchin does 
advocate our naturalization, that nature is neither “drugged” (2005, 411) nor “stingy” 
(2005, 349), but defined by ecological relationships. As such, communities would “obey 
nature’s ‘law of return’” and be oriented toward the “fabrication of use-values” within 
natural limits (2005, 444).  
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To build and work within ecological limits, Bookchin advocates for “new technology 
scaled to comprehensible human dimensions,” including “small solar and wind 
installations, organic gardens, and the use of local ‘natural resources’ worked by 
decentralized communities” (2004, 66). Decentralized economies would aid in this venture, 
since “a relatively self-sufficient community, visibly dependent on its environment for the 
means of life, would gain a new respect for the organic interrelationships that sustain it” 
(2004, 38). Those who work with the land “must develop [their] sensitivity to the land’s 
possibilities and needs while [they] become an organic part of the agricultural situation” 
(2004, 32). Because such sensitivity requires that interactions are devolved to the human 
scale, decentralization is a requirement of such attunement (2004). To borrow a phrase 
from another school of thought, knowledge is always situated (Haraway 1988), and 
knowledge is required for sustainable interaction with the rest of nature.  
The same principle of diversification and attunement to natural settings applies to 
electrification, as well. Bookchin imagines an electrical grid “pieced together as a mosaic, as 
an organic energy pattern developed from the potentialities of a region” (2004, 33). “In 
sunny latitudes, we could rely more heavily on solar energy...in areas marked by 
atmospheric turbulence, we could rely more heavily on wind devices; and in suitable coastal 
areas or inland regions with a good network of rivers, the great part of our energy would 
come from hydroelectric installations” (2004, 33). By diversifying our energy mix, we can 
gain independence from harmful fuels and power decentralized communities according to 
what nature offers. One of the most important technologies associated with community 
choice aggregation is just such a subversion of the prevailing macrogrid, which separates 
sites of generation from sites of end-use. As will be explored in the first chapter of this work, 
CCAs can enable greater development of local renewable generation, such as community 
microgrids or distributed energy resources (DERs). In this way, local control is used to 
implement local energy sourcing, siting, and end-use. These new systems can not only be 
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comprised of locally-available generation sources, depending on the climate, but can be 
built to serve local economies and needs. These possibilities resonate with the energy 
democracy framework’s emphasis on economic and environmental resilience through 
decentralization and democratization of energy systems. 
The field of social ecology has important affinities with ecofeminism, such as that 
presented by White in the previous section of this literature review.5 In the words of Ynestra 
King, a champion of both social ecology and ecofeminism, “both feminism and ecology 
embody the revolt of nature against human domination. They demand we rethink the 
relationship between humanity and the rest of nature, including our natural, embodied 
selves” (1989, 132). Ecofeminism puts women and the exploitation of women at the core of 
the ecological problematique. First, the exploitation of women here is wrapped up in the 
capitalist exploitation of the earth, and the vulnerability of women is exacerbated by 
ecological calamity (White 2011). But women and the environment share more than an 
analogous story of abuse and victimization — for ecofeminism, ecological resilience and 
women’s resilience share a positive dialectical relationship. Women have been on the 
frontlines of abuse, but also on the frontlines of resistance (White 2011, 18). Insofar as 
women fight for the ability to interact ecologically with the rest of the biotic community, 
ecological resilience and women’s self-determination are mutually fortified. White’s work 
emphasizes this point well in the context of urban gardening in Detroit: “Black women, in 
this case, engage the environmental and transform vacant land into urban/community 
gardens and, in so doing, these spaces operate as a safe space where they are able to define 
their behavior as a form of resistance, one in which their resistance is against the social 
                                                
5 While much has been made of the contradictions between social ecology and ecofeminism (Gruen 
1992), I argue that the most compelling currents within each school are compatible and 
complementary. Differences have been promulgated unnecessarily by Janet Biehl, a social ecologist 
writing in the legacy of Bookchin. Biehl maligns ecofeminism’s use of goddess mythology, which is 
not today an important strand of ecofeminism (Gruen 1992). In her work “Social Ecology and ‘The 
Man Question’,” Ariel Salleh argues that while Biehl’s attack on ecofeminism has driven a wedge 
between these two schools, Bookchin’s work is actually quite close to ecofeminism (Salleh 1996). 
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structures that have perpetuated inequality” (White 2011, 18). Here, interactive, 
collaborative relationships with their environments become a means to carve out self-
determination and self-efficacy and break out of relationships of domination vis-a-vis class, 
race, and gender. Because both social ecology and feminism employ the critical edge of 
ecology as a way to understand toxic relationships of domination and chart paths toward 
liberation, both perspectives are essential in forming libertarian technics of social and 
infrastructural technologies.  
With these social ecological and ecofeminist commitments in place, it is worth exploring 
briefly one key way that scholars have identified that we may decentralize our energy 
systems ecologically. In his work LifePlace: Bioregional Thoughts, Robert Thayer, Jr., 
advocates a reconstitution of the local bioregionally, according to natural habitats (2003). 
Like Bookchin, he argues that technologies of transportation and transmission — of water, 
electricity, and people — have made possible dramatic disconnections between human and 
non-human worlds, which “leads directly to the exaggeration of the scale of human 
infrastructure and to the extraction of resources at rates far in excess of rates of natural 
regeneration” (2003, 8). Like Bookchin, Thayer recognizes that without a good deal of 
interaction with local habitats, sustainable and ecological interactions are jeopardized. 
Situating resource and economic activity sources close to end use here provides an 
important correction. Insofar as ecological crisis results from “the sheer displacement of 
resource and economic activity sources from end uses” (2003, 121), bioregional 
autonomous self-governance and self-determination can make for more resilient and 
sustainable interactions between humans and their natural environments by internalizing 
costs and harvesting at sustainable rates (2003, 124).  
Thayer brings this conversation to bear on the California electrical grid and claims that a 
bioregional approach to electrical systems enables both more efficient and sustainable 
policies. Thayer remarks that “the electrical power delivery system is notoriously inefficient 
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[...] Nearly two-thirds is lost in transmission-line reductions, conversion inefficiencies, and 
waste heat” (2003, 129). These inefficiencies are due in large part to the vast distances 
power must often travel in California due to the geographic remove of use from source. 
Alternatively, Thayer argues that “locally controlled utilities are more apt to facilitate 
source-to-end-use matching of energy, with the result that greater efficiencies in production 
versus use can be achieved” (2003, 133). The premise here is that local needs are best 
expressed, recognized, and met within bioregions. While Thayer does not reference 
community choice aggregation in particular, his vision is a stunning approximation of the 
movement currently under discussion. Thayer anticipates the movement toward 
community choice aggregation by explicating these characteristics of a “truly relocalized, 
‘bioregional’ energy system” (2003, 134). 
Bookchin concludes his work with the assertion that libertarian technics “can tolerate 
no disjunction between ends and means: “Direct action, so integral to the management of a 
future society, has its parallel in the use of direct action to change society. Communal forms, 
so integral to the structure of a future society, have their parallel in the use of communal 
forms — collectives, affinity groups, and the like — to change society” (2005, 446-447). The 
goal of liberation requires the process of liberation. This literature review has explored 
works that emphasize the moral and practical arguments for structuring our communities 
around participatory governance. Direct engagement and communal life are crucial to both 
individual creative development and communal resilience. These guidelines for building 
liberatory social organizations and mending ruptured ecological relationships deeply inform 
the energy democracy framework and should be considered throughout the conversation 
about community choice aggregation to follow. 
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5. Science and Expertise 
The thrust of this literature review has been to argue for an energy democracy 
framework and advocate for its usefulness in understanding the aims and conditions of 
successful CCAs. Moreover, I have emphasized democratization in energy decision-making 
procedures. This assertion would be naive if attention were not also paid to the matter of 
scientific expertise, which must be mobilized when addressing these energy system issues, 
as with any field of public concern that is intensely technical. In this section, I will ask, In 
pursuit of energy democracy, what do we need to know about the relationship between 
science and democracy to best incorporate expertise that serves the public? In offering 
some answers, this section begins with an account of how bureaucratic management of 
energy questions faces a crisis of legitimacy when removed from public participation. I then 
demonstrate how science can be mobilized by publics when faced with sluggish, 
incompetent, or nefarious state formations. In this way, I complicate facile arguments that 
science is exclusively and most typically a mechanism used by states for the purpose of 
domination: instead, governmental noninvolvement also fails to speak to public concerns. 
From here, I argue that science best serves public ends when it is locally manifested, and 
when it is directed by democratic principles of negotiation, consensus-building, and 
assertions of autonomous expertise. These themes, resonant with the energy democracy 
framework as explicated in previous sections, show how democratic principles6 can be 
mobilized to strengthen and legitimize science. 
In his work on the welfare state, Claus Offe argues that by consolidating decision-
making powers and removing avenues for public participation, technocratic institutions 
generate their own crises of legitimacy. Carol Hager develops this point in her work on the 
                                                
6 To clarify, I use the term “democratic principles,” rather than typical democratic processes, to 
clarify that an approach to science and expertise resonant with the energy democracy framework 
does not entail, for example, voting on what correct science looks like. Throughout this literature 
review, I have hoped to communicate that democracy explicitly is not reducible to majoritarianism, 
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environmental movement of the 1970s and ‘80s in West Germany. At the start of these 
movements, institutional avenues for citizen participation, such as parliament, did not 
possess the technical expertise to develop energy policy, which was determined largely by 
closed, expert-led bureaucratic structures that lied outside the reach of citizens (1995). 
Incorporating Offe, Hager argues, "the very technical complexity of these projects is used to 
justify their removal from popular influence. They are considered the territory of experts, 
removed from politics” (1995, 3). Moreover, “The new citizen groups connected 
environment with democracy; to them, destruction of the natural environment was linked 
to the nonparticipatory form of decision-making” (1995, 2). While the groups failed to win 
all their substantive goals, “as a result of the controversy the plant [in question] was scaled 
down, relocated, and equipped with the latest pollution control devices” (1995, 4). More 
importantly, “on the legitimation dimension, the legacy of the controversy is a more 
skeptical, activist, informed populace and an everyday political discussion of environmental 
matters previously reserved for technical experts. Bureaucratic encapsulation is no longer 
possible” (1995, 4). Hager demonstrates that when non-participatory policy-making bodies 
face crises of legitimacy, citizens can mount successful citizens’ campaigns through a search 
for alternative means of advocacy. 
In Slick Policy, Teresa Spezio describes another instance wherein publics assert their 
own capacity for participation, this time through the mobilization and transformation of 
science (2018). Using the context of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill, she argues that the 
spill provided a stage for scientists to test and publicize their new technologies of measuring 
pollution to other scientists and government officials (2018). While new chemical 
technologies were developed by industries in the wake of World War II, technologies of 
pollution detection and regulation that were made possible by these industrial 
developments did not immediately follow suit (2018). At the time of the Santa Barbara spill, 
                                                                                                                                                 
but is instead dependent on participation. 
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scientists were regarded by members of the local public as insufficiently objective because 
the scientists brought in to study the effects of the spill were bankrolled by the oil industry 
(2018). Moreover, they were accused of the “underuse of emerging methods” of chemical 
analysis (2018, 165). Most importantly, prevailing methodologies did not square with what 
locals were seeing and experiencing on their own beaches (2018). Concerned publics 
therefore forced scientists to use newly-developed technologies of pollution detection. Here, 
publics were able to seize science and technology for the satisfaction of public concerns over 
and above the discretion of industry. 
Spezio presents one case wherein the public mobilizes science to address matters of 
public concern; in her work on environmental governance in Chile, an archetypical 
neoliberal state lacking the capacity to generate scientific knowledge, Javiera Barandiarán 
further complicates the notion that science serves to depoliticize publics and argues that 
government noninvolvement in environmental problems fails to serve the common good 
(2018). Using Scott’s notion of the rationalizing, totalizing “empire” state as a foil, 
Barandiarán shows how the Chilean government has undermined chances of responsible 
environmental management by playing the “umpire” in matters of environmental concern 
(2018, 6). During his rule, Augusto Pinochet had incorporated the neoliberal economic 
policies of Milton Friedman, who advocated for just such an “umpire” state that would not 
dole out expertise, but “provide a means whereby we can modify the rules, to mediate the 
differences among us on the meaning of the rules, and to enforce compliance with the rules 
on the part of those few who would otherwise not play the game” (Friedman 1962, 25; from 
Barandiarán 2018, 6). This umpire state, when trained on the environmental 
problematique, captures the essential problem of ecological modernization: that institutions 
can be mobilized to make the playing field work for capital without attending to the 
common good. Barandiarán shows how the response to state-as-umpire on environmental 
questions has manifested a similar crisis of legitimacy explicated by Hager. Writing of a 
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series of protests in 2011 against a range of issues, Barandiarán summarizes, “the state 
faced a crisis of legitimacy because it lacked the capacity to answer citizens’ demands” 
(2018, 6). But this time, the state’s inability to speak to public concerns was not based in 
their technocratization of public concerns, but their inactivity vis-à-vis industrial 
despoliation.  
It is thus far too simplistic to conceive of science as either simply a tool of domination or 
empowerment; it is also insufficient to declare that science is both. As we search for ways to 
navigate matters of public concern that require scientific expertise, an energy democracy 
framework demands that we be attentive to which actors are served. To this end, 
Barandiarán argues for “cultivating ‘critical communities’ that include scientists into 
routines and procedures that allow them to participate in the vetting, probing, and making 
of state policies as well as decisions” (2018, 21). Critical communities exist within “civic 
epistemologies” (Jasanoff 2005, 249) — that is, “the institutionalized relationships between 
individuals, groups, and organizations that sustain routine procedures used to produce, 
validate, disseminate, and apply knowledge to collective decisions” (Barandiarán 2018, 30). 
Specifically, critical communities within frameworks of civic epistemologies must manifest 
at the local level. From an emphasis on place-based knowledge, Barandiarán argues that 
scientific collaborates must “recognize the importance of scientists’ cultural attachments to 
the work they do,” demonstrating that foreign-led studies flag along three dimensions: 
“knowledge of local geography, knowledge of local society, and institutionalized 
accountability” (29). In this way, Barandiarán presents another practical reason to pursue 
decentralized decision-making systems as scientific expertise is mobilized as meaningful 
governmental actors to address matters of public concern. 
Following Spezio and Barandiarán, we are invited to understand a more complicated 
relationship between the people and science than is typically conveyed by critics of 
bureaucracy and technocracy. While bureaucracy and technocracy might serve a crucial 
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function to state and capital formations by depoliticizing conflict, the relationship between 
science and democracy is not entirely one of popular alienation. In his survey of this 
relationship, Mark Brown argues that science and democracy are bound in that they involve 
and require processes of representation, or “practices of mediation that transform what 
they represent” (2009, viii). Here, neither the will of the people nor the status of science are 
fixed, and neither people nor science are simple outputs; instead, they are coproduced 
through transformative processes (2009). On the side of science, “Scientific facts emerge 
from hybrid processes shaped by human ingenuity and initiative, sociotechnical structures, 
and institutions, and nonhuman entities and phenomena” (2009, xi). Likewise, Brown 
views representation not just as an expedient form of coping with the large size of modern 
states, but as normatively superior: representative governance forms the people, which do 
not exist prima facie (2009). Perhaps because Brown does not distinguish between 
participatory and direct democracy, he does not grasp the dialectical development of 
subjectivity inherent in participatory governance and instead flattens participatory 
governance to a correspondence model of truth (2009). Thus, he takes for granted that 
representative governance is essential to the active construction of the people while 
ignoring less hegemonic alternatives. Still, his basic insight is important: that both science 
and the people are built things constructed of shared interests and sympathies, as systems 
of “collective representation that continually mobilizes and transforms both nature and 
citizens” (2009, 8). 
Still, Brown recognizes that with the rise of the “risk society,” there was an amazing 
growth in public demand for expertise that went unmet, since expert knowledge in the risk 
society is “often incomplete and uncertain,” and citizens’ interests are often “inchoate or 
unclear” (Brown 2009, 11). In a word, the people cannot fully articulate their concerns, and 
experts cannot resolve them. In such cases, expertise is suspended, and interest groups are 
free to shop around for expertise that suits their ends (2009). In her work The Fifth Branch, 
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Sheila Jasanoff responds to this crisis of confidence surrounding both political and 
scientific authority (1990). Like Brown, she endeavors to bring awareness of the socially 
constructed nature of scientific reality into policy analysis literature (1990). Jasanoff is 
critical of both the technocratic approach, which “looks to scientists as primary validators of 
policies with high technical content” and the democratic approach, which “views broad 
public participation as the antidote to abuses of expert authority” (1990, vii). Instead, she 
looks at scientific advisory committees, emerging in the context of the risk society, to center 
a discussion of the relations between science and regulation. A central question for Jasanoff 
is, why does expert knowledge so often fail to contain or close technical disputes (2)? In a 
word, why don’t decision-making bodies listen to experts? 
Jasanoff describes a scientific advisory process as neither technocratic, in that their 
science is contingent and socially constructed and often hamstrung by litigation and other 
judicial procedures, nor as democratic, since participation by lay-interests and cross-
examination is limited (1990). Moreover, “the artificiality of [the strict separation between 
science and politics] can no longer be doubted” (1990, 230). Instead, suggesting such a 
strict separation “frequently generate[s] more conflict than those which seek, however 
imperfectly, to integrate scientific and political decisionmaking” (1990, 231). To this end, 
Jasanoff suggests that scientific advisory proceedings might be “most effective in building 
consensus and guiding policy when they foster negotiation and compromise” (1990, 230). 
Better work can be done with greater resolve when artificial boundaries separating science 
and democracy are cast aside. The underlying point here about negotiation is that 
legitimacy hangs not just on assertions of expertise, but on the active creation of consensus. 
In this way, Jasanoff’s work extends and supports the participatory principles of an energy 
democracy framework. 
At the same time, Jasanoff develops through case studies the assertion that while 
negotiation is “one of the keys to the success of the advisory process,” negotiation alone “is 
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not sufficient to ensure the pubic and judicial acceptability of agency decisions based on 
regulatory science” (1990, 234). In addition to negotiation, scientific advisory bodies must 
also engage in boundary work. Boundary work, like posting “‘keep out’ signs to prevent 
nonscientists from challenging or reinterpreting claims labeled as ‘science’,” is “crucial to 
the political acceptability of advice” (1990, 236). Through negotiation and boundary work, 
scientific advisory procedures are imbued with opportunities to build broad consensus and 
assert unshakeable authority. Often, negotiations may actually concern the drawing of 
boundaries (1990, 236). Moreover, boundaries, whose construction must be actively 
engaged with, are not only mechanisms for depoliticization, as has been the concern of 
many thinkers on the Left, but also mechanisms of repoliticization as groups and interests 
assert their claims for engagement and to knowledge. Boundaries are thus also claims 
toward self-direction and autonomy resonant with energy democracy and social ecology 
principles. 
In her work Knowledge, Policy, and Expertise, Susan Owens draws attention to 
boundary organizations, which are tasked with the boundary work that depoliticizes and 
repoliticizes matters of fact and concern (2015). Here, Owens argues that boundary work is 
not just the unconscious product of structures, but is also a “proactive, intermediating 
activity, capable of being planned and managed” (2015, 15). Boundary organizations, 
existing at frontiers of science and policy and including actors from both sides, produce 
boundary objects such as reports, models, and ideas (2015). In the context of CCAs, 
boundary organizations such as the advisory working group that incorporated county 
staffers and community stakeholders, was created to oversee the production of the 
boundary object of the feasibility study. Owen’s insight that boundary work is a site of 
indeterminacy that can be planned and managed opens to the understanding that the 
process of a technical feasibility study is not a simple, pure, and scientific output. It is 
  77 
instead a built object emerging from a site of contestation where claims to knowledge are 
made to fashion legitimacy while actors negotiate consensus.  
The ultimate goal for Jasanoff is not “the naive vision of natural advisory bodies 
‘speaking truth to power,’ for in regulatory science, more even than in research science, 
there can be no perfect, objectively verifiable truth” (1990, 250). Instead, we should work 
toward “a serviceable truth: a state of knowledge that satisfies tests of scientific 
acceptability and supports reasoned decisionmaking, but also assures those exposed to risk 
that their interests have not been sacrificed on the altar of an impossible scientific certainty” 
(1990, 250). Jasanoff’s intention is thus to help make manifest a kind of science that works, 
and moreover works for the public interest, and she argues for consensus-building through 
negotiation with some boundary work to guard expertise and ensure acceptance and trust. 
Jasanoff critiques any clear fact-value distinction between science and society, politics, or 
power. In this way, perhaps, we should align with Latour and admit that the search for facts 
must be driven by matters of concern (2004). The energy democracy framework argues that 
matters of concern must be determined by the publics that a given infrastructure serves, 
and this section has explored how science and expertise may be used to further common 
goods insofar as science and expertise emerge through practices resonant with democratic 
principles of local situatedness, negotiation and consensus, and assertions of autonomous 
expertise through boundary work. 
C. Policy Review 
1. Pre-History: Regulation and Deregulation in the United States and California from 
1893 to 2001 
Our electrical system is a techno-cryptic web of policies and institutions, characterized 
by complex intersections of regulatory and management bodies, featuring both public and 
private institutions, and generating technocratic policies made far from public view. The 
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mystification of such publicly-relevant infrastructure effectively depoliticizes questions 
regarding the production, distribution, and consumption of energy. Meanwhile, our energy 
system is replete with injustices: production is located in disempowered communities, is 
inefficiently transmitted across vast distances at great environmental cost, and often leaves 
areas at the fraying edges of grid systems vulnerable to outages (Sovacool and Dworkin 
2015). To grasp ownership of these systems that manage public and private life, as 
community choice aggregation has the potential to do, requires an understanding of how 
that depoliticization occurred, how environmental and social gains were sidelined along the 
way, and what opportunities have been uncovered for us to seize our power once again. This 
section begins by charting the rise of private utilities through the centralization of 
regulatory powers. Here, regulation of electricity emerges from and enables collusion 
between state and capital forces and reveals some problems of bureaucratic management. 
Next, I demonstrate how state-run attempts to weaken the power of private utilities through 
deregulation ultimately helped utilities maintain market power. Next, this section turns to a 
study of 1990s deregulation in California, which I argue took an eco-modernist form, and 
proceeds to a discussion of the resultant electricity crisis of 2000-2001. I conclude by 
positing renewable portfolio standards (RPS), net energy metering (NEM), and community 
choice aggregation (CCA) as important outputs of the crisis. Understanding this history is 
crucial if we are to pick up the pieces and take control over our electrical infrastructure. 
The first phase of utility dominance is characterized by a move toward regulation as a 
way to legitimize and concretize private power, and toward centralization as a way to most 
efficiently capture that regulatory process and shape technologies for the profit of private 
utilities. Before investor-owned utilities (IOUs) came to dominate energy infrastructure in 
the early twentieth century, there were debates on the municipal level as to whether power 
should be managed by companies or by cities (Wasserman 1999). If electricity systems were 
public, “municipalities could own the system’s assets, provide service at a lower price, and 
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create municipal revenues through the process” (Stokes 2015, 81). Private firms, which were 
well-funded, well-connected, and well-lawyered, fought public power until Samuel Insull of 
Commonwealth Edison Company in Chicago proposed a “third way”: private firms would 
submit to regulation by public entities, thus legitimizing privatization in the eyes of the 
public (Wasserman 1999, 20). These firms would occupy noncompetitive “natural 
monopolies” over specified geographic regions, thus centralizing production in favor of 
large companies but in the name of efficiency (Stokes 2015, 82). Crystalizing in 1907, 
consensus between utility managers and politically prominent parties affirmed this “third 
way” utility dominance (Hirsh 1999). Two important trends emerge from these first years of 
electrical debates. First, private utilities holding natural monopolies developed technologies 
that necessitated greater centralization. Second, industry leaders “exerted power over the 
regulatory bodies that purportedly oversaw their activities” (Hirsh 1999, 9). Put another 
way, public regulation of private interests via regulation served to legitimize rather than 
check the power of private firms. With the establishment of the first state-level public utility 
commissions (PUCs) in 1907, regulatory powers were evacuated from municipalities and 
PUCs became more vulnerable to regulatory capture by utilities, who were those regulatory 
bodies’ “main and most influential stakeholder” (Stokes 2015, 87). Utility managers found it 
increasingly easy to control regulators as politicians and civic reformers lost interest in 
utility affairs and utilities continuously brought down the price of electricity, both through 
development of new technologies and containment of radical inventions that could upset 
energy centralization (Hirsch 1999). Ultimately, both regulation and centralization served 
to empower and protect private utilities. 
Utility dominance started to falter in the 1970s. Utility systems’ technological 
improvements stagnated and their declining costs plateaued, the energy crisis of 1973 
motivated politicians to intervene in energy systems once again, and the environmental 
movement created public demand for renewable energy (Hirsch 1999). During the Carter 
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Administration, activist policy pushed for deregulation aimed at opening the electrical 
industry to reduce its costs and pursue more renewables. At the same time, this activist 
trend was not so much regulatory activism but deregulatory activism. Policy under Carter 
was designed to challenge utilities through deregulation and market logics, with substantial 
research and development funds focused on renewable technologies. As part of a solution to 
rising energy costs and growing concerns about the environment, in 1978 President Carter 
and federal lawmakers created the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) (Hirsch 
1999). The policy privileged independent electric power companies, enabled new producers 
to offer electricity at prices comparable to those offered by regulated power companies, and 
“led to the introduction of free-market principles” into energy systems (Hirsch 1999, 71). 
The incentives for alternative generation companies under PURPA’s Section 210 were 
especially great in California, precipitating a “‘gold rush’ of nonutility energy entrepreneurs” 
(Hirsch 1999, 89). However, in California PURPA favored the development of natural gas 
over green alternative energy systems (Stokes 2015). Further, gains in renewables 
nationally started to falter in the 1980s and ‘90s once the federal government, administered 
by Presidents Reagan and Bush, defunded nearly all renewables research (Wasserman 
1999). The 1990s were “largely a lost decade for renewable energy policy,” as the 
conversation changed from renewables to deregulation (Stokes 2015, 192). In sum, the very 
deregulatory activism that opened up energy markets to renewable technologies manifested 
free-market policies that failed to secure those gains. This history suggests that 
liberalization of the energy market is a fickle mechanism for achieving new green energy 
technologies. 
In the 1990s, efforts at deregulation at the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) deepened. Here, deregulation refers to attempts to reform the electricity system to 
achieve lower prices and greener energy by breaking utility monopolies’ geographic control 
over electricity sales. In this way, consumers are allowed to buy energy directly from 
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producers, introducing competition. Collusion between state and corporate actors persisted, 
though mechanisms for achieving greater renewable content were effectively sidelined. In 
1993, the CPUC started allowing large consumers to buy directly from independent energy 
service providers and choose where “to buy their energy from, along with how green that 
energy would be” (Stokes 2015, 194). The pinnacle of deregulation legislation in California 
was AB 1890, and its main function was to bring those market choices already available to 
large customers to all individuals. The bill was crafted by John Bryson, who had been both 
the chair of the CPUC and the President of Southern California Edison (SCE) (Wasserman 
1999). While deregulation was intended to lower prices and achieve higher renewable 
content, AB 1890 was a boon for IOUs and did little to incentivize renewables. It allowed 
IOUs to reap $28.5 billion in “stranded costs” of uncompetitive generating facilities that 
could not be recouped on the market (Wasserman 1999, 56), precipitated windfall sales for 
IOUs in their gas and coal fired plants (Faulkner 2010), and opened competition only on the 
individual level such that “less than one percent of California’s consumers had switched to a 
new provider” (Wasserman 1999, 60). In sum, IOUs got to offload bunk assets and did not 
face real competition. 
Renewable development under deregulation in California depended largely on “green 
market” policies that failed to shore up gains for renewables. Green market strategies 
include those avenues for achieving higher renewable content through market mechanisms. 
These strategies included green power purchasing (GPP), based in customers’ new freedom 
to buy renewable energy on a deregulated market, as well as the public goods charge (PGC), 
which collected small, volumetric charges from customers to fund public benefits, such as 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects (Stokes 2015). Importantly, both GPP and 
PGC could still function under a deregulated market (Stokes 2015). Meanwhile, the CPUC’s 
“Blue Book,” a rough guide to deregulation in California, “provided little incentive for 
existing or new biomass, geothermal, wind, or solar plants, which were more expensive but 
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provided additional environmental benefits” (Stokes 2015, 198). This trend toward green 
marketing can be understood as an eco-modernist tactic to address concerns with the 
electricity system. Here, eco-modernism entails specifically the resolution of environmental 
problems such as runaway energy use by using market mechanisms instead of policy 
mandates, community decision-making, and demand reduction. 
The failure of this scheme to increase renewables simply through market mechanisms 
was unsurprising to many green advocates at the time. In her report “Green Buyers 
Beware,” lobbyist for American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) in California Nancy 
Rader argued, “To suggest that green marketing is an answer to the lack of market 
penetration of renewables is to ignore the market imperfections that have hindered 
renewables in the first place” (Rader 1998, 4). Such market imperfections, including 
externalities, public goods, and transaction costs, hamper the efficient workings of the 
market and necessitate policy intervention (1998). From here, Rader recommended a three-
pronged approach to the problem of renewables and sustainability. First, echoing some of 
the core principles of energy democracy, Rader called on “consumers as citizens” to push for 
policies that “ensure that the industry becomes significantly cleaner over the next decade” 
(Rader 1998, 51). The most important such policy was the Renewable Portfolio Standards 
(RPS), which created a binding requirement for new renewables (Stokes 2015). Second, 
with a recommendation foreshadowing community choice aggregation, citizens would have 
to work together “to create a purchasing agent, or public aggregator, to purchase green 
power on behalf of all citizens in the community,” which was precluded by AB 1890 (Rader 
1998, 51). Critiquing AB 1890, Rader writes, “Relying on individual choice to achieve social 
goals also ignores our collective responsibility to achieve those goals through democratic 
processes” (Rader 1998, 50). If “community choice” were realized, “green power then 
becomes affordable and meaningful” (Rader 1998, 51). Finally, Rader urges that “the best 
way for consumers to reduce the environmental impact caused by their own electricity 
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consumption is to use less electricity” (Rader 1998, 51). Rader’s criticism of California’s 
deregulation scheme may not be worth such careful explication if this were simply a policy 
memo written by a lobbyist; Rader’s remarks are noteworthy because they so explicitly 
foreshadow the aims of community choice aggregation and resonate with energy democracy 
commitments to community participation in questions of energy systems. 
California’s experiment with deregulation culminated in the electricity crisis of 2000-
2001. AB 1890 inducted two new regulatory and management apparatuses: the California 
Power Exchange (CalPX), a spot market that handled day-ahead electricity sales, and the 
California Independent System Operator (CAISO), tasked with ensuring the California 
electricity system had enough power to meet demand each day (Faulkner 2010). Because 
CAISO was forced to pay higher prices for energy when it was kept scarce, energy sellers 
were incentivized to maintain conditions of artificial scarcity (Faulkner 2010). In this way, 
free markets meant creating a market that could be easily manipulated for the benefit of 
sellers. As a result of artificial scarcity, caused by this physical withholding of power as well 
as increased natural gas prices, average energy prices rose sharply in June 2000, “breaking 
the $100 per MWh mark” (Faulkner 2010; Weare 2003, 1). Further, large companies such 
as Enron manipulated the market to inflate electricity prices at peak demand (Jung 2017). 
Outages and rolling blackouts plagued the state, and “on the worst day, January 18 [2001], 
the equivalent of almost one million households lost electricity” (Weare 2003, 2). Investor-
owned utilities suffered a crisis of legitimacy in the wake of the 2000-2001 electricity crisis, 
after which PG&E filed for bankruptcy and SCE required direct financial support from the 
state to keep the lights on (Stokes 2015). The drivers of the electricity crisis were many, but 
a key flaw was that:  
market and regulatory conditions aligned, making a particularly ripe environment 
for the exercise of market power. The shortages in generating capacity played a 
critical role, increasing the bargaining strength of merchant generators and 
signaling the enormous profits that could be gained through supply shortages. At the 
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same time, the excessive reliance on the spot market, constraints on transmission 
capacity, features of the market structure, and the division of regulatory authority all 
increased the opportunities and incentives for strategic manipulation of the markets 
(Weare 2003, 50). 
California’s experiment with deregulation was a resounding failure because of the excesses 
of market power that it enabled. At the same time, free market ideologies did not create 
open markets, but rather enabled the more perfect exercise of market power by already 
powerful utilities. In response to the crisis, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) eliminated the regulation for IOUs to trade power through CalPX and instead 
incentivized long-term contracts (Jung 2017). California publics were left with the bill, and 
advocates of public power and renewables went back to the drawing board.  
The two decades since the electricity crisis have witnessed several important changes to 
the California energy system. In the wake of the electricity crisis, some of the renewables 
policies suggested by Rader and others began to gain traction. First, RPS policies have been 
successful in setting progressively higher floors for mandated renewable content, leading to 
greater development of renewables and a voluntary exodus of several oil and gas 
manufacturing companies that have relocated to Texas (Stokes 2015). Second, net energy 
metering (NEM) policies, wherein utilities provide credit to customers with solar panel 
systems for the energy they produce, have become an oppositional force working against 
utility dominance (Stokes 2015). Finally, a new policy called “community choice 
aggregation” would emerge as a solution for how California could deregulate smarter by 
giving communities a chance to choose how they procure electricity, essentially 
collectivizing the deregulatory approach of AB 1890, incurring decision-making power to a 
level of social organization capable of manifesting energy expertise and creating the 
structure whereby markets can be kept open. The months after the electricity crisis of 2000-
2001 were times of bold regulatory experimentation, perhaps even a revival of the 1970s age 
of deregulatory activism. Californians are still seeing these changes play out, and the 
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outcomes of these policies are still variable, their futures still unwritten. The remainder of 
this work will address community choice aggregation and the promise it holds for public 
power and more sustainable tomorrows. 
2. The Promise of Community Choice Aggregation 
In 2002, AB 117 brought community choice aggregation (CCA) into existence in 
California. It passed the California legislature with the promise that it would create a 
smarter way to deregulate by shifting decision-making power over energy procurement 
from IOUs not to individuals, but to locally-controlled public agencies. The point of 
insertion of the CCA in the energy system is illustrated in Figure 3. In his work on the 
history of electrical utilities, Harvey Wasserman muses that “community choice could be 
the ultimate fruit of unintended consequences, a back-door route to the public-controlled 
power stymied by the private utility industry for 120 years” (Wasserman 1999, 67). In this 
way, it created the policy conditions for energy democracy. While the point of deregulation 
was most importantly to save ratepayers money, in the wake of the electricity crisis other 
issues moved to the forefront, including reliability, energy independence, price stability, 
and renewables (Burke et al. 2005). Crucially, there was a new push for local resilience, 
inspired in part by Los Angeles, which had maintained municipalized energy throughout 
the crisis and had been saved from the energy shortages and blackouts affecting the rest of 
the state (Burke et al. 2005). Shifting priorities and the desire to find new solutions to the 
electricity system made community choice an attractive model.  
Figure 3. Energy System Processes and Actors  
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Community choice aggregation secures local control by shifting decision-making power 
over energy procurement from IOUs to community aggregators. In the CCA model, 
aggregators “combine the electricity demand of customers in their jurisdictions and procure 
electricity through their own generation or through the market” (Faulkner 2010, 2). Often 
cities, counties, or some constellation thereof, organize into joint power authorities (JPAs). 
JPAs then actively choose among energy service providers (ESPs) based on an array of 
different criteria, including price and source of generation (Burke et al. 2005). In this way, 
AB 117 and CCA takes seriously Rader’s call for choice at the level of the community, rather 
than the individual, and incurs in communities the bargaining and decision-making power 
provided to large industries in 1993 at the start of deregulation and to individuals with AB 
1890. Few ratepayers actually switched ESPs through AB 1890, which suggests that energy 
expertise perhaps does not incur at the level of the individual; it might, however, coalesce 
and become actionable at the level of the community. Here, communities are empowered to 
set rates and choose renewable and local energy sources, rather than the local utility’s mix 
of energy sources (Faulkner 2010). At the same time, aggregation was designed “to facilitate 
the purchase and sale of electrical energy in a more competitive market” (Burke et al. 2005, 
3). In this way, the promise of free markets is realized in the ability to keep markets open 
through public ownership of that market. Community empowerment and free markets are 
intended to mutually reinforce one another. At the same time, CCAs are imagined to entrust 
communities with the power to direct their electricity systems toward substantive 
commitments, including renewable and GHG-free energy sources, cost-saving to customers, 
local generation, and local job production. However, the free market and community 
commitments are not necessarily amenable to each other. As such, an important tension 
exists within CCAs from their inception. A full exploration of the promises and pitfalls of 
community choice aggregation will be undertaken in the pages that follow. However, several 
crucial features must be noted here.  
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• First, CCAs transfer decision-making power over energy procurement from IOUs to 
locally-controlled public agencies (Weinrub 2017). This feature is the crux of CCAs, 
and bears the promise of reviving public power in California. Important questions 
concerning how the local should be defined, as well as how CCAs should be 
structured, are salient here. However, with CCAs there is the possibility that 
ratepayers could become engaged once again in decisions regarding matters of 
electricity. 
 
• Second, CCAs are seen by a variety of different groups to constitute a path to more 
local generation projects, increased renewable content, revenue generation, and 
cost-savings to customers (Jung 2017). Predictably, these aims are sometimes 
mutually affirmative, and sometimes contradictory. Nonetheless, the movement for 
CCAs has brought labor unions, alternative energy companies, consumer groups, 
environmental groups, and city and county government officials to the table. This 
alone is an important achievement of CCAs. 
 
• Third, CCAs operate on an “opt-out” basis, meaning that “they can choose to stay 
with their existing electrical corporation,” but must actively elect to do so (Faulkner 
2010, 7). On this point, CCAs have a tremendous advantage. In the words of one 
participant, if CCA programs had to entice consumers, “you would never get off the 
ground.”7 AB 1890 saw less than one percent of ratepayers switch providers, which 
is unsurprising given that most ratepayers are not well-informed of electricity 
markets. With AB 117, that lack of common knowledge about the electrical utilities 
may actually work in favor of community choice by keeping people in the programs.  
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• Fourth, CCAs undermine utility dominance, but they do not entirely expunge them 
from the electrical system. Under the CCA framework, “the local Investor Owned 
Utility still owns and maintains the transmission and delivery systems” (Faulkner 
2). As such, while no longer guaranteed to make returns from the CPUC on their 
generation assets, IOUs still stand to make impressive profits off of transmission 
fees, which for SCE is the bulk of their profit. At the same time, insofar as CCA 
enables communities to develop new technologies such as distributed energy 
resources (DER), CCAs could eventually pose an existential threat to utilities. 
 
• Fifth, CCAs exist at the pleasure of the CPUC. In at least one sense, this is good. AB 
117 does not contain any language regarding renewable standards, but CCAs must 
abide by CPUC regulations, and RPS policy concretized there would apply to CCAs 
as well. (Still, it is unlikely that areas that opt for CCAs would set more regressive 
goals than a body that oversees all of California and is open to regulatory capture by 
IOUs.) At the same time, because CCAs are answerable to the CPUC, the CPUC 
always retains the power to create policy fatal to CCAs. The power to regulate is the 
power to manage, to cultivate, and to destroy. Recent policy maneuvers at the CPUC 
have set restrictions that severely limit CCA enactment, a topic that will be taken up 
in Chapter 5. 
 
• Sixth, by the end of 2018 over 25% of Californians are expected to use electricity 
procured by a CCA.8 Over the next five years, as many as 60% of utility customers 
may depart to CCAs (Weinrub 2017).  
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Hayes, Joseph. October 19, 2017 (21:30). 
8 Carr, Amelia. September 29, 2017 (25:00). 
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This brief entre into CCAs will be expounded upon throughout this work. In sum, CCAs 
could be a way for Californians to not only deregulate smarter by keeping the market open, 
but by committing to the notion of public power and energy democracy. In the sections that 
follow, this work will explore how CCAs are intended to speak to four primary public goods: 
local control, environmental concerns, cost-savings, and local generation. 
a. Local Control 
Community Choice Aggregation transfers decision-making power over energy 
procurement from IOUs to locally-controlled public agencies. This feature of local control is 
the crux of CCAs, and bears the promise of reviving public power in California such that 
ratepayers could become engaged once again in decisions regarding matters of public 
concern. For example, they may advocate for energy independence, price stability, energy 
efficiency programs, renewable and alternative energies, and local employment (Burke at al. 
2005).9 CCAs also allow municipalities to meet other objectives, such as directing funds into 
local economies through power project development, hiring administrative staff, and 
reducing local and regional air pollution (Burke et al. 2005). Local control occupies a 
special place in the analysis of CCAs because it is both a key mechanism for achieving other 
substantive goals and carries intrinsic value of enabling public participation in key energy 
questions. 
As a mechanism, CCAs are intended to function much like Bookchin’s libertarian 
technics: CCAs are a form of socio-technical work that brings together social liberation 
(democracy) and ecological liberation (sustainability). In his 2017 work on CCAs in 
California, Samuel Jung recognizes that while other market-based environmental socio-
technical works have channeled capital toward greenwashed companies, CCAs promise to 
                                                
9 Cregar, Jennifer. October 6, 2017, (23:00). 
  90 
speak to the Just Transition (Jung 2017). For Jung, the Just Transition refers to “a 
fundamental transformation of the current fossil fuel-based system into place-based, 
sustainable, equitable, and democratically controlled economies that provide meaningful 
jobs for workers displaced by the deep decarbonization of society” (Jung 2017, 5). Here, 
democratic control over energy can ensure local production and jobs, ethical social and 
ecological relationships, and fair distribution of source and product ownership (Jung 2017). 
At the same time, communities are not locked into pursuing particular ends. Instead, 
publics can “meet their electricity needs in ways that express and align with their values” 
(Jung 2017, 13). At its most aspirational, CCA creates a mechanism for democratic control 
over energy that gives communities the power to make good decisions for themselves. 
Writing at the same time, energy democracy scholar Al Weinrub recognizes CCA as a 
potential manifestation of energy democracy. His perspective is also cautionary in that 
CCAs in and of themselves are no silver bullet: “Community Choice is merely a vehicle; it is 
not a destination. Without a clear destination and a good driver, this vehicle can take us in 
the wrong direction, to the wrong place” (Weinrub 2017, 147). Here, substantive economic, 
social, and environmental justice goals may be achieved only insofar as communities look 
beyond CCAs as a simple buyer and seller of electricity and manifest community control 
over CCA programs (Weinrub 2017, 148). Weinrub thus reveals an important tension 
existing between the eco-modernist and local control mechanisms underlying CCAs, a 
matter that will be taken up in depth later in this work. Taking a dialectical approach, 
Weinrub argues that to pull marginalized communities into the conversation — to make 
CCAs a truly communal venture — will require “building a political base in those 
communities that would benefit most from such a program — a base centered in working-
class communities, low-income communities, and communities of color” (Weinrub 2017, 
148). Involvement from citizens should further be institutionalized into community 
advisory committees and the like (Weinrub 2017). For Weinrub, community engagement in 
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CCA programs is not simply a feature of community choice, but is necessary for CCAs to 
achieve other goals. Weinrub here reveals an important distinction between necessary and 
sufficient conditions of energy democracy. Local control is necessary but not sufficient to 
energy democracy, in the same way that decentralization is necessary but not sufficient to 
democracy. Local control opens up opportunities for participation, but energy democracy 
can only be realized with deep community engagement in CCA programs. 
Despite their focus on local control, community choice aggregation is not simply a local 
phenomenon, but interacts complexly with happenings at the state and federal levels. First, 
in the context of Santa Barbara, CCAs have also been framed as part of a trend to advance 
goals on the local and state level that have been directly undermined on the federal level. 
When asked whether the push for local control bore any connection to uncertainties 
regarding the future of energy policy on the national level, Amy Parker of the CEC 
communicated that the “hatred of what’s happening at the national level” has been 
emphasized in conferences and workshops concerning CCAs in California.10 As California 
distances itself from federal trends, communities are ripe to move forward locally on 
CCAs.11 CCAs are an important part of that shift, and Parker affirms that CCAs are the only 
means by which communities can seize control over their energy sources.12 Next, CCAs are 
also framed as a way for national NGOs such as the Sierra Club to touch down locally.13 In 
this way, CCAs do not signify localism in opposition to national trends, but are themselves a 
local manifestation of broader concerns, a friction point between the local and, even, the 
global (Tsing 2005). Finally, Weinrub argues that CCAs are “essential to building the public 
institutions, resources, leadership, and vision needed to shape and control our electricity 
systems at the state level” (Weinrub 2017, 164). In this last instance, CCAs are a way of 
building local power that can change more centralized systems from below. Thus, it is 
                                                
10 Parker, Amy. September 14, 2017, (28:00). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, (12:00). 
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incorrect to imagine CCAs’ call for local control as simply an attempt to shut out state and 
federal level policies that have proven unsatisfactory. It is much more useful to understand 
CCAs as a local strategy that seeks to incorporate national movement discourse on winnable 
terrain with hopes of addressing global concerns and affecting statewide policy. 
b. Environmental Concerns 
While AB 117 is designed to permit communities to pursue local control, and is actually 
silent on renewables and environmental concerns,14 the most prominent substantive goal of 
CCAs is the pursuit of more aggressive environmental standards.15 When communities are 
beholden to IOUs, their environmental demands are met at the whim of private companies 
and the CPUC. Alternatively, CCAs allow communities to surge ahead of RPS requirements. 
Energy efficiency programs are also expected to be managed better through CCAs than 
through IOUs (Burke et al. 2005, 8), especially since CCAs will be empowered to set rates 
for NEM and thus incentivize rooftop solar installations.16 Presently, and by their own 
admission, utilities have not encouraged rooftop or community solar, as such programs 
effectively reduce demand for electricity from the grid.17 
Jung and Weinrub see energy democracy as a mechanism for securing environmental 
commitments, but more sustainable electricity policy may also be had through eco-
modernist channels of free market competition. In a trend that is expected to continue, 
Jung shows that as wind and solar technologies advance, their costs have decreased 30-60% 
between 2008 and 2014 (Jung 2017). Further, electricity policies have both created 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Carr, Amelia. September 29, 2017, (23:00). 
14 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part I, 34:00). 
15 The general term “environmental concerns” is used here, instead of “renewable” or “greenhouse 
gas (GHG)-free” energy, to denote an important debate occurring in CPUC regulation. As of late, 
policy around alternative energy sources has come to favor GHG-free requirements over renewables. 
While most renewables are also GHG-free, GHG-free energy sources include such non-renewable 
energy sources as nuclear and large hydroelectric power. Because electricity policy currently speaks 
to both renewables and GHG-free energy sources, the broader term is used here. 
16 Carr, Amelia. September 29, 2017, (1:00:00). 
17 Parker, Amy. September 14, 2017, (14:00). 
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favorable markets for investment in renewables and increased social buy-in for renewables 
(Jung 2017). During the first preliminary feasibility studies performed by Navigant 
Consultants in 2005, implementation plans that reach 40% renewable power by 2017 were 
considered likely to remain cost effective (Burke et al. 2005). Renewables are also expected 
to be insulated from price upsets, especially in comparison with oil and gas (Burke et al. 
2005). 
Across the state, local governments that are motivated to reduce their GHG emissions 
and to further implement their climate action plans may pursue CCAs as a way to reach 
those goals.18 In the city of Santa Barbara, CCAs are also seen to be a crucial component in 
achieving municipal renewable goals. In June of 2017, the Santa Barbara City Council 
passed a non-binding resolution to convert to 100% renewable energy by 2030 (Yamamura 
2017). The resolution refers exclusively to municipal power use, which does not include 
residential energy use. Still, Parker from the CEC has cited the CCA as “the most 
straightforward pathway to helping the city meet that goal,”19 in part because the CCA will 
enable the city to electrify its bus fleets20 and engage in power-wheeling,21 a process 
whereby the city could power certain municipal projects, such as the incredibly energy-
intensive desalination plant, with off-site photovoltaics. As of now, municipal governments 
have strikingly little authority over how they source their energy; this would change with 
CCA program implementation. Not only are CCAs seen as important means to achieve 
environmental goals, but goal-setting also acts to advance the movement for CCAs. Where 
piecemeal attempts to achieve net zero status fall short, CCAs can equip cities with the tools 
to make bold leaps of their own accord, as has been demonstrated by the CCA in Lancaster, 
CA.22 
                                                
18 Cregar, Jennifer. October 6, 2017, (23:00). 
19 Santa Barbara City Council Meeting. Santa Barbara City Hall. October 31, 2017, (13:00). 
20 Ibid, (15:00). 
21 Ibid, (19:00). 
22 Romano, Mary. September 20, 2017, (15:00). 
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c. Cost-Savings 
Despite the emergence of other environmental priorities, lower energy rates are still a 
principal objective in CCA implementation. Navigant Consulting’s initial 2005 analysis 
conducted thirteen feasibility studies and found eleven of those studies to “show an average 
benefit of 5 percent in generation cost-savings from 2006 to 2024” (Burke et al. 2005, 5). 
Several mechanisms converge here to produce cost-savings. 
First, on the organizational side, as energy procurement is shifted from private utilities 
to locally-controlled public agencies, CCAs are empowered to defer profits. As such, CCAs 
might chose to yield those cost-savings to customers. Further, because public agencies have 
control over rate-setting, prices can be intentionally stabilized by bodies accountable to the 
public. Second, on the techno-economic side, because CCAs still rely on transmission 
infrastructure belonging to IOUs, start-up costs can be relatively low. CCAs are also 
typically able to use low-cost financing for the projects, giving them a competitive edge over 
utilities (Burke et al. 2005). Further, unlike municipal utilities, CCAs are not necessarily 
tasked with generating their own power, either (Burke et al. 2005). While CCAs might move 
toward the kind of power system held my municipal utilities, where all infrastructure is 
owned by the city, especially through progressively advanced administrative, generational, 
and infrastructural capacity, CCAs can also choose to keep costs low and pass savings onto 
customers (Burke et al. 2005). Finally, early policy analysis here suggests that costs are 
expected to fall as the market becomes freed from “regulatory capture by the IOU” (Burke et 
al. 2005, 5). Other CCAs in Massachusetts and Ohio have yielded promising results on this 
front (Burke et al. 2005).  
There are other important financial reasons for communities to pursue CCAs. Santa 
Barbara County’s South Coast, stretching across the progressive leaning cities of Goleta, 
Santa Barbara, and Carpinteria, rests at the end of the power lines, which in places march 
precariously over the Santa Ynez Mountains. As such, the South Coast experiences frequent 
  95 
power outages. A CCA program would allow communities to pursue local generation 
projects to address resiliency issues. For this reason, the Santa Barbara Chamber of 
Commerce has supported a local CCA,23 and Santa Barbara City Administrators have also 
claimed community-wide private sector interest in developing generation, storage, demand 
response, and microgrid opportunities.24 
Commitment to cost-savings occupies a crucial yet contentious place in the array of CCA 
benefits. On one hand, many advocates of CCAs, such as the participant from the California 
Alliance for Community Energy, have expressed concern that CCAs in SCE territory might 
not be able to make good on promising lower rates, and any failure to meet those goals 
could soil the perception of CCAs. Moreover, those fiscal commitments could force CCAs to 
pursue power purchasing that contradicts other substantive goals such as environmental 
concerns or local generation, which will be discussed shortly. In the short history of CCAs, 
some programs that were motivated by cost-savings rather than environmental benefits 
have shuttered early in their development. Chicago’s CCA, which emphasized cost-savings, 
closed just a few years after its launch due to market changes that made the program less 
attractive.25 The CCA serving the San Joaquin Valley Power Authority (SJVPA) was also 
suspended in 2009, just three years after its feasibility study, due to market conditions 
(Faulkner 2010). In the SJVPA case, like the Chicago case, environmental concerns had not 
been identified as a priority, and this dearth of ideological commitment has been cited as a 
possible explanation for the failure of these programs and the success of other early CCAs 
that privileged environmental commitment, such as Marin Energy Authority (Faulkner 
2010). Though ideological commitment, or institutional inertia, might sustain an active 
CCA through unfavorable market conditions, it is logical that a CCA established to deliver 
cost-savings should fold when it is no longer capable of doing so. 
                                                
23 Carr, Amelia. September 29, 2017, (55:00). 
24 Santa Barbara City Council Meeting. Santa Barbara City Hall. October 31, 2017, (Line 40). 
25 Cregar, Jennifer. October 6, 2017, (49:00). 
  96 
Still, while CCAs committed to cost-savings might not weather market storms, rate 
competitiveness is fundamentally baked in to successful CCA operation. If a CCA’s rates are 
significantly higher than those offered by the incumbent utilities, ratepayers may opt out of 
the program and render them infeasible. Even slight changes in rates could be levied 
against CCA advocates in policymaking roles, jeopardizing their positions. In this way, for 
many CCAs, including that proposed in Santa Barbara County, low-cost might constitute 
more of a floor or requirement, even if not a substantive goal.26 
d. Local Generation 
While CCAs can simply collaborate with energy service providers (ESPs) to address their 
generation needs, they can also directly fund the development of new energy generation 
facilities for greater transmission efficiency and higher renewable content (Burke et al. 
2005). Local generation is a particularly important rallying cry for Santa Barbara because of 
its relative isolation in the grid and its resultant resiliency needs.27  
Local generation would by definition be more decentralized, and typically smaller in 
scale. New electricity source technologies, which are amenable to such localization, are 
commonly referred to as distributed energy resources (DERs), and they are comprised of 
three components:  decentralized electricity generation, demand reduction, and system 
balancing (Weinrub 2017). Aspirationally, they are also referred to as Net Zero Energy 
Systems. DERs would be sited on “existing structures or vacant or contaminated land close 
to the point of electricity consumption so that the high cost and energy loss of high-voltage 
transmission lines is not required” (Weinrub 2017, 144). As such, decentralized local 
generation is more efficient and more ecological, as DERs must be designed according to 
what is naturally available in the particular geographic region, whether that may be solar, 
                                                
26 Ibid, (23:00). 
27 Parker, Amy. September 14, 2017, (21:00); Carr, Amelia. September 29, 2017, (24:00). 
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wind, geothermal, small hydroelectric, wave turbine, combined heat and power, or biomass 
(Weinrub 2017). 
In addition to being more ecologically liberatory, in Bookchin’s sense, DERs also speak 
to social liberation through energy democracy. Weinrub argues that “the centralized energy 
model, even when applied to renewable energy, is based on large-scale, centralized 
generating systems — big solar plantations and large wind farms — that are the product of 
concentrated financial and economic power” (Weinrub 2017, 144). As such, even the 
environmentally sustainable centralized renewable plant “represents the interests of 
powerful economic forces aligned with investor-owned utilities and aided by a 
corporate/state apparatus unfettered by democratic restraints” (Weinrub 2017, 144). 
Alternatively, DERs enable the shift to decentralized, democratically controlled production 
by turning consumers of electricity into producers by distributing generation throughout 
the communities that own and use their power (Weinrub 2017). When the polarity of 
electrical systems is reversed, so that consumers become producers, centralized and 
bureaucratic hierarchies may be upset. Power is relocalized, and the centers of generation 
and consumption become many. This transformation resonates with Kristov’s conception of 
ecological energy decentralization, which places concrete local actors at the center of 
electrical systems with local and regional interconnections that emerge in service of their 
many distributed centers (2017). Public power that serves its publics is the essence of 
energy democracy. 
From here, and even more boldly, DERs bear the promise of challenging existing 
paradigms of capitalist exploitation and alienation. In capitalist production, alienation 
occurs when “the object that labour produces, its product, confronts it as an alien being, as a 
power independent of the producer” (Marx [1844] 2000, 86). In this sense, actors do not 
overcome their alienation when energy is distributed to them equitably, or even when 
energy distribution is managed by public bodies. Local actors empower themselves when 
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they in fact become producers (Jung 2017). In this way, local actors can seize the reins of 
their electrical systems, shape them to their will, and in so doing become history makers 
(Flacks 1988).  
Community choice aggregation can also be a way to accrue benefits in communities.28 
Local generation is crucial should CCAs want to deliver social, economic, and 
environmental benefits to communities. This is because these benefits hinge on the 
construction of environmentally sustainable energy projects, located efficiency close to sites 
of end-use, and built by local union labor (Weinrub 2017).29 CCAs can stimulate new jobs, 
through professional staffing as well as construction and operation and maintenance 
roles.30 Unlike “buying from central,” local generation and local control keep investments 
and jobs close to home.31 Further, CCAs can help ensure local energy resilience in the face of 
natural disasters, which can contribute to a more secure local economy.32 
CCAs merely present the opportunity for community engagement; local generation is 
the essential characteristic of a CCA that brings communities into substantive interaction 
with their energy systems by making community benefits available. In this way, 
communities can realize that they have skin in the game (Taleb 2017). Chloe Becker from 
the CACE recognizes that associated programs such as demand response energy efficiency 
and transportation electrification produce social justice benefits that can speak to 
environmental justice aims: “Those who have historically lived in environmentally unsound 
neighborhoods can receive benefits from these programs. So that's why I feel like it's so 
promising.”33 Through CCAs, communities may be able to create important benefits for 
themselves and through their own institutions. 
                                                
28 Parker, Amy. September 14, 2017, (21:00). 
29 Carr, Amelia. September 29, 2017, (23:00). 
30 Cregar, Jennifer. October 6, 2017, (23:00). 
31 Lewis, Craig. Presentation at Central Coast Sustainability Summit, University of California, Santa 
Barbara. October 11, 2017, (1:09:27). 
32 Santa Barbara City Council Meeting. Santa Barbara City Hall. October 31, 2017, (Line 43). 
33 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part I, 2:00). 
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At the same time, promises of local generation are not always enough to get union 
support for CCAs. According to the CEC, the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers chapter covering exclusively PG&E territory was involved in AB 726, a bill that 
would have effectively killed CCAs by requiring IOUs to engage in more long-term contracts 
for renewable energy.34 Still, local IBEW chapters like Local 413 in Santa Barbara County 
and Local 11 in Los Angeles tend to favor CCAs, so long as those programs are geared 
toward local generation.35 Thus, insofar as IBEW chapters are convinced they can secure 
steady work through IOUs, they may oppose CCAs.  
CCAs may create opportunities for local generation, but they will only be able to make 
good on those promises if they have the financial capacity to engage in new local projects. 
As it stands, local generation is somewhat at odds with the objective to secure cost-savings. 
Essentially, as CCAs generate revenue through electricity sales, they must decide how to 
mete out that excess: they may favor reducing rates for customers, or they may invest in 
local generation projects. To be sure, local generation projects may yield cost-savings in the 
future and promise to create other positive economic externalities. It is unlikely that CCAs 
will prioritize either aim absolutely over the other, instead seeking a balance between these 
two goals. At the same time, CCAs are often faced with the choice of which to privilege at 
any particular juncture, and this choice is important insofar as it makes manifest the 
tension between eco-modernism and energy democracy. While eco-modernism strives to 
address environmental concerns by stabilizing “business-as-usual” practices, energy 
democracy seeks to transform socio-technical systems and put them under democratic 
control. This tension lies at the heart of the dilemmas that confront community choice 
aggregation in Santa Barbara County. 
                                                
34 Parker, Amy. September 14, 2017, (26:00). 
35 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part I, 22:00). 
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e. The Process 
As per AB 117, any city, county, or combination thereof can pursue a CCA program as 
long as they are currently located within an IOU service area.36 Most of these steps to 
forming a CCA are designed to manage relations between the aggregator and regulatory 
bodies, regional IOUs, local governing entities, and customers, though still more enact 
protocols that shift energy procurement responsibilities to the CCA and provide for its 
operation. These steps are illustrated in Figure 4. Certain steps and protocols must be 
followed in order for an aggregator to commence a community choice aggregation program. 
Other protocols, while not legally required, are now considered to be best practice.  
Figure 4. Community Choice Aggregation Enactment and Implementation 
Processes 
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When a governance unit resolves to form a CCA, it must submit a Declaration to Pursue 
to both the service area IOU and the CPUC. Each city and/or county desiring membership 
in the CCA must also pass a local ordinance or resolution to make their membership official 
and to pursue the formation of the legal entity. If the CCA is being formed in a single 
jurisdiction (e.g. the City of Lancaster, or the County of Santa Barbara’s unincorporated 
area) they must establish a division within their governing structure to administer the CCA. 
If the CCA spans cities or counties (e.g. the County of Santa Barbara’s unincorporated area 
and the Cities of Santa Barbara, Goleta, and Carpinteria), a JPA must be formed of those 
cities and counties that desire membership in the CCA. Finally, an implementation plan 
must be filed with and certified by the CPUC prior to launch. This implementation plan 
must contain an organizational structure of the program, rate setting and costs to 
participants, methods for entering into and terminating agreements with other entities, 
rights and responsibilities of participants, plans for termination of the program, and 
information about financial, technical, and operational capabilities of third party suppliers 
of electricity.37 
To begin serving customers, the CCA must enter a service agreement with the service 
area IOU for use of its transmission and distribution system. It must then secure energy 
supplies, data management, and electricity scheduling services from the IOU. All customers 
in the service area are automatically opted into the CCA upon its establishment, though the 
CCA must distribute notices to customers of the change in service and manage any negative 
declarations or “opt-outs” from customers.38 
Though not required by AB 117, CCAs typically also undertake a technical feasibility 
study. A feasibility study can help communities understand their electricity needs, examine 
available energy resources and forecast rates, and provide CCAs with useful insights as to 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Section 2, Electrical Restructuring: Aggregation, AB 117, Section 2. September 22, 2002. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
  102 
what programs will be available to them in the short- and long-term. Most of all, feasibility 
studies are designed to show whether CCA programs will be viable, and whether their 
electricity rates can be cost-competitive with their area IOU’s rates. Feasibility studies can 
be undertaken by consultants who simply perform an economic analysis of the program and 
are paid regardless of their findings; governments may also hire at-risk contractors such 
that consultants are paid once they develop a workable, feasible program.39 The feasibility 
study process can be lengthy and expensive. In Santa Barbara, in took over a year to carry 
out its first $50,000 study (Central Coast Power n.d.). As of new policy, E-4907, 
implementation plans must be submitted a full year before program launch, causing one- to 
two- year lags (Villasenor 2018). Still, as more CCAs are established, the time between 
conception to implementation is decreasing. Lancaster Choice Energy and Peninsula Clean 
Energy both went from concept to launch in less than two years (Bonson and Brashares 
2017). In Santa Barbara, the timeline has been quite drawn-out, less because of policy 
restrictions than because of the deliberate pace of conception and mustering of political 
will. A timeline with key dates can be found in Figure 5.40 Locally, the push for the CCA 
came about as part of a groundswell of support from local community groups.41 In 2015, the 
county government picked up the movement, reached out to surrounding jurisdictions, and 
brought ten onboard.42 An advisory working group was formed, tasked with overseeing the 
feasibility study, performing marketing and outreach, and exploring how CCAs were 
developing across the state.43 This work picks up in June 2017, after the commissioning of 
the feasibility study with Wildan, but before its presentation to the public. 
 
 
                                                
39 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part I, 16:30). 
40 Dates credited to Central Coast Power website (Central Coast Power n.d.). 
41 Cregar, Jennifer. Presentation at Central Coast Sustainability Summit, University of California, 
Santa Barbara. October 11, 2017, (1:23). 
42 Ibid, (1:29). 
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Figure 5. Community Choice Aggregation Timeline, Santa Barbara County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 Ibid, (2:18). 
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II. Community Choice Aggregation in Santa Barbara County 
Community choice aggregation is a socio-technical manifestation that exists in a matrix 
of institutions, technologies, and values.44 It emerges from a set of demands, historically 
situated in the wake of failed deregulation, designed to address a pastiche of sometimes 
conflicting substantive commitments. As technical, it may work alongside new alternative 
technologies in generation, transmission, and storage, which destabilize the natural 
monopolies enjoyed by utilities for over a hundred years. As social, it exists at the whim of 
an ungainly regulatory apparatus beholden to IOUs and, aspirationally, to the public. CCA 
is socio-technical not only ontologically, but because it transforms each element of this 
matrix and tests the matrix’s total dynamism: as CCAs develop, what new technologies will 
be available, what institutions will be required to manage them, and what values will CCAs 
realize and challenge? This work takes the success of CCAs as its “matter of concern” 
(Latour 2004), and as such directs its search for facts toward those problems that arise with 
enactment, and that will likely arise with implementation.  
The story about CCA is also a story about the infrastructure it could make manifest. 
Before the rigorous work of constructive critique commences, it is worth dwelling for a 
moment on infrastructure and the Apollonian (Nietzsche [1872] 2012). In a sense, of 
course, all infrastructure is Apollonian, reaching for a reality ordered and formal, rational 
and eutopic. Our best selves. All infrastructure, to the extent that it is planned, plans to 
create greatness through design. Even the most alienating architectures of the Beaux Arts or 
the Green Belts of suburbia attempt to cultivate a particular sensibility in the people, to 
create rational solutions to messy cultural problems. And if no master plan precedes 
construction, one of two things will happen: if the outcome is good, agency will be conjured 
post hoc from the chaos;45 if the outcome is bad, people will de-agentify themselves and 
                                                
44 Stevens, Brian. May 9, 2018, (20:00). 
45 As in, for example, the conclusion of Robert Frost’s “The Road Not Taken” (1916). 
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pretend the whole thing was tragic but mostly inevitable. In the introduction to their work 
Communitas, Paul and Percival Goodman confront the question of why the American 
imagination has failed to develop these master plans, these creative solutions to problems of 
infrastructure (1947). Infrastructure, “the heaviest and biggest part of what we experience” 
is left to experts and planners and speculators, depoliticized and technicized (1947, 3). The 
Goodmans lament that Americans “seem to be trapped in their present pattern, with no 
recourse but to complicate present evils by more of the same” (1947, 6). Further still, if 
someone “plans in a physicianly way to remedy the causes of an ill rather than concentrate 
on the symptoms, if he proposes a Master Plan to provide for orderly future development, if 
he suggests an inventive new solution altogether, then he is sure to be called impractical, 
irresponsible, and perhaps a subversive alien” (1947, 7). 
Ultimately, we end up abdicating our own competence. We are deskilled through 
specialization, overwhelmed by the “sacred cow” of technology, and terrified by the chaos of 
surplus (1947, 14). Today, we choose our scarcity. We live in the knowledge of more kinds of 
technology and more modes of governance — in short, more opportunities — than at any 
moment in human history. The opportunity and challenge of CCA is to bring control over 
infrastructure back into the light. We are living in times of great potential, it says. Let’s 
start living like it. Still, despite the guides, the handbooks, the feasibility studies, the 
implementation plans and regulations — and despite the powerful corporations and 
bureaucracies — CCAs are not plans. Instead, they allow us to plan. Consequently, the whole 
design is breathtakingly open-ended.  
AB 117 emerged at a time when the values of Californians were in flux. In the wake of 
the electricity crisis they wanted reliability and price stability and low rates, but they also 
wanted alternative energy and resilience. Two processes were identified as to how these 
goods could be gotten. First, since free market ideologies had survived the rolling blackouts 
of the electricity crisis, policy-makers identified competition, with aggregation at the 
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community level this time, as a way to ensure public goods at low rates. While the state was 
keen to return to the monopoly status quo, policymakers also wanted to seed local 
governments a carve-out so that they could decide to offer their communities choice in 
procurement.46 Because in this formulation competition and market sense are seen to 
resolve environmental problems, we can refer to this discourse underlying the market side 
of CCAs as eco-modernist. At the same time, community choice held the promise that 
energy democracy could better speak to substantive commitments. By opening markets and 
shifting power to public agencies, both free market ideology and energy democracy were 
expressed in AB 117. CCA advocates thus possess diverse and contradictory aims. In this 
work, I will demonstrate the extent of these contradictions and argue that moving through 
them requires a recognition of the serious practical hemorrhages that result from eco-
modernist policy constraints. I recommend that actors embrace models of CCA enactment 
and implementation that emphasize stakeholder participation and are oriented to local 
environmental and economic resilience through the use of distributed energy resource 
(DER) infrastructures. 
A. Chapter One: The Libertarian Technics of DERs 
Community choice aggregation is a political mechanism that shifts energy procurement 
responsibilities from regulated monopolies to public governing bodies. By establishing 
democratic procedures, communities can be empowered to pursue substantive 
commitments that align with the values and priorities of those communities. David Turner 
of the World Business Academy explained, “CCAs are a tool. It’s a political mechanism to 
democratize energy.”47 Once established, CCAs become new sites of energy expertise and 
sources of public revenue within local governments that can speak to community demands 
precisely because they are designed to serve local publics. Across California these CCAs have 
                                                
46 Cregar, Jennifer. October 6, 2017, (35:00). 
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created a host of programs to deliver better rates on net-metering, contract for feed-in 
tariffs, establish electric vehicle charging stations, and electrify municipal bus services. In a 
word, by enacting an organizational transformation, different energy futures are made 
possible.  
Beyond this diverse suite of programs and offerings, CCAs bear the potential to 
dramatically remake technology infrastructures that connect end-users to electrical 
supplies. Perhaps the most important new infrastructural technology made possible by 
CCAs is a form of local renewable generation referred to as microgrids, or distributed 
energy resources (DERs). DERs are comprised of three main components, including 
distributed generation units, energy storage units, and technologies for demand reduction. 
CCAs enhance organizational opportunities for locales to pursue DERs. As energy 
democracy scholar-activist Al Weinrub argues, CCAs can promote local energy programs 
that are difficult to achieve at the state level (2017, 143). Whereas CPUC regulations operate 
largely through IOUs, CCAs can make substantive commitments to energy efficiency, 
demand reduction, and renewable generation “above and beyond what the incumbent 
utility offers” (2017, 143). Moreover, these programs can be tailored to meet the needs of a 
specific community (2017, 143). In sum, CCAs can encourage the development of 
microgrids at their own pace and tailored to their local regions. 
For some CCA advocates, this connection between DERs and CCAs is central to their 
mission. As Josh Hudson from the Community Environmental Council remarked, “I always 
envisioned CCAs as something that would enable microgrids.”48 With CCAs come local 
control, as well as a source of revenues that can be used to create new local generation 
projects.49 While these opportunities for building assets are not likely to be available in the 
first months of a CCA’s operation when CCAs tend to focus on being rate competitive with 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 Turner, David. May 7, 2018, (1:00:34). 
48 Hudson, Josh. May 8, 2018, (34:15). 
49 Ibid, (34:52). 
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IOUs, once CCAs build up reserves, they can use revenues to either reduce rates or engage 
in local build-out according to the CCA board’s priorities.50 
Further, when DERs and microgrids are pursued by CCAs, they can constitute a dual 
power system standing apart from and even in opposition to the macrogrid operated by 
IOUs. While taking over procurement responsibilities from IOUs, by default CCAs remain 
dependent on IOUs for their transmission and distribution infrastructure. This 
infrastructure is part of a macrogrid, defined by centralized generation facilities located far 
from sites of end-use, complete with transmission lines that cut precariously across 
mountains and through chaparral forests. Because microgrids incorporate distribution 
systems as well as generation systems, they cut into IOUs’ transmission and distribution 
functions while manifesting an alternative energy framework that places generation close to 
sites of use.51 In this way, energy infrastructure is decentralized, and more power is put in 
the hands of the communities that power will serve. The mechanism of this shift is the CCA, 
which creates the local expertise, the capacity for local ownership, and the local revenues to 
recreate the grid to serve communities. 
To be sure, the relationship between microgrids and CCAs is not clear-cut. DERs and 
microgrids, as they are sometimes referred to, have also been pursued by IOUs to meet 
requirements for local resilience. In 2018 Southern California Edison, for example, issued a 
request for proposals for a microgrid in the Moorpark-Goleta region spanning the South 
Coast. At the same time, as David Turner of the World Business Academy noted in our 
interview, whether IOUs’ pursuit of microgrids is a good faith move to secure local 
resiliency or a tactic to steal the thunder from more robust movements for energy 
democracy remains an open question. On the other side, CCA formation is no guarantee of 
local renewable generation, and early years of CCA operation are often marked by the 
                                                
50 Ibid, (41: 22; 42:05). 
51 Ibid, (35:07). 
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procurement of out-of-state resources with little local build-out. These conditions may 
persist when CCAs are kept anemic, revenue-starved, and heeled by IOUs attempting to 
retain customers and the CPUC wary of major changes to electricity regulation. 
CCAs and DERs do not share a simple relationship, and their connection is mediated by 
political will and financial opportunities. Still, the relationship between CCAs and DERs is 
not reducible to the policy maneuvers and asset developments enabled or problematized by 
CCAs. They bear a deeper connection in that both radically remake the socio-technical 
world of electricity generation, transmission, and use. CCAs decentralize energy 
procurement responsibilities and subvert the centralized IOU decision-making model by 
creating many distributed centers of control. Likewise, DERs challenge the centralized 
macrogrid and assert in its place an infrastructure borne from the communities they serve. 
Community choice aggregation is the socio-political organizational mechanism, and 
distributed energy resources the techno-infrastructural manifestation, of a system that 
subverts centralized hierarchies and affirms local resilience. 
Distributed energy resources are a libertarian technic (Bookchin 2005), and they 
constitute the most radical and important possibility for CCAs to pursue. In this section, I 
will develop a thorough understanding of their significance in the struggle to assert public 
power organizationally and technologically. This analysis considers both how particular 
social formations enable the development of certain technological systems, and how those 
technological systems create and entrench corresponding social formations. The 
connections between social and technical formations is crucial both to grappling with 
existing infrastructure and imagining how new social and technical formations can produce 
liberatory outcomes. This section begins by examining the prevailing energy infrastructure 
issuing from a set of corporate and governmental institutions, favoring particular 
technologies, and producing and reproducing a corresponding set of values. These 
technologies, institutions, and values present important problems for local renewable 
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generation. In this light, DERs rise to meet those challenges by providing mechanisms to 
attune to cycles of feast and famine characteristic of decentralized renewable energy. Next, 
DERs are taken up as an insurrectionary technology that upends grid centralization, which 
is empowered through the new institution of the CCA, and is capable of reconfiguring the 
values associated with energy so that they serve community resilience. In a word, CCAs and 
DERs work dialectically to fashion democratic social organization and technology. This 
section concludes with an exploration of how this feat of creating an energy infrastructure 
that serves local resilience may be undertaken strategically. 
1. Old Socio-Technics and the Problem with Renewables 
As the policy review of this work demonstrates, centralized technological systems were 
made possible by powerful utilities, entrusted with natural monopolies, and presided over 
by well-heeled regulatory bodies. This socio-technical formation is embodied by the grid, 
with its gargantuan power plants and networks of one-way circuitry feeding out to a mass of 
powerless, or at least power-dependent, consumers. This socio-technical formation, whose 
chief feature is centralization, has typically fed off of non-renewable sources such as natural 
gas, nuclear, and large hydro-electric dams. However, the defining feature of this system is 
not its use of non-renewable energy, but its degree of centralization. Solar and wind farms 
located in inland California hills and deserts meant to serve densely-populated coastal areas 
demonstrate how well renewable projects can take the old system in stride without 
embracing systemic socio-technical change. Just as the technology of non-renewable energy 
systems did not determine the kinds of institutions that emerged to generate and distribute 
them, a simple transition toward renewable energy will not deterministically usher forth 
democratic energy futures. Understanding the old, non-renewable macrogrid as a socio-
technical manifestation gives contemporary policymakers and advocates the analytic tools 
to craft new institutions and technologies that are both democratic and sustainable.  
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For the past century, the institutions designed to manage and reap the rewards of 
energy generation, distribution, and use were few and powerful. Investor-owned utilities 
dominated, spanning tremendous service areas, while they engaged in corporatist 
arrangements with state-level regulatory bodies. These institutions benefitted from 
technologies that localized power in the hands of energy producers and could be generated 
and distributed on massive scales. To this end, non-renewable energy fit the bill. Fossil fuels 
deliver base load power that can be turned on or off at the whim of its keeper and are 
capable of releasing tremendous energy precisely when they are burned, nuclear reactors 
(usually) obey the whims of the plant managers, and insofar as water is plentiful, turbines 
provide constant power ready to be used at a moment’s notice. Because these seemingly 
boundless — though paradoxically non-renewable — sources of energy allow utilities to 
meet demand at every second, institutions have been able to capitalize on ever-increasing 
demand for energy. This demand may be met favorably by burning ever-increasing stores of 
gas, bursting ever-increasing quantities of uranium, and building ever-increasing numbers 
of dams. At the same time, contemporary infrastructure is technologically dependent on 
that demand being met at a moment’s notice, and the memory of the 2000-2001 electricity 
crisis looms large as a warning of the rolling blackouts that may occur in the event of energy 
shortages. Meanwhile, consumer demand for the constant permanence of energy supplies 
gives utilities a publicly-acceptable rationale to continuously expand their systems.  
The expectation that demand for energy must be met, as though electricity bore an 
unconscious will toward infinite growth, has become a value unto itself. The will of 
monopolies to continue to grow, legitimated by the need to meet customers’ consumption, 
is here naturalized. This value of on-demand energy should be understood as emerging 
through the interaction of centralized institutions bent on growth and technologies that 
exist at the whim of those institutions. Though consumer demands supposedly fuel the 
expansion of energy generation, historically, producers of energy have decided when and 
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how much power will be generated. In the lead-up to the 2000-2001 electricity crisis, 
energy producers withheld energy to increase the value of their power, culminating in 
shortages that caused chaos around the state. Still, the fiction that growth in energy 
generation and use is purely a function of consumer demand allows that growth to be 
perceived as an unconscious will, its determinism taken at face value. 
Centralized institutions that harness on-demand energy technologies to service 
consumers who value constant permanence pose important problems for the adoption of 
decentralized renewable generation. The availability of renewable energy depends on 
natural cycles of wind and sun that do not always correspond with human cycles permitted 
and promoted by prevailing energy systems. The sun shines during the day, but what use is 
that when we leave our homes empty to work, and return to use high-powered electronics to 
prepare meals and entertain ourselves in the evening? The wind blows fiercely through 
valleys and across plains and out to sea during the shoulder seasons, but what use is that 
when we power our air conditioning and heating systems in the winter and summer? 
Intermittency is the bane of renewable energy when our values are bent toward constant 
permanence. To make renewables work for us, humans would need to attune their cycles to 
natural systems, to feast when there is plenty and economize in times of famine. In a word, 
we would have to adapt, humbly, to the offerings of nature.  
For those renewable energy supplies that come in cycles, problems of intermittency 
become problems of curtailment. Joseph Hayes from the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers explained that while an intermittent system unable to meet demand 
entails outages, “the opposite also happens.”52 In these cases, more energy is generated than 
can be used or stored, so output must be either restricted and reduced or literally wasted, 
since that power still must go somewhere. In the existing system, California often sells their 
excess solar at a loss for pennies on the dollar to Arizona. In other cases, “they’ll actually 
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literally drive it into the ground.”53 Turner explained that because of the need to curtail, 
IOUs may shy away from letting more renewables onto their grid to avoid curtailment.54 
This model also has important consequences for use of distributed energy generation, such 
as rooftop solar. Utilities argue that the technical need for excess solar to go somewhere 
means that NEM customers must remain connected to the grid. As Hayes elaborated, this 
framework makes NEM a good deal for utilities. The excess solar “typically goes back to the 
utility, and you sell it back to them, at a fraction of what they’ll actually turn around and sell 
it to you for. [...] They’ll actually give you credits for putting electrons back on the grid, but 
down to the point where your bill hits zero, that’s it. They’re not gonna send you a check.”55 
With storage systems, Hayes noted that power could be dumped into batteries, “but that 
infrastructure’s not in place yet.”56  
Insofar as our approach to energy demands constant permanence, local renewables 
alone cannot address our electricity needs. Contemporary technology offers no iron-clad 
assurance that demand will be able to be met at every second by renewable energy sources. 
Thus, as nuclear plants have shuttered across California, gas-fired peaker plants – not 
renewables – have emerged in their wake. Peaker plants are designed to turn on only when 
they are needed, such as during emergencies or heatwaves. They do not satisfy base load 
energy requirements, which in California are still largely met by nuclear,57 and they are 
insufficient for meeting local resiliency needs. Because they are designed to satisfy sudden 
spikes in demand, they are typically gas-fired. Without a better strategy to harness sources 
of energy like solar, California will continue to rely on carbon-intensive systems.58  
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According to my participants, California has both not enough solar and too much. 
Larger-scale renewable operations, particularly those embedded in regional spanning states 
and time zones, are better able to manage problems of curtailment and intermittency, 
largely because they are able to centralize generation while distributing electrons across 
vast networks of demand. But the challenges of curtailment and intermittency, perhaps 
better framed as the challenges of abiding by non-human cycles, presents an impasse for 
decentralized renewable energy systems. It is this challenge that distributed energy 
resources rise to meet. 
2. Beyond Curtailment 
At present, discourse surrounding renewables has emphasized how renewables present 
problems of intermittency, where demand is not met by supply, and abundance, where 
supply supersedes demand. At root, these are problems stem from the current 
infrastructure’s inability to manage supply. David Turner from the World Business 
Academy explained, “Until recently, curtailment’s been looked at as just a kind of fact of 
life.”59 According to the old paradigm, “You sell it or give it away or sometimes you even pay 
other states to take this energy off your hands. Or you just run it into the ground. You throw 
it away.”60 Turner concluded, “The way we are right now, when we’re in a period of excess, 
we throw away clean energy. When we’re in a period of shortage, we burn energy. It is 
totally back-asswards.”61 
Turner proceeded to propose a system that feeds off the feast and famine of energy, 
asserting, “If you have to curtail, you’re not doing it right.”62 He continued, “Most people’s 
question is, how do you avoid [curtailment]? And my answer is, you’ve got to design a 
system that doesn’t just manage excess, but actually plans for it, actually embraces it, 
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actually wants more of it, feeds off of it. And that’s what we’re advocating for at the World 
Business Academy.”63 This effort entails the development of distributed energy resource 
(DER) systems. DERs, a more precise though largely synonymous term for microgrids, 
describe the three-part systems of decentralized energy generation, system balancing, and 
demand reduction (Weinrub 2017, 145). Decentralized energy generation refers to 
(typically) renewable generation components, such as photovoltaic solar panels and wind 
turbines, that can be decentralized. These energy sources can be localized on the scale of a 
city, a neighborhood, or even a building. System balancing most commonly entails batteries 
and backfeeding technologies that enable the two-way flow of energy. Demand reduction 
encompasses a host of technologies and practices ranging from simple conservation to 
energy efficiency to smart devices that smooth out the peaks and valleys of use.64 These 
technologies can attune renewable energy to human demand while enabling their 
decentralization under community ownership. 
The three features of DERs directly challenge the principal characteristics of the 
macrogrid. First, because they source energy from decentralized generation, they can 
counter the centralization of the macrogrid, which was made possible by and in turn made 
possible the vast concentration of wealth in the hands of regulated monopolies. Second, 
because they use system balancing technologies to capture, store, and distribute energy, 
they defy the one-way flow of energy that manifested a hierarchy of producer over 
consumer. And third, because they incorporate demand reduction, they problematize the 
assumption that demand must be met at every second by creating technological 
mechanisms whereby end-users can alter consumption according to supply and 
accommodate energy peaks and valleys (Weinrub 2017, 146). The microgrid is thus an 
                                                                                                                                                 
62 Ibid, (25:02). 
63 Ibid, (25:36). 
64 Lewis, Craig. Presentation at Central Coast Sustainability Summit, University of California, Santa 
Barbara. October 11, 2017, (1:35:00). 
  116 
infrastructural antithesis of the macrogrid that in turn threatens prevailing institutions and 
the technologies that have enabled their dominance.  
As microgrid technologies have advanced and more environmental activists and 
renewable companies have recognized the potential of battery storage, they have clashed 
with experts who abide by older ways of thinking. Turner was most strident on this point. 
He recalled a series of webinars and conversations he had been engaged in at the state level, 
and he asserted that those who have been in the industry or decades, “are struggling 
because they’re clinging on to these old ideas about how energy needs to be managed and 
planned for and things like that.”65 He mocked, “’Tweak this, tweak that’ – no! You’ve got to 
burn the whole thing to the ground first!”66 To move forward with microgrid technologies, 
Turner insisted, “You’ve gotta, not physically, but conceptually, break the whole thing 
down, you’ve got to establish a whole new vocabulary, a whole new set of values.”67 In 
particular, “policy evolution” would be essential, especially “regulations passed establishing 
concrete value metrics for all the different types of services.”68 Here, new value metrics are 
created when experts assign worth to legitimize new forms of energy management and thus 
facilitate investment in new technologies. While current value metrics are oriented toward 
generation, our efforts must be aimed at “avoiding curtailment, being able to collect, store, 
and distribute energy on-demand.”69 
Crucial here is Turner’s assertion that even this new energy system must be capable of 
distributing “energy on-demand.” At heart, the management of energy is concerned with 
how to turn an energy supply that does not ebb and flow according to social demand into 
something humans can control. While discussions regarding renewables have emphasized 
diversity in technologies according to bioregions, where sunny plains are home to solar 
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farms and windy valleys host wind turbines. Still, technologies surrounding renewables are 
developing so that humans may become disconnected from any requirement that we attune 
ourselves to the offerings of the seasons. Fossil fuel energy constituted of course the most 
dramatic severance from natural cycles, and pursuing that energy source that took 
millennia to accumulate has within a few decades brought global ecological catastrophe. 
Fossil fuels, remarked Turner, are “one hundred percent reserved, stored energy,” and what 
we are forced to move to now is “a system that’s day-to-day collected, intermittent.”70 Early 
concerns about renewable storage struggled to figure out how to deal with daily duck curves 
and energy storage systems designed to handle “two- or four-hour iterations” and “the late 
afternoon, early evening spike.”71 According to Turner, “the truth is, we’ve gotta get beyond 
that to daily, weekly, monthly storage. We gotta get into seasonal storage.”72 At the same 
time, dealing with curtailment means that we have to grapple with constant permanence in 
a new way. Rather than trying to wring constant permanence out of impermanent systems, 
a distributed grid is one where we must store and plan in anticipation of impermanence. 
Not all technologies we develop in the context of energy and renewables mean we are more 
independent of nature – sometimes it means a refashioning of those relationships along 
more ecological lines. In the context of DERs, new technologies can mean energy can be 
more decentralized, and that it can be tailored to the needs of particular communities. In 
the framework of social ecology, energy systems that enable community control over 
common resources where production and consumption stay local is the gold standard. 
3. The Challenge of Balance 
Crucial to overcoming issues with curtailment and intermittency are technologies of 
system balancing, including the ability for systems to back-feed electricity across the grid. 
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In a word, DERs depend on the grid’s capacity to share energy horizontally across a 
network. In contrast, the current macrogrid that supplies the South Coast with energy is 
built to accommodate centralized energy production, which renders local renewable 
generation technically difficult. Our existing infrastructure, designed according to 
institutions established one hundred years ago and infrastructure built fifty years ago, is 
typically comprised of one massive generation source and a series of one-way distribution 
lines that scale down the voltage as the electricity passes through substations until they 
reach a small enough voltage that they can be used in commercial and residential facilities.73 
This system “was never intended to have these multiple sources of generation scattered all 
through the grid that are essentially back-feeding in the opposite direction.”74 Like 
curtailment, the issue of back-feeding poses problems for NEM customers.75 David Turner 
from the World Business Academy explained that “even if you’re doing just a very small 
percentage of your total load, [the IOUs] have to run through all these technical 
assessments to make sure you’re not going to back-feed.”76 As such, acquiring approval to 
interconnect to the grid is a long, involved process.77 
In order to properly accommodate decentralized microgrid energy generation, the grid’s 
inability to manage back-feeding will have to be addressed. Hayes explained, “In order for 
[microgrids] to really work well, to be able to feed and back-feed and share loads [...] you’ve 
gotta have a smart grid. And that means really re-thinking and re-building and re-
engineering what’s out there.”78 Turner described this process of instating a smart grid as 
“grid modernization.”79 Grid modernization is intended to “provide the bidirectional flow of 
electricity and information needed for balancing a decentralized energy system” (Weinrub 
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2017, 146). In my conversations with Hayes from the IBEW and Turner from WBA, both 
spoke to the enormity of the task ahead. Hayes insisted, “You really, you gotta think about 
the whole system, not just little aspects of the system.”80 Hayes emphasized that many 
different kinds of microgrids are possible: “there’s all kinds of different ways to put that 
together, but it takes a lot of thought, a lot of engineering, a lot of coordination, and a lot of 
investment.”81 Grid modernization, which would be crucial to the development of DERs, 
was more than a simple technology; it would need institutions to bring it to fruition. 
Regarding the investment, Hayes and Turner agreed that grid modernization would 
occur whether a CCA or IOU institution took the lead. Hayes asserted that grid 
modernization could be a tremendous boon for whoever owned the grid: “If I had that kind 
of money, I would double-down on that kind of stuff and say, ‘Hey, yeah, my company 
wants to invest in this because I see that this pays off over time in a big kind of way’.”82 
Tellingly, Hayes concluded his statement, “You know, just like the privately-owned utilities 
had done decades ago.”83 Here, Hayes refers to the major investments in infrastructure 
made by IOUs over the past century. In such cases, IOUs had poured money into public 
works because they were guaranteed monopolies over those systems, and suffice it to say 
the resulting infrastructure had been fundamental to IOU dominance over the next hundred 
years. Turner noted, “The money’s gonna be spent one way or another. And people’ve got a 
choice. They can either do something about it and do the things that they want, or the 
decisions are going to be made for them. And we better hope that they like what the 
decisions are.”84 Insofar as IOUs control the grid, communities will have to cross their 
fingers, hoping for decent systems that serve them well. With CCAs, public entities in 
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California now have a chance to make those investments in infrastructure and fund the 
development of microgrids so that they can own the power. 
If CCAs are able to make those investments in microgrid technology, they will be poised 
to reap the financial benefits, and they will be able to develop and secure publicly owned 
energy infrastructure. Advanced system balancing technologies could also make for a more 
robust CCA. For example, Chloe Becker from the California Alliance for Community Energy 
argued that the South Coast is poised to combine its renewable resource potential and its 
need for local storage in the event of storms into a system to finance the CCA. They 
elaborated, “If our CCA were designed from the get-go to have a ton of storage capacity, [...] 
the California Independent System Operator could send those electrons our way.”85 In that 
way, the South Coast “could be taking that excess electricity off their hands instead of 
having to pay neighboring states to take it, and that certainly would change the economics 
of our program.”86  
In turn, and insofar as CCAs embrace new ways of thinking about curtailment and 
intermittency, CCAs are likely to more aggressively pursue DER technologies. The 
technological changes made possible by DERs are at odds with the existing electrical 
infrastructure and those institutions that have fashioned the macrogrid. Thus, it is little 
wonder that, for example, the microgrid pursued by SCE in 2018 was unceremoniously 
shuffled away.87 The tension between old ways and new ways of thinking about renewables 
has had important consequences for the fight for more renewables in Santa Barbara County. 
Wildan is the consultant firm behind the first feasibility study for Santa Barbara’s CCA, 
which has elsewhere been criticized for adopting assumptions typical of an IOU88. Amelia 
Carr from the Sierra Club criticized Wildan for creating a faulty model based on ways of 
thinking about procurement typical of IOUs. In reference to a supposed saturation of the 
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solar market, Carr explained, “Wildan said, ‘Oh, that shows that we don’t need any more 
solar, we’re at maximum solar capacity.’ And that doesn’t mean that at all.”89 Instead, Carr 
advocated for storage, as well as balancing solar generation with wind and wave turbines.90 
Carr remarked that, when they had recently put out bids for storage in Aliso Canyon, even 
SCE was surprised at “the low bids they got, and how quickly they were able to do it.”91 
Where IOUs and those institutions that have adopted old ways of thinking about renewable 
energy fail to fully embrace new technologies, CCAs may act as an organizational tool to get 
DERs that are pursued according to the demands of the community and placed under the 
community’s control. In this way, CCAs as an organizational mechanism, and DERs as a 
technological advancement, may together constitute just such a socio-technical 
insurrection. 
4. Decentralization: From Resilience to Reversing Polarity 
Building a smart grid capable of feeding and back-feeding and sharing loads not only 
enables system balancing and makes possible more aggressive transitions to renewables, 
but it promises to challenge the centralized character of electricity generation and 
transmission that typifies our present model. In addition to clear environmental benefits, 
including their ability to manage and increase renewable capacity and increase efficiency in 
transmission with generation sites closer to end-users, microgrid technologies also make 
possible a transformation of the social organization of energy production. Microgrids entail 
decentralized generation such that there could be many producers, and they could be 
distributed more horizontally. Decentralized generation would enable greater community 
resilience in the face of natural disasters, but it would also create greater resilience as 
communities by reversing the polarity of the electricity system and putting power into the 
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hands of consumers. In this way one-time consumers, restricted to the role of homo 
economicus, make decisions irreducible to fears over reliability and price, and thus claim 
the functions of homo politicus. 
Distributed energy resources constitute what Murray Bookchin has called a libertarian 
technic. A technic is applied knowledge that shapes the knower and their social context. 
Technics can be more or less libertarian, more or less authoritarian, and the significant 
problem of technics is “its ties with the ideals and social structures of freedom” (2005, 326). 
In a world, how do our technologies make or unmake our freedom? For Bookchin, achieving 
a libertarian technics would reconstitute social and productive relations ecologically to 
foster consociative interactions (2005, 329). Practically speaking libertarian technics entail 
decentralized technologies that remain close to local ecosystems and affirm the integrity 
and resilience of the human community (2005, 347). 
A system characterized by distributed generation would ease the precarious energy 
situations that many communities find themselves in. In my conversation with Turner, he 
remembered how he first discovered the gravity of Goleta’s resiliency problem, chiefly the 
precarity of the Edison transmission lines coming over the mountains and the fragility of 
the Glen Annie substation. He recounted, “I used to run down the back of Glen Annie and 
think, ‘Oh yeah, there’s the power station,’ and not even think that that is the station. [...] If 
someone wanted to take down this entire grid, or most of this grid, all they’d have to do is 
blow up the Glen Annie Station, and that would be it.”92 Turner found out about the 
resiliency problem “on a lark” when he was checking out the CPUC website: “I said, ‘Holy 
shit, this is like, really bad’.”93  
Not long before our interview, the residents of the South Coast had encountered the 
fragility of their energy system with the Thomas Fire in December 2017 and the Montecito 
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Mudslide in January 2018. These events made brutally clear Lorenzo Kristov’s argument 
regarding local power, which Turner cited in our interview: that resilience is always local. 
According to Turner, when the debris flow from the Montecito Mudslide had come down 
the mountains, it had ruptured the pipes to the local reservoirs. While the facilities were 
equipped with shut-off valves, Turner explained, “You had to be on-site to manually start 
them up, to provide energy to start the valve. And it was because of that that they’ve almost 
lost half the local water.”94 Turner argued that a system capable of employing local 
distributed generation with storage capacity would have been able to power the emergency 
shut-off valve, “So when the grid did go out, there would have been on-site generation that 
would have kicked in, and there would have been no disruption.”95 The lesson from this 
dramatic example is that, the closer a source of generation is to the end-user, the more 
resilient each user is in the face of disasters and outages. Moreover, Turner wanted to seize 
the moment of the Mudslide to create resiliency where it had been lacking before: “We say, 
this is terrible, it’s a terrible thing, but it opens up an opportunity. I mean, there were areas 
that were wiped so clean, they had to go back and resurvey to figure out the property 
lines…What we’re saying is, instead of rebuilding the same thing, and putting back up the 
same polls, basically replicating, let’s do a microgrid.”96  
Resilience is typically understood vis-à-vis threats to precarious power lines, but during 
our interview, Turner also touched on economic resilience, a theme also explored in 
Kristov’s work. Here, Turner pointed to the two plants in Oxnard and Camarillo coming 
offline. He warned, “The polarity is about to switch because they’re going from a place 
where they were a source of energy sending out, both are going to be gone, and now they’re 
strictly consumers. They’re relying on transmission of energy from other locations into their 
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location in order to function.”97 From here, “They’re gonna have a revenue problem because 
any money that's generated within city boundaries is taxable. So, what I'm telling them is, 
you might not have the resiliency problem that we have up here. Your problem is 
economic.”98 In this way, the development of a local microgrid could help Oxnard and 
Camarillo generate excess revenue and may even employ more people than a conventional 
plant, since distributed energy systems often require more maintenance and can thus offer 
more local jobs.99 
In turning sites of energy consumption into sites of generation, microgrids foster 
resilient electrical and economic systems. In this way, microgrids mount a serious challenge 
to the prevailing grid structure. Beyond the technical problems associated with the existing 
grid – with its inability to back-feed and share loads and its fragility in the face of natural 
disasters – there is a more fundamental problem with how power, in the sociological sense, 
is distributed. Insofar as consumers are separated from energy production, they exist at the 
whim of energy producers and distributors. According to the old macrogrid, illustrated in 
Figure 6, power is generated at a single center and distributed down through a chain of 
substations. Understood hierarchically, the center of power generation is also the top of the 
power ladder, and all those underneath function at the whim of that center. Technologically 
and sociologically, this is a precarious system that literally disempowers publics. With a 
microgrid model, illustrated in Figure 7, the centers become many. These centers are 
fundamentally different from macrogrid centers in that they are located in the areas they 
serve, and ownership of those sites of production may be had by the very entities that 
consume that power. The functions of producer, distributor, and consumer are knit together 
here. When these functions are brought together locally, it becomes more difficult for the 
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costs of production to be externalized to other areas, for consumption to outstrip an area’s 
productive capacities, and for distribution to bear inequalities. 
Figure 6. The Macrogrid 
 
A number of positive results issue from this new energy model. These systems will be 
more resilient to natural disasters, but they will also create tighter economic circles, and 
revenue generated from these distributed sites will stay in and around these many centers 
as local labor is both in demand and ready at hand. Moreover, IOUs with their massive 
centralized systems will be scarce as more of their distribution – not just procurement – 
functions will be taken over by locally-controlled public agencies more answerable to the 
communities they serve. Robust decentralized energy systems will become “part of the 
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general planning process in the resiliency of the community.”100 Communities will not 
simply be encouraged to care for their own, but will have the infrastructural capacity to do 
so. 
Figure 7. The Microgrid 
 
As the polarity of electricity systems are reversed, and power is vested in decentralized 
publics, those publics may find new opportunities for standing up and speaking for 
themselves on matters of energy use. At present, the public has been flattened from homo 
politicus into homo economicus, the consumer with their narrowly circumscribed set of 
possible inclinations effectively reduced to price and quantity. In the discourse of 
centralized energy, corporations assert that consumers demand electricity at ever-
increasing quantities; at the same time, by centering consumer demand, IOUs are able to 
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legitimize the continuation of the centralized grid. In reality, it has always been the energy 
producer, the procurer, and the distributors who make money off of energy sold who have 
pulled the levers. Meanwhile, homo economicus has never been asked what kind of world 
they want to live in. As one-time consumers are re-agentified through distributed 
generation siting and public ownership over procurement decisions, both political and 
economic decisions will be made available. Now IOUs hold publics hostage with the threat 
of high rates and failures of reliability. Microgrids change the script by putting power into 
the hands of publics and making them centrally resilient. We need no longer be damsels but 
heroines.  
The real-world success of microgrid technologies and other decentralized energy 
systems abound. At a talk at the Central Coast Sustainability Summit at UCSB in 2017, 
Craig Lewis of the Clean Coalition recounted Germany’s tremendous success in powering 
their country on DERs. In 2002, California had twice as much solar capacity deployed as 
Germany, but Germans focused on wholesale distributed generation while California 
emphasized centralized generation and retail distributed generation.101 For the following 
decade Germany “ran circles around us” and put up ten times more solar than us.102 In a 
move promising to those concerned about landscapes blanketed horizon to horizon with 
solar farms, almost all of Germany’s solar has been constructed on manmade, “built” 
environments.103 Further, the projects are mostly small, local operations owned by 
individuals. Ninety percent of solar projects are built at 1 megawatt or smaller,104 and over 
50% is owned by individuals, with 11% owned by farmers.105 Finally, Germany pays about 
half as much for their solar as Californians: given the amount that Germans save on 
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transmission by virtue of their distributed grid,106 with German efficiency, Californians 
would be paying around five cents per kilowatt hour.107  
The German case demonstrates that distributed generation can effectively reverse the 
polarity of our energy system, placing one-time consumers in positions of ownership over 
their electrical systems. It would be possible for downtown areas to cover their parking 
garages with panels, for residences to install panels and become producers for their 
communities, for cities to lay claim to the real estate on top of big box stores. Essentially, 
areas that were once energy sinks could become sources, and consumers could become 
producers. Community choice aggregation is a means to shift political power so that public 
bodies answerable to local communities are empowered to make decisions to pursue 
microgrids. While these technologies have been undertaken by IOUs, these programs have 
historically been weak. Moreover, while DERs owned and operated by IOUs may mark a 
technological change, they will not bring a change in how energy is managed 
organizationally. CCAs may also push the development of microgrids by placing experts in 
microgrid technologies in positions of directing energy policies for the express benefit of 
publics. In a word, CCAs are a social and organizational tool that can be used to make 
manifest technologies that refashion energy systems that are democratic and resilient. 
5. Technoregions of Insurrection 
In his work, Lorenzo Kristov imagines centers of power generation and consumption 
starting at the level of the building and expanding outwards in concentric circles to involve 
blocks, neighborhoods, cities, and counties (2018). The state level mostly operates as a way 
to lock in local advances and to bankroll local operations. Kristov’s model radically conflicts 
with the typical way that regions are organized politically, where more centralized modes of 
organization such as federal or state bodies wield sovereign power over broad territories. As 
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the literature review of this work has explored, there are important reasons to work toward 
Kristov’s vision of relocalization. By breaking up centralized power and creating a multitude 
of horizontally distributed centers, communities are better empowered to participate in 
their own governance, more able to engage in social experiments to make big changes in 
small places, and capable of adapting their energy systems to what is locally ready at hand. 
In this section, I will explore the promise of relocalizing specifically around the concept of 
the technoregion and using infrastructure as the units of module, insurrectionary change. 
There are many compelling strategies for how to reconstitute the local in a way that does 
justice to local control. Insofar as participatory governance involves cooperation toward the 
accomplishment of community goals, having affinity among people within locales is crucial 
to achieving local democracy. These zones of affinity might be referred to as socio-regions. 
Elsewhere in the literature, it has become attractive to reimagine location according to 
bioregion. Locales must consider the availability of natural resources to power their lives 
efficiently without creating broad networks of exchange that leave them precarious and 
disempowered, and so there is much to appreciate in the bioregional approach. At the same 
time, these socio-regions and bioregions rarely correspond to political zones. These politico-
regions, defined by legal precedent, ordinances, and political power, both circumscribe 
action and may be marshaled to address collective concerns. Thus, beyond the obvious 
problem of how to relocalize against the wishes of centralized powers, another important 
problem surfaces as politico-regions conflict with socio-regions and bioregions. 
At the same time, the existing grid and territorial dominance of utilities requires that we 
consider the technoregion as an important way that microgrid technologies for 
decentralization can scale-out. Technoregions refer to areas that are networked by 
infrastructural technologies, bear their own regional properties, and are more or less 
autonomous. Like bioregions, technoregions are defined by networks of production, 
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distribution, and consumption, and they are shaped around a region’s material properties. 
Unlike bioregions, technoregions appertain not to the offerings of nature, but to the 
availability of human-made infrastructure. Technoregions may be defined by cable 
networks and telephone lines, by dams and irrigation systems, by energy substations and 
community solar projects. Technoregions can exist under the domain of IOUs, but control 
over technoregions may also be claimed by local governments and communities. 
If our model of change is infrastructural, we would do well to consider infrastructural 
zones or technoregions as modules for change. Here, the creation of microgrids fitted to 
existing technoregions can enact infrastructural change by shifting power to communities 
and dramatically upsetting the centralized power of macrogrids. And because microgrids 
enable communities and decentralized publics to assert themselves as a multitude of 
centers, they can manifest a new geography of engagement among those centers by 
interconnecting and sharing energy horizontally.108 Where these technoregions overlap, 
they can support each other; where they touch, they can form interconnections (Kristov 
2018). Moving technoregion by technoregion, microgrid technologies can disperse 
throughout broad networks while maintaining local control, and without ceding resilience 
to centralized systems. Here, insurrection by technoregion offers a blueprint of socio-
technical change antithetical to top-down models that can easily capture centralized 
regulatory bodies and are not oriented toward the needs of concrete local actors.  
To accomplish such infrastructural decentralization, however, and to enact modular 
change that begins from concrete realities of the existing grid, microgrids must be fitted to 
existing infrastructure. In this vain, during his presentation, Lewis of the Clean Coalition 
described how microgrids may be developed locally and packaged into replicable models 
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that might be used in other areas of the grid. Here, the technoregional substation is the 
principal unit of change. For Lewis, microgrids can target an area of grid, such as a 
substation within a grid, develop a blueprint, test the model, and spread that blueprint to 
other substations throughout a territory.109 At the same time, before microgrids are 
established, a variety of baseline analyses of energy use must be undertaken, and microgrids 
will be unique to each area.110 Further, microgrids must be developed according to the 
availability of hosting capacity on the grid, and if for example the grid is already saturated 
with solar, utilities may refuse to interconnect a new microgrid or may “send you a very 
large bill, and then the economics of the thing won’t work anymore.”111 Thus, in the model of 
change that takes the technoregion as the unit of analysis, modular change must occur 
within certain technical and financial restrictions while also challenging them. In the 
context of CCAs, microgrids can act as a form of dual power vis-à-vis IOU-owned 
distribution and transmission infrastructure. Because they create alternative avenues to 
generate and secure energy without toppling the macrogrid in one fell swoop, microgrids 
can thus be considered an insurrectionary alternative to IOU grid power. 
The insurrectionary model of change, of building the new world in the shell of the old, 
has special importance in the case of microgrids. Lewis spoke to the Clean Coalition’s 
involvement with East Bay Community Energy, where the CCA is pursuing DERs sited on 
city rooftops.112 Lewis emphasized the potential of siting hundreds of megawatts on “built 
environments,” so that community microgrids will not take up “greenfield land.”113 In 
addition to the clear environmental benefit of siting solar on city rooftops, locating 
microgrids close to end-use sites will mean greater resilience for the communities they 
serve. It could also mean that those communities will have greater control over their energy. 
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Such local control over energy requires not simply a change to microgrid technology, but 
also requires that that energy be held in common, such as by a CCA. Thus, we should be 
wary of microgrid projects that are owned by IOUs, or which are scaled to cover so vast a 
region that they do not meaningfully create the possibility for local management. For 
example, SCE’s request for proposals for a microgrid issued in 2018 was set to cover the 
area from Moorpark to Goleta, cities that lie over 60 miles apart.114 Insofar as the capacity 
for sustained interactions among local actors are an important feature of a locale, the region 
ranging from Goleta to Moorpark encompasses an area far larger than a locale. Here, the 
IOU’s definition of a workable technoregion also fatally conflicts with other understandings 
of the local, such as the socio- or bioregion. To speak to issues of local resilience and 
community control, the microgrid must be much more distributed and must be owned by 
communities.  
If technoregions are to be an important unit of change, it becomes important to ask 
more specific questions about how we should define those units and their potential for 
change. In short, what qualities make a substation a possible site for insurrectionary, 
modular change? First, crumbling and outdated infrastructure may create pragmatic 
opportunities for dramatic technoregional change, since infrastructure must be updated 
regardless of other normative commitments. Recent histories of natural disasters create not 
only infrastructural gaps in substations, but also political and strategic openings for IOUs 
eager to protect their image and their ability to secure resilience. More broadly, high 
demand for resiliency could spur the drive for microgrids in precarious areas. These 
openings may in turn be seized by groups aimed at more radical futures. Infrastructural 
affordances may also be created as allied oppositional movements against peaker plants 
gain traction. From here, technoregions may be constructed to serve communities, but the 
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extent to which DERs can make good on their promise of energy democracy could depend 
on how DERs are sited and who owns them. 
Microgrids open up the possibility for the formation of new technoregions. Existing 
technoregions were created by IOUs and centralized regulatory bodies, and these 
techoregions contain far-flung sources of energy generation and sinks of energy 
consumption. In short, production and consumption of resources were rearranged over 
massive scales to optimize profits. The technoregion fueled by the Diablo Canyon Nuclear 
Power Plant dwarfed the size of counties, and the technoregion of the Los Angeles Aqueduct 
was created by presidential mandate to move resources from the thriving community of 
Owen’s Valley to turn Los Angeles into a bustling city. But while old technoregions 
expanded their reach to concentrate power and shift resources, new technoregions defined 
by microgrids can be built as locally-managed, locally-serving projects. Beyond community 
choice, it is even foreseeable that neighborhoods could collectively manage their energy 
production and consumption, trading energy within communities through programs 
facilitated by Blockchain technologies. Here, isolated nodes in a network are less vulnerable 
to transmission failures because each node would have access to the means of its own 
generation. It may behoove communities to develop methods of exchange, as per Kristov’s 
concentric circles, but these interactions would be secondary to the principal work of self-
sufficiency. Moving by technoregion through replication, mimicry, and horizontal 
interaction, distributed energy resources can become the new technology for our energy 
future. Local control through community choice aggregation can constitute the 
organizational mechanism to achieve those aims. 
B. Chapter Two: Contradiction 
Community choice aggregation is a tool that shifts decision-making power from 
corporations to locally-controlled public agencies capable of building the expertise and 
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revenues necessary to create decentralized energy systems, which can better ensure local 
environmental and economic resilience. This new energy system is an important part of the 
movement for energy democracy. At the same time, CCA policy as outlined in AB 117 bears 
important conceits to existing regulatory and market frameworks that pose significant 
problems for the aspirations of energy democracy advocates.  
In this work, I understand these problems in terms of a fundamental contradiction 
between the energy democracy aspirations of CCAs and the eco-modernist burdens 
embedded in CCA policy. Genealogically, eco-modernism can be understood as an 
agreement between capital and state actors, both reliant on bureaucratic methods of 
rationalization, to manifest technocratic solutions to ecological collapse while leaving intact 
capital and state domination (Scott 1998). In terms of archaeology, or how it exists in the 
world and how we know it, eco-modernism is a loose discursive bundle of commitments to 
limit the excesses of anthropogenic ecological calamity, protect existing business interests, 
minimally impact consumers, and strategically accommodate radical and especially 
anarchist environmentalisms (Hajer 1995). The basic contradictions between the eco-
modernist approach and the energy democracy approach to CCA formation and 
implementation can be found in Table 2. 
Key sites of conflict include methods of increasing clean energy content, the role of 
publics versus markets in determining program features, acceptable prices for clean and 
publicly-owned energy, and the future of relations between incumbent IOUs and new CCAs. 
Here, each consideration when building a program is met with a corresponding structural 
constraint that favors the eco-modernist approach. To the right can be found alternative 
energy democracy solutions. In the remainder of this work, I will demonstrate how these 
structural constraints foreclose aspirations toward energy democracy, especially by limiting 
the viability of distributed energy resources. Meanwhile, advocates of more ambitious 
programs that understand local control and public ownership as a path toward  
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 Table 2. Eco-Modernism and Energy Democracy Consideration Matrix 
Consideration Eco-Modernist 
Commitment 
Structural 
Constraint or 
Condition 
Energy 
Democracy 
Response 
How should the 
proportion of clean 
energy be 
increased? 
GHG-free and 
renewable 
technologies should 
be procured at the 
lowest cost. 
Low-cost renewable 
and GHG-free 
energy can be had if 
they are built at 
large-scales and 
located far from 
sites of end-use. 
Renewable and 
GHG-free sources of 
energy best serve 
communities and 
provide for 
economic resilience 
when they are 
generated locally 
and owned publicly. 
How should publics 
engage in CCA 
program 
development? 
Substantive 
decisions should be 
determined by “the 
market.” 
It has become 
politically 
customary for 
communities to 
engage in technical 
feasibility studies at 
the beginning of 
CCA exploration. 
Advocates and 
communities must 
strategize on 
program specifics 
from day one to 
ensure programs 
are sustainable and 
serve the needs of 
the community. 
How much should 
communities be 
asked to pay for 
clean, publicly-
owned power? 
Keeping rates low is 
a top priority so as 
to minimally impact 
consumers. 
If CCA rates are not 
competitive, 
ratepayers may 
always opt out and 
remain with 
incumbent IOUs. 
Ratepayers should 
be understood as 
community 
members with a 
wide array of 
commitments and 
concerns, including 
environmental, 
social, and 
economic justice. 
How should CCAs 
continue to engage 
with IOUs? 
CCAs should engage 
IOUs as partners to 
be kept financially 
viable. 
IOUs maintain 
control of 
transmission and 
distribution 
infrastructure. They 
also remain 
providers of last 
resort, thus offering 
ratepayers 
“customer choice.” 
Continued 
engagement with 
IOUs is a threat to 
public power, such 
as when PCIA 
charges are used to 
keep CCAs anemic. 
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environmental concerns strive to carve out a space for more radical futures in a policy 
framework that is designed against them. 
In this analysis, it is not necessary to argue that any particular participant holds eco-
modernist tendencies. Even those participants more willing to abide by eco-modernist 
constraints structured into CCA policy may not necessarily identify as eco-modernists in 
any appreciable way. Instead, I simply take note of how they respond to those structures 
that are rooted in eco-modernism, and reflect on the kinds of strategies they use to move 
through problems as they arise. In this way, eco-modernist policy does not map seamlessly 
onto actors, though eco-modernist policy finds resonance among some actors and 
resistance among still more. 
The first important contradiction between eco-modernist constraints and energy 
democracy aspirations is on the very matter of distributed energy resources. Where eco-
modernist approaches to energy procurement value renewables at low-cost, energy 
democracy calls for renewables, but also for an inversion of the existing energy structure to 
place communities at the center. This aspiration has been fully fleshed out in the first 
section of this work. At the same time, CCAs confront the structural necessity of keeping 
rates low to prevent customer opt-outs. Customer opt-outs preserve customer choice, but 
they also build in a requirement for rate competitiveness between CCAs and IOUs, which 
presents an important barrier for more expensive, decentralized energy systems. Customer 
opt-outs, and the structured requirement for low rates, creates a constraint for CCAs that 
bears a connection to eco-modernism. Here, the suggestion is that consumers should be 
minimally impacted by the transition to cleaner futures, and that customers should be able 
to choose among energy procurers. These conceits actually help maintain the dominance of 
IOUs and thus help preserve existing business interests. In this way, commitment to certain 
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eco-modernist principles ultimately help IOUs and keep intact the existing centralized 
macrogrid. 
From here, I turn to an analysis of how CCA advocates grapple with these constraints 
and argue for the development of more comprehensive programs and the creation of new 
value metrics. Emerging from this discussion is the conviction on the part of energy 
democracy advocates that when community benefits such as DERs are designed into CCAs 
from the beginning, communities and stakeholders will support the CCA programs on their 
own terms and become committed participants in the CCA themselves. In this way, by 
soliciting active participation, CCA programs can most successfully speak to energy 
democracy aspirations. These CCA advocates who regard stakeholder participation as 
fundamental to successful CCA programs tend to work on the “outside” of CCA program 
design, and they come into conflict with county staff working on the “inside.” These inside 
actors have elected to begin CCA exploration with a technical feasibility study, rather than 
with program design pitched at serving local communities and created from the bottom up.  
The first technical feasibility study failed to produce favorable results, and the survival 
of the movement despite those results can be understood in light of the political will of local 
politicians. The study was conducted by third party consultants whose expertise was 
regarded as objective because they were precluded from helping to manage the program if 
and when it launched. In this way, these consultants had no skin in the game as to whether 
the CCA succeeded or failed. The failure of the first feasibility study to deliver favorable 
results presents an opportunity to explore the varying strategies that different CCA 
advocates adopted to move forward on such commitments as clean energy and local control.  
Still, because of the political will of some actors, the County voted narrowly to continue 
to explore developing a CCA program despite the poor results of the study. In the following 
months, a second feasibility study was commissioned with a new consultant firm that took a 
less conservative view of program finances and would be allowed to engage in the 
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management of the program if and when it launched. The case demonstrates a point 
resonant with the energy democracy framework explored earlier, namely that engagement, 
commitment, and skin in the game can help foster successful programs. Moreover, this case 
suggests that a CCA’s best chance of success may lie with those actors who, when faced with 
roadblocks such as dismal feasibility studies, reaffirm their commitment to local control as 
the sole guarantor of just and sustainable futures, even if it means breaking with market 
norms. 
At the same time, in the case of neither feasibility study did the study actually manifest 
expert consensus, and the vote was split between North County (opposed) and South 
County (in favor) in each case. Following the insights of Sheila Jasanoff, I posit that this 
failure to arrive at expert consensus may be connected to a lack of meaningful engagement 
and negotiations between CCA advocates and politicians in North County (Jasanoff 1990). 
Here, an approach more oriented toward energy democracy, which would emphasize 
engagement with communities in North County, may have helped win over North County 
votes through centering negotiation and consensus.  
The presentations of and discussions surrounding the first feasibility study made it clear 
that the unfavorable market conditions that had capsized the study were due in large part to 
manipulations by incumbent investor-owned utilities. IOUs occupy important positions of 
power even within CCAs, since under current CCA policy IOUs remain responsible for 
transmission and distribution, and they remain “providers of last resort” in cases where 
ratepayers would choose to stay with their incumbent IOU. Both roles are widely considered 
to be essential to successful CCA operation, but they also dictate that IOUs must be “kept 
whole” through the imposition of “exit-fees” or power charge indifference adjustment 
(PCIA) costs. Here, maintaining the financial viability of IOUs jeopardizes the financial 
feasibility of CCAs and problematizes their pursuit of energy democracy aspirations. 
Structural constraints brought on by eco-modernist tendencies within CCA policy here take 
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on an ideological valence that reduces community members to depoliticized consumers of 
cheap, abundant energy and stunts CCA advocates’ criticisms of IOUs, which in turn may 
even limit the exploration of more radical solutions to the problem of utility dominance in 
the form of DERs. 
This analysis demonstrates that conceits to customer choice and cost competitiveness 
that are built into the structure of CCA policy itself serve to undermine the viability of CCA 
programs and, most importantly, limit the extent to which CCA can engage in local 
renewable generation. If CCAs are to pursue radical energy system transformations, they 
must confront the contradictions residing at the core of CCA policy. Still, in Santa Barbara 
County, there is reason to be hopeful about the future of CCA and ultimately its ability to 
deliver local renewable generation. The CCA has had robust support from a range of 
environmental organizations, as well as from the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, and there are businesses committed to developing DERs on the South Coast. 
Further, while political will is split — most importantly between North and South County 
representatives, but also within each camp — CCA proponents were unfazed by the poor 
results of the first feasibility study, and CCA detractors remained unswayed by new, more 
positive results. Moving forward, advocates and strategists may use the case of these two 
studies as a way to think about what kinds of evidence and what technologies of legibility 
(Scott 1998) can be effective in forging ahead with programs whose aspirations run amok of 
narrow policy norms. 
C. Chapter Three: Building a Program 
In the early days of CCA development in California, CCAs were battered by assaults 
from IOUs, most of all in PG&E territory. San Joaquin Valley Power Authority didn’t make 
it, but Marin did. Others joined their ranks, and early successes like the CCAs in Marin, 
Sonoma, and Lancaster have worked to create a culture of solidarity and mutual aid in the 
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CCA community. CCAs are a relatively new policy technology, and nascent CCAs are hungry 
for information and guidance. New CCAs have benefitted from “the pioneers,” as they were 
referred to by David Turner of World Business Academy, insofar as those first actors laid 
the foundation of the movement.115 Still, in the early days, staying competitive meant 
fighting like the underdog. Put less charitably, this meant early CCAs had to put some 
substantive commitments, such as higher renewable content and local projects, on hold 
while they worked to accrue revenues. In their short history, CCAs have confronted 
significant roadblocks to securing local clean energy, and they have both garnered criticism 
and been offered pardon.  
Marin Clean Energy in particular has withstood criticism for its use of unbundled 
renewable energy certificates (RECs), which provide no physical delivery of electricity, but 
function as credit toward renewable standards on an IOU or CCA’s power content label. In 
this way, unbundled RECs greenwash power content labels while sourcing from often out-
of-state renewable sources that already exist, thus failing to develop new renewable 
markets. Further, according to Chloe Becker from the California Alliance for Community 
Energy (CACE), Marin Clean Energy’s carbon footprint was actually bigger than PG&E’s for 
the first five years of its operation, having contracted with a host of natural gas power plants 
“just to make money, just to be cheap, make revenues, and then start doing cool stuff and 
cleaning up their act.”116 Becker continued, “There’s all this dark and dirty stuff about what 
really happens with CCAs. Which honestly really makes me think, is this really what I want 
to be working on right now? It’s not what we want in Santa Barbara.”117 In addition to lack 
of funds early on, risk aversion has also been an important limiting factor in the 
development of renewable markets. According to Craig Lewis of the Clean Coalition, most 
CCAs have started with shorter-term contracts for one to five years because of the risk 
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associated with the new enterprises, and for fear of getting locked into bad deals.118 Shorter-
term contracts, typically for power that is already being produced, have garnered much 
criticism, since they fail to drive long-term renewable energy development.119 
Still, in my conversation with David Turner, he defended Marin and other early CCAs in 
their use of non-local and non-renewable energy: “You know what, they had to, because — 
we gotta wheel them a debt. [...] When they started, it was just wilderness, and they had to 
plow a number of roads on a policy basis.”120 Now that Marin and others like Sonoma have 
accumulated some financial reserves, they have the capacity to engage in local renewables 
projects and speak to substantive goals.121 Lewis argued that these CCAs are now able to 
reinvest in their communities and work with power developers directly to construct new 
renewable projects and extend contracts for up to twenty years.122 This claim was echoed by 
Jen Cregar123 and Amelia Carr of the Sierra Club, who suggested launching at just a slightly 
better RPS than an IOU before ramping up their commitments. Once reserve funds have 
accumulated, “you can start being more aggressive about your renewable portfolio 
standard, and you have that local control — so at least you’ve got it in place.”124 In this way, 
the trajectory of Marin and Sonoma shows that there is no clear contradiction between the 
economic viability of CCAs and their ability to procure and develop renewables. Moreover, 
important strides toward reaching substantive goals have been made by CCAs across the 
state as CCAs have gained momentum.  
However, higher renewable content is not the only goal for CCA advocates. The golden 
calf for Turner, Becker, and many others who are dedicated to energy decentralization is not 
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simply renewable generation – which may be centralized in a manner not unlike 
conventional generation – but microgrids and distributed energy resources (DER). With 
these smaller-scale energy resources, contradictions between existing market logics and the 
aims of CCAs come into conflict. Economies of scale and proclivities for centralization that 
are built into the way energy projects are financed mean that decentralized energy systems 
tend to be much more expensive than centralized energy. Under CCA policy, CCAs are 
constrained to always pursue cheaper options, since ratepayers can always opt out of CCAs 
and remain with incumbent utilities who might offer cheaper rates. The requirement that 
CCA customers be allowed to choose their energy procurer thus becomes an imperative to 
chase low rates, which stacks the deck both in favor of IOUs and centralized energy systems. 
In this way, conflicts between energy democracy proponents and constraints emerging out 
of eco-modernist policy are not purely ideological, but are baked into CCA policy.  
The struggle for CCAs to develop DERs points to a broader contradiction between (a) 
eco-modernist frames of cost-savings, customer choice, and competitive rates and (b) 
energy democracy calls for public power and local renewable generation. CCA policy was 
developed and achieved by both sets of advocates, and today these advocates clash over 
what strategies can best provide for a successful program. For advocates of cost-savings and 
rate competitiveness, programs should start modestly and add on programs as they build 
reserves, while always fundamentally pitching to the bottom line and presuming that 
consumers’ principal interest lies in securing cheap, abundant energy. Those who favor 
energy democracy argue that successful programs that are truly participatory and 
democratic will require community buy-in, and as such programs should emphasize local 
power and local jobs from day one; on the way, third party consultants and contractors 
should have skin in the game. Commitment and political will are paramount. While Turner 
defended early CCAs’ use of non-local energy, he argued, “CCAs need to go to school on 
that, they need to learn the lessons that Marin and Sonoma have gone through by practice, 
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not by trial and error, but just had to deal with, practically, and start from there, not back 
there at the beginning.”125 Turner’s point is that the assumptions made by Marin and 
Sonoma — about tabling DERs to tighten their belts — need not be swallowed wholesale 
anymore. In CCA advocacy, the gulf between proponents of energy democracy working on 
the “outside” and those cleaving closer to eco-modernist constraints on the “inside” 
becomes the difference between participatory models of strategic planning and pursuing 
narrowly construed “objective” technical feasibility studies, which are not even required by 
AB 117. The tensions and debates among these different actors are explored here. 
1. Attracting Finance 
In their short history, CCAs have yet to deliver on some of their substantive 
commitments to local renewable generation. In his 2017 work on CCAs, Samuel Jung states 
that, “operational CCAs have been unable to implement strategies that meaningfully utilize 
the form and capacities of community choice aggregators to effectively generate jobs for 
local communities within their service territories” (2017, 41). One important reason that 
CCAs seek large-scale private developers over these smaller, local projects is that energy 
generated and procured locally and on a small-scale has unattractive load profiles, which 
make smaller projects more expensive. The existing economic development model 
privileges larger-scale projects, undertaken with private developers, over decentralized, 
community-owned renewables (Jung 2017). In assessing the viability of developing DERs in 
the CCA framework, a crucial question is, should this failure to build small-scale local 
renewable generation be understood as an early-year problem associated with 
underdeveloped programs, or is DER development constrained by fundamentals of the 
existing energy market? Here, I argue that this failure to build small-scale projects locally is 
irreducible to risk aversion characteristic of early-year operation. Instead, CCA policy all but 
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guarantees that low rates will be chosen over local renewable energy, since costly programs 
may be infeasible as CCAs fight to remain cost-competitive with IOUs. 
In much of the discourse surrounding CCAs and DERs, contradictions between current 
market norms and some advocates’ ideals of small-scale, decentralized energy are shuffled 
away in favor of a more harmonious account. During his presentation at the Central Coast 
Sustainability Summit, Craig Lewis of the Clean Coalition made a compelling argument for 
community microgrids. For Lewis, community microgrids have three goals: economics, 
resilience, and environment.126 Lewis remarked that, on the economics side, electricity is a 
six trillion dollar annual market, so the first ones to make the transition would be huge.127 
Further, energy independence would mean the U.S. no longer has to be embroiled in foreign 
wars, so microgrids have relevance for “national security,” as well.128 Regarding resiliency, 
microgrids are designed to provide and generate power locally, so areas like the South Coast 
need not fear weather events and fires that threaten the precarious power lines that connect 
us to the macrogrid. Concerning the environmental aspect of microgrids, “that’s easy.”129 
This comprehensive picture is immediately appealing, but does not necessarily stand up 
to scrutiny. The first question from the audience at Lewis’s talk at the Sustainability Summit 
was from David Turner at the World Business Academy. He began, “I wanna approach the 
‘community’ side of the term ‘community microgrid’ and ask you, can you speak to the 
values of being able to analyze a particular area, being able to develop a coherent strategy 
and get community buy-in. [...] How do you see that being part of the community 
microgrid?”130 From my position in the audience, Turner’s tone had been more 
confrontational than I had expected. While the conflict between Turner and Lewis was not 
altogether intelligible to me at the time, it was clear that Turner was worried about the 
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community component of distributed energy resources getting boxed out in favor of other 
commitments to competitive pricing. 
Lewis was cagey in his response. “Yeah, thanks for your question, Dave.”131 Lewis 
elaborated that, as for the economic, environmental, and resiliency opportunities 
manifested in DERs, it would be up to communities to decide how those aims were 
prioritized.132 Earlier in his presentation, Lewis had lauded the German model of small-
scale renewable generation, but suddenly now Lewis began to walk back his claims about 
such projects’ financial viability. “Economies of scale are real,” he argued, asserting that 100 
megawatt projects are more efficient than 10 megawatt projects. He concluded that larger 
projects meant better deals from developers, which meant savings for customers.133 Lewis’s 
point was that despite some actors’ commitment to resilience and local generation, smaller 
projects are harder to finance. More expensive local renewable generation would have to be 
weighed against cost-savings, and the comparison would likely be unfavorable. 
Turner responded by pinning his concern for community ownership over energy and 
energy decisions to a recent upset in the local South Coast energy community. Southern 
California Edison had initiated a request for proposals (RFP) earlier in the year, but it had 
been suspended pending resolution of the issue of government participation in the 
bidding.134 Turner was troubled that SCE had moved the RFP through its bidding phase and 
suspended it without opening the matter to the community. According to Turner, the 
approach of SCE had been both too opaque and too hasty. Against the opacity of the SCE 
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RFP process, Turner advocated for a community-centered approach: “By bringing the 
community into the conversation earlier, by determining, how does the community wanna 
develop these things, and bringing stakeholders like commercial-industrial owners, schools, 
government properties, and developing a plan, you can kind of approach it in a much more 
strategic fashion.”135 SCE’s RFP process had also been too hands-off when it came to 
community involvement: “Basically, Southern California Edison says, we need 100 
megawatts of capacity, however you get it, and then they give you a slate of form 
agreements, and then they just kinda let things go.”136 In sum, where SCE had left program 
design to the bidders, Turner’s ideal of community-mindedness required strategizing 
among local advocates and stakeholders.  
In response, Lewis attempted to defend a focus on rate competitiveness as an important 
community value. The Clean Coalition has done work supporting East Bay Community 
Energy, the poster-child for CCA energy democracy in California, and Lewis was ready to 
bring that to bear. The local development program there had been “very much community-
driven,” but “what’s happened is, a lot of what Jen [Cregar] talked about where the cost 
realities come into play, right? Local is more expensive.”137 By invoking Cregar, the County 
lead on the CCA, Lewis brought the issue home and implied that, here, too, local renewable 
generation was out of reach. It simply cost too much. And the demand for cost 
competitiveness is built into CCA policy: “if you do not beat the incumbent utilities’ price, 
you will not have enough subscribers to make the economics work, and you will not 
continue on as a CCA.”138 Lewis concluded, “It’s just a fact of the matter. And so, you’ve just 
gotta work your economics out as best you can while maximizing the goals of whatever it is 
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you’re trying to accomplish.”139 In matters of public concern, then, other priorities could be 
considered, but cost competitiveness would eat first. 
Within the current financial framework sketched out by Craig Lewis, what kind of 
decentralization is conceivable for CCAs that desire not just renewable energy, but local 
energy that they have some control over? The next questioner put the matter this way: what 
scale does solar need to be for it to be economically competitive?140 Lewis responded that a 1 
megawatt project can attract good deals from developers and competitive financing from 
financiers. “There are lots of financiers,” he warned, “who won’t be interested unless it’s, 
like, $50 million of total investment required, so that comes out to 25 megawatt scale.”141 
Smaller investments are, “just way too much a pain in the butt” if an investor is looking to 
invest a billion dollars.142 The questioner confirmed, stating that Wells Fargo hadn’t wanted 
“to look at anything smaller than 1 megawatt.”143 Over the course of Lewis’s presentation, 
the promise of local renewable generation, even with the organizational technologies of 
CCAs, had been narrowed and all but closed off as a financial possibility. What then was left 
of community energy? 
2. Markets Over Interests 
While those who were currently employed in energy systems management and 
institutional green groups typically presented their objectives as a balance between rate 
competitiveness and environmental and community outcomes, I found a more candid 
proponent of cost-savings in Brian Stevens, Santa Barbara’s most ardent layperson 
supporter of CCAs. I’d seen him at Clean Energy Meetings, at summits, and at every 
important city and county meeting held on the CCA. He always gave public comment, which 
was always articulate and strategic, and he spoke with the assuredness of an expert ready to 
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throw his hat in the ring one more time before finally learning to enjoy his retirement. All I 
knew about him prior to our interview was that he had worked in the energy industry. I 
soon learned that he had worked for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 
for the American Public Power Association (APPA), and had conducted research on India’s 
electrical grid on a Fulbright Scholarship. In our conversation, Stevens presented a 
viewpoint of energy systems management that, through its focus on rate competitiveness, 
ultimately both reduced the more holistic community demands championed by energy 
democracy advocates to simple consumer interests in low rates and diminished the role of 
deliberative politics in energy decision-making. In this way, Stevens’s candid defense of the 
eco-modernist constraints of CCA policy dramatized the impact such constraints can have 
on the energy democracy aspirations of CCAs. 
Like Craig Lewis, Stevens was dedicated to CCAs, but also understood that current 
market mechanisms were not designed to accommodate DERs. While renewables can be 
fitted into a market framework, decentralized, small-scale energy projects that are more 
difficult to finance pose serious problems to the economic feasibility of CCAs. Totally 
decentralized, local generation would be possible with Tesla batteries and solar, according 
to Stevens, “if everyone wanted to pay $60 a megawatt hour.”144 Such rates would be 
unthinkable under any framework, and patently infeasible under CCA policy. Lewis 
advocated for balancing substantive commitments to local renewable generation with rate 
competitiveness, which ultimately balanced DERs out of existence; Stevens went further in 
advocating that the free market should determine our energy supplies. Here, Stevens’s 
principal criticism of California’s energy system was its blindness to the limitations of the 
market and its dogged determination to find workarounds through regulation. For Stevens, 
the “Big Mistake” with California energy policy was   
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California’s belief in its uniqueness....That we’re all so very smart, that we can figure 
out whatever social problem that is out there, and we identify it, and then we put 
together a task force of really smart guys and gals, get together and go analyze it, and 
then it gets some political attention, so some politicians get involved, and then the 
government forms this task force, and then they analyze the problem with a  178-
page report with 700 pages of appendixes and then they analyze every single part of 
it, and then they go to meetings and negotiate the outcome, and all the stakeholders 
get involved, and each of the stakeholder groups get what they all need.145  
In this attempt to get local generation and renewable power by creating the perfect solution, 
Stevens argued that regulatory bodies such as the CPUC had created a clunky system that 
drives prices up by destroying opportunities for competition. For example, when 
regulations call for RPS in addition to incentive programs to spur in-state generation and 
prices on carbon, which ultimately narrowly circumscribe procurement requirements, “you 
don’t have the ability to negotiate, which results in higher costs.”146 A much more efficient 
system would entail simply setting a price on carbon.147 By designing markets well in this 
way, goals can be reached efficiently without the burdens of regulatory mandates. Stevens 
maintained, “You want to let the market go.”148 
There are important critiques of regulation, just some of which have been taken up in 
this work. Still, Stevens’s criticism of regulation begins with an argument against 
inefficiency, but slips into an argument against advocacy itself. Not only would competitive 
markets allocate capital more efficiently and “produce better outcomes,” but hands-off 
management would also “overcome the political power people have” to influence decision-
making for their own benefit.149 For Stevens, “the state oughta be agnostic on technology. 
Tell the utilities, go figure that out. They’re in the business of doing it.”150 Here, markets and 
their apparently objective proponents in government are used to argue against the 
formation of political demands. Speaking elsewhere of unions’ interest in solar as a source 
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of new jobs, Stevens allows, “That’s okay, they’re an advocate. But the role of the political 
system should be to moderate those views, and not let them rule. Because sometimes you’re 
missing out on buying much cheaper power from out of state.”151 In a word, by Stevens’s 
account, it’s worth setting aside union demands to pursue lower rates. Further, political 
systems should be empowered to make sure those lower rates are secured by moderating 
the interests of stakeholders. But while Stevens does not take at face value the interests of 
union workers, he takes for granted the generalized consumer’s interest in low cost energy, 
which in his eyes governing bodies should be determined to protect. Through the course of 
our conversation, it became clear that regulation was bad principally because it could not 
guarantee the lowest prices.  
Stevens’s focus on securing low rates is interesting for two reasons. First, there is an 
assumption undergirding his argument that the cost of energy is too high, or is bound to 
become too high with too many interested parties at the table. The question of whether 
energy is too expensive is an empirical question, and would be discernible if, for example, 
demand dipped or energy costs could be connected to increased precarity. These indicators 
of too-high cost are neither immediately clear nor presented in a systematic fashion. 
Second, Stevens legitimized his dedication to cost-savings by appealing to ratepayers’ 
apparently universal interest in low rates. This is indeed a bizarre twist on the Marxian 
concept of the universal class of the proletariat: in this reformulation, it is not the worker 
but the consumer who is made universal, and with that all interests are flattened to those of 
homo economicus. Stevens drives his point home by arguing that, “the money that you put 
in the union job family is money that somebody in Imperial Valley has to pay. And the 
working man who farms in Imperial Valley makes a lot less money than union workers in 
the bay area.”152 Of course, the wage of a union worker does not singularly determine the 
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cost of energy, which is in truth mediated by a variety of factors. But this simplification is 
useful, since it allows advocates to argue for cheap energy not on behalf of the corporation, 
but on behalf of the working person themself.  
Indeed, the public can be interested, and can have more complex demands than for 
cost-savings. But Stevens does not present a governing structure capable of hearing and 
speaking to those more complex demands. Stevens favors CCAs governed by representatives 
from participating jurisdictions, with a few independent board members (“people like me, 
who know something about it and have opinions”) representatives from the environmental 
community, and “stakeholders who speak to the needs of the poor.”153 In sum, “You want a 
board that’s responsive to the community, but also looks at CCA as a business, as a public 
enterprise.”154 But beyond these stakeholders, politics should be kept out as much as 
possible. The Board should be realistic and clear in its goals above all else, giving managers 
responsibility and leeway without interfering in the day-to-day of CCA operations.155 
The political system tasked with overseeing energy markets is here designed to 
“moderate” among various commitments. However, the purpose of this “umpire” model of 
governance is not to provide a platform for people to fight for livable worlds, but to manage 
the popular will and train it to the bottom line, if within certain environmental limits 
(Barandiarán 2018). Stevens urges the creation of political systems such that advocates “can 
be honest with officials so they’re not pushed into making promises they ultimately can’t 
keep.”156 Presenting the problem in this way, Stevens suggests that the problem with 
regulation is a problem of too much democracy without enough accountability, of a 
government that is so by the people that it fails to be for the people — a government that is 
too responsive to popular demand. To most who have experience advocating for particular 
substantive demands before representatives, this suggestion does not paint a legible portrait 
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of the relationship between social body and representative. Even when much is promised 
during campaign seasons, or even enacted as policy, outcomes and implementation often 
fall short of public demand (Bättig and Bernauer 2009). 
At the same time, Stevens understands the importance of local accountability in the 
effective operation of utilities. Speaking of his time working for municipal utilities, he 
remarked,  
I used to joke in my speeches, they had to be responsible to the community because 
the general manager goes to the Kiwanis Club and the same Methodist or Catholic 
Church as everybody else, and if the rates go up or the lights go out, he’s hearing it in 
the aisle when he goes to pick up milk at the store. It creates a level of 
responsiveness within small communities that I think is really important.157  
Still, in Stevens’s example the local public interest is quite flat: keep the power on, and keep 
the rates low. The range of public interests here is limited to reliability and cost-savings. 
The presumption is that the public is simply a collection of consumers, capable of and well-
suited to oversight, but not disposed toward engagement in pursuit of substantive concerns. 
Insofar as CCAs are able to weigh priorities, Stevens does recognize that they “can weigh the 
advantages of local jobs and local facilities versus exporting it from elsewhere.”158 And while 
Stevens rejects rooftop solar for violating economies of scale,159 he does regard community 
solar as “a good trade” of cost-savings for good-feelings.160 Still, Stevens was quick to point 
out how much cheaper building in solar elsewhere in the desert would be. He also 
advocated for the creation of national energy markets, against the demands of unions and 
solar companies, saying “that would save you some money.”161 The suggestion that local 
control could be used to legitimize energy development elsewhere betrays the fundamental 
normative commitment of local control: that we should have the ability to participate in 
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those decisions that affect and create us. Local control has undermined its purpose when it 
is used to legitimize trans-spatial reach for the externalization of social bads. Here, Stevens 
uses narratives of local control to actually circumvent interested engagement while paying 
lip service to local accountability. 
In this framing, the benefit of local control is not to create avenues for popular 
participation in decision-making. Instead, local control allows companies to move 
procurement into deregulated terrain where demands are simple. According to Stevens, 
CCAs will not necessarily have to go through the same approval processes at the CPUC for 
new projects,162 and in general oversight at the level of local government can be more 
nimble than regulation at the state level.163 In a word, Stevens is not concerned with local 
control and democracy as a process, but as a way to more quickly achieve goals determined 
outside of democratic deliberation. And in this way, Stevens’s approach to governance 
aligns with his preference for goal-setting over mandates.164 Mandates are too hands-on, 
and they are designed to speak to certain particular interests, rather than the apparently 
universal good of cost-savings. At one point, Stevens elaborated a criticism of RPS, which he 
claimed is biased toward in-state renewables and excludes nuclear power for the benefit of 
narrow interests. He asked, “Is your goal environmental, or is it to promote rooftop 
solar?”165 In this statement, Stevens demands a choice between environmental goals and 
small-scale renewables, thus demonstrating an inability to juggle more than one substantive 
commitment beyond the bottom line. Stevens’s eco-modernist stance vis-à-vis market 
solutions to environmental and socio-technical conundrums is to seek low prices with a 
light touch. This perspective is fundamentally at odds with the interested-stakeholder, 
participatory model of energy governance central to energy democracy. 
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Concluding my conversation with Stevens, it was difficult to pin down what about CCAs 
piqued his interest and kept him coming back to county and city meetings month after 
month. He was retired. Regarding his continued engagement with energy policy, he offered, 
“I’d just like to see this succeed. I’d like to see it happen because, like I said, I think the CCA 
could be a platform for doing what Santa Barbara wants to do, which is to push the envelope 
on progressive solutions.”166 Throughout our interview, Stevens had tempered all talk of 
progressive solutions, advocating narrow, achievable goals. Who then could weigh in on 
these progressive solutions, and what kinds of progressive solutions were available?  
He finished, “Nobody lives in Santa Barbara — unless your company moves you here — 
but you move here for the amenities, for what it is, and so...And that’s what I’m interested 
in. I want to make it even better.”167 For Stevens, then, these progressive solutions — 
namely, large-scale renewables at affordable prices — were amenities, were consumer 
goods, were things to draw transplants like himself to the community, rather than to 
provide for the community that already lives and works here. As such, I was skeptical as to 
how energy-as-amenity could speak to an energy democracy framework that emphasizes 
participation and a genuine shift in power to address inequalities. For those models of an 
energy future, I would have to look to a different model of CCA. 
3. Designed for Success: Building Energy Democracy from the Ground Up 
For all Stevens’s consideration of cost-savings and his framing of environmental 
concerns as “amenities,” he did recognize that CCA programs would have to offer more than 
cost-savings to remain competitive against IOUs. In fact, Stevens did not imagine it likely 
that CCAs could compete in terms of pricing with IOUs, and he cautioned against over-
promising on cost-savings.168  As more of California turns over to the CCA model, he 
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predicted CCAs’ ability to secure deals would become more competitive.169 This would be 
doubly true insofar as the CPUC held them to the same regulatory regime as IOUs, which 
are larger than CCAs and have teams of brilliant strategists and decades of experience with 
regulators.170 For Stevens, CCAs’ competitive edge would have to come from their 
connection to the community and their focus on community goals. More broadly, CCAs 
could help cultivate “a local infrastructure of engineering expertise and cash flow from the 
energy side that you can use to accomplish these broader goals”171 such as electrification of 
transportation.172  CCAs would thus endow the community with the capacity to take up a 
new set of problems and solutions. The benefit of CCAs would extend beyond the electron-
as-commodity, in fact constituting an important expansion of community power: “If you’re 
just competing based on the commodity, which is renewable energy, where’s that 
competitive advantage?”173 There is much in Stevens’s analysis that conflicts with energy 
democracy frameworks: he tends to view community members as simply consumers 
searching for cheap amenities, and he does not appear to be interested in community 
engagement with energy decision-making. Still, he demonstrates that, even from a largely 
eco-modernist perspective, it can be strategically useful to build complex CCA programs 
that speak to equally complex community concerns. The benefits of CCAs are for Stevens 
framed as amenities; in the energy democracy framework, these benefits are an issue of 
justice. Local generation, with local jobs, local control, and clean futures are not amenities, 
but essential should CCAs hope to give communities good reason to become active in 
repoliticizing energy. 
Stevens’s fundamental point about CCAs and how they must shape their goals to remain 
competitive against IOUs has much in common with energy democracy approaches outlined 
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by Chloe Becker, David Turner, and scholars like Al Weinrub and Denise Fairchild. In 
essence, Stevens argues that CCAs must become more than procurers of energy; they must 
engage in a broad range of community works and in so doing accumulate expertise on the 
local level that can catalyze progressively more ambitious works. In the discourse coming 
from CCA advocates aligned with energy democracy, this distinction between the limited 
goals of CCAs, particularly in their start-up years, and those of more ambitious and 
networked programs is referred to as a distinction between CCA 1.0 and CCA 2.0 (Weinrub 
2017). CCA 1.0 is typified by the early business models of Marin and Sonoma. CCA 2.0 
refers to the integrated, strategic planning that moves beyond oversight to engagement. 
Advocates of energy democracy maintain that CCA 2.0 can make just as much market sense 
as CCA 1.0, since, with Stevens, it can be strategic to develop programs that go above and 
beyond IOU functions. The main interest in CCA 2.0, however, is to build local buy-in for 
public power so that communities can be engaged in the energy decisions that affect the 
local production, distribution, and consumption of energy. 
Examining other CCAs’ histories demonstrates that commitment to a range of social 
goods can make for more robust programs. The case of San Joaquin Valley Power Authority 
(SJVPA) illustrates how programs that are not designed to speak to a range of social goods 
can flag. Emerging alongside Marin Clean Energy (MCE), SJVPA ultimately suspended 
their CCA plan due to market conditions, not to mention a vicious campaign leveled against 
CCAs by PG&E (Faulkner 2010, 13). In her work, Faulkner suggests that, “unlike [MCE], 
using more renewable electricity was not a priority for SJVPA. This ideological difference 
was possibly an important reason why [MCE] succeeded and SJVPA did not” (2010, 13). 
While Faulkner does not develop this point further, having a substantive commitment to 
social goods such as renewables might improve the chances that a JPA will pursue CCA 
programs even in the face of economic adversity. 
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Lack of public engagement could also explain under what circumstances CCAs that do 
get off the ground fail to meet substantive commitments. In the case of Marin, Chloe Becker 
suggested that Marin’s early failure to deliver either more renewables or local generation 
went hand in hand with a failure to enable community oversight. Regarding the report that 
Marin had increased its carbon footprint in the early days of its operation, Becker revealed, 
“it took a friend of mine who’s a utility genius, who has actually been a power manager, to 
uncover this. He had to dig into this on his own, that’s not —.” Becker stopped, before 
asserting, “We need a transparent program where they have to post on the website, like, 
where is the electricity coming from, you know what I mean?”174 Becker’s implication here 
was that transparency would have to be a precondition of rigorous programming, and that 
engagement can help ensure that a CCA will remain dedicated to their substantive 
commitments to local and renewable energy. 
Political will can also help CCAs move toward their goals even despite market 
challenges. According to Mary Romano of Lancaster Choice Energy (LCE), the program’s 
feasibility study “was a little darker than what [their] actual numbers were.”175 Their 
feasibility study had used what turned out to be conservative estimates, and the program 
was projected to lose money in the first years. Still, because it forecasted long-term success, 
Romano said, “we took that chance anyway. And it turns out, that never came to fruition. 
We were in the black all the time.”176 In this case at least, the political will rested firmly in 
the hands of the city’s dictatorial mayor, who is well-known throughout the region for 
pushing through initiatives with little thought to political repercussions. LCE’s procurement 
is managed out-of-house and far from public scrutiny, and so their determination to move 
through risk may be due to autocratic governance rather than popular dedication to the 
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cause of local renewable generation. Still, Lancaster’s case demonstrates how market logics 
need not rule the day.  
Chloe Becker was principally dedicated to manifesting a strategic plan that could lead 
Santa Barbara to establish a CCA fully fitted with local generation and programs responsive 
to social justice. To this end, East Bay Community Energy offered a promising example by 
committing to build $500,000 of local renewable generation in their original business 
plan.177 This would create local jobs and community benefits associated with keeping 
revenues local. “That’s best practice,” they concluded.178 From here, Becker elaborated on 
the difference between CCA 1.0 and CCA 2.0: 
There’s one camp of CCAs in the state that are like what I described, they think, or, 
you know they'll tell you: step one, get your CCA started, make a bunch of money, 
and then start doing cool stuff, right. Then there's the other camp, that's like, no, you 
have to start from day one, with all of your goals lined up, your commitments to 
environmental justice, your commitment to local jobs and, you know, really set the 
bar high from day one. And so I'd say, I think we're going to see that same tension 
mirrored here locally, right?179 
According to Becker, actors on the outside like herself have advocated the second, allegedly 
more sophisticated approach, whereas those who have been leading the charge on the inside 
have advocated the more conservative approach.180 Unfortunately, it was these inside actors 
“who got to talk to the decision-makers directly, and meet with the staffers directly,” while 
the outside actors worked to drum up public support.181 Becker conveyed their frustration: 
“The whole time I was like – ergh! – because I come at this from a local benefits 
perspective, and I just had this feeling the whole time, like, no, we need to be more 
sophisticated here. We can't just follow Marin's footsteps, and it turns out it was probably 
true.”182 At the time of our conversation, the results of the first, failed, feasibility study were 
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known to certain actors, but not yet to me. Still, Becker was hopeful, and certainly not 
willing to cede the local build-out position.  
4. Strategies Inside and Outside 
The split between advocates who are willing to make concessions to the eco-modernist 
constraints of CCA policy and those who are dedicated the energy democracy and CCA 2.0 is 
reflected in the divide between “outsiders” and “insiders” in the conversations surrounding 
the CCA in Santa Barbara. Throughout our conversation, Becker had expressed frustration 
at not being heard at meetings with staffers and insiders. “It has not been run as a really 
collaborative process at all. It’s been point people from each jurisdiction meeting in private, 
updating the community every once in a while about high-level changes. [...] There hasn’t 
really been an invitation to offer ideas.”183 This lack of communication seemed particularly 
vexing for Becker, since she, along with Amelia Carr from the Sierra Club and others, had 
been pushing for the CCA feasibility study since the beginning. CCA advocacy had in part 
grown out of the defeat of Measure P, a county-wide anti-fracking ballot measure that had 
failed in 2014 and that Becker had been instrumental in championing. Becker framed the 
CCA movement as emerging from the momentum of that movement, and the feasibility 
study “was perceived to be the first step.”184 
Becker’s intention in advocating for the feasibility study, which was not a legal 
requirement as per AB 117, had not been to reduce the program to its economic feasibility. 
Still, it had resulted in a kind of siloing of insider and outsider advocates. Becker clarified, “I 
think there was just hope that the feasibility study would be straightforward, that it was just 
kind of a hoop to jump through and we would be able to get started with more complex 
things like program design and stuff after we got the feasibility study back.”185 In a word, the 
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actors on the inside had not factored in how important strategic planning from the 
beginning would be, and they had not sought the input for such a plan. 
When I spoke with Jen Cregar, she confirmed Becker’s narrative. There had been a 
separation between the projects Becker had wanted to build in from the start and the 
technical feasibility evaluation conversations, which had been limited to staff from 
participating governments.186 Attempts had been made to “try to keep that communication 
channel open” with a couple in-person meetings, an email listserv, and website updates, but 
these means hardly constitute the kind of sustained collaboration that would have satisfied 
Becker. Moreover, Cregar cleaved to a conception of community engagement that was 
likewise anemic. When asked about possibilities for community engagement, Cregar 
explained that CCAs can have “community groups and the staff kind of at the table from the 
very beginning.”187 In Santa Barbara they had not chosen this model “because again, it was 
mainly focused on hiring an expert to do this feasibility study evaluation. Once we got past 
that point and we were thinking through corporate design, and what are the actual projects 
and programs we wanted to offer, that’s where the community feedback would be the most 
beneficial.”188 In this second model of community involvement, a formal community 
advisory body would be formed, as has been the case in many CCAs across the state.189 
Here, community engagement is not solicited for program design. According to the CCA 2.0 
strategy, program design is the crucial time at which community advocates must be brought 
in to ensure that programs developed actually serve communities. 
Instead, the work of the staffers and insiders on the CCA front in Santa Barbara had 
been markedly narrow. They had focused on the technical feasibility study, while shutting 
out advocates for community benefits. In their model of community engagement, 
participation is institutionalized in a formal community advisory body well after the 
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parameters of the program have already been determined. And with this focus on technical 
feasibility, greater questions about where the CCA’s substantive commitments would lie 
seem to have been excluded. In a telling moment, Cregar refused to take a stand on the 
Puente Power Plant in Oxnard, Ventura County — the fate of which had been unravelling to 
the satisfaction of local environmentalists and social justice advocates over the previous few 
weeks.190 The CCA, set to cover Santa Barbara County as well as parts of Ventura and San 
Luis Obispo Counties, would need to get power from somewhere, and they would have to 
take power sources into consideration as they created their models; it is thus unlikely that 
the topic of the Puente Power Plant, sited in an already-polluted, poor, and predominantly 
Latinx area, had never been discussed. If it had not been discussed, it would reveal an even 
more dire lack of collaboration with local stakeholders from the environmental and social 
justice groups in the area. Still, Cregar maintained, “I haven’t had that conversation with 
staff from the other side [Ventura].”191 She continued, “And again, because they are more 
locally focused on their own communities, they’re probably paying less attention to what’s 
happening down in our region.”192 Creating regional silos offered decent cover for indecent 
ignorance and permitted insiders cleaving closely to eco-modernist policy constraints to 
ignore the substantive commitments to community goods advocated by proponents of CCA 
2.0. 
To be sure, the insider advocates and county staff had not willfully tried to squelch calls 
for local renewable generation, nor had they in ill will endeavored to create an entirely 
technocratic process. Instead, according to Cregar the advisory working group had focused 
on the question, “can this be a viable venture for us?”193 Along the way, they had not been 
agnostic to priorities of the community, and they had worked with elected officials and 
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community groups to set policy priorities to “integrate as much renewables as we could, 
cost-effectively, and commit to transition away from fossil fuel resources.”194 But they had 
not gone into the specifics of, for example, whether they would be able to offset the need for 
Puente Power Plant with renewables, even though it was opposition to this and similar gas-
fired projects that had helped get some advocates on board. In Cregar’s words, “We haven’t 
been working with that granular level of detail yet.”195 
In his presentation at the Sustainability Summit, before he had conceded that local 
generation projects under 1 megawatt were financially infeasible, Craig Lewis had 
advocated for building substantive commitments into early project design. He had urged 
listeners to start with their goals,196 to create microgrids unique to the service area,197 and to 
build local to keep investments local.198 With those goals and strategies in place, then 
communities could conduct a cost-benefit analysis.199 Instead, Santa Barbara had started 
with vying for economic approval, excluded strategists and stakeholders who wanted to 
focus on specific projects and gaining support from the community, and had been met with 
disappointment. 
D. Chapter Four: Feasibility and Infeasibility 
The energy democracy views explicated in the previous section maintain that CCA 
programs can best articulate energy democracy aspirations when community benefits such 
as DERs are designed into CCAs from the beginning. A prevailing problem in the Santa 
Barbara case is that these energy democracy advocates were excluded from the early stages 
of program development. The local CCA advisory working group tasked with shepherding 
the concept through early phases of its development opted to undertake a technical 
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feasibility study conducted by third party consultants that were precluded from continuing 
to collaborate in the formation of the CCA, and so had no particular dedication to the 
success of the CCA. The feasibility study was designed to simply evaluate whether a CCA 
program could be cost-competitive with IOU rates and remain financially solvent; staffers 
thus engaged in questions of economic viability to the exclusion of conversations about 
substantive commitments to local renewable generation. Its framing was fundamentally 
eco-modernist, in that the region’s ability to pursue sustainability goals was circumscribed 
by whether the program could deliver cost-competitive rates within existing market frames 
while minimally impacting ratepayers. The resultant technical feasibility study, presented to 
the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors on October 3rd, 2017, failed to present a 
viable program and became the first CCA in California to fail this assessment. 
The failure of the first feasibility study in Santa Barbara creates an important 
opportunity to reflect on CCAs generally as a rough assemblage of sometimes incompatible 
discourses regarding energy and governance. On one hand, those cleaving closely to eco-
modernist policy dictates embraced market logics without centering the importance of local 
democratic process. Energy democracy advocates, on the other hand, connected local 
control and sustainability into a single plan, recognizing that active, participatory 
engagement with problem definitions and solutions is the best and necessary path toward a 
just and livable future. Ultimately, the study’s failure gave energy democracy advocates 
reason to blame insiders for hedging their substantive commitments in favor of evaluating 
viability as a simple function of prevailing market logics. 
The unfavorable results also allowed for an exploration of how different CCA advocates 
responded when the goal of addressing environmental concerns through a focus on local 
control met with resistance from the market. Faced with the prospect of having to make 
strategic compromises between local control and environmental concerns in light of the bad 
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news, some actors retreated to the position that CCAs were simply a tool to achieve more 
renewables. Meanwhile, an array of environmental NGOs and renewables figureheads 
urged the Board not to give up. North County representatives were eager to throw the 
project out, while those from South County clamored to patch together a new strategy to 
achieve greater renewable content ahead of the IOUs and salvage the promise of local 
control. Most critiqued the particular formulas and assumptions made by the consultant 
firm, Wildan, but suggested that these unfavorable results could be resolved through more 
public discussion. Others argued that only a program designed by interested actors fully 
committed to the total suite of environmental and social goods promised by CCAs could 
deliver the program the County needed. This latter camp stood firmly in the terrain of 
energy democracy. In sum, because goals vis-à-vis the CCA were shared among advocates, 
witnessing their responses to the feasibility study allowed for greater focus on how the 
feasibility study was understood by different actors. For the range of advocates, the study 
operated as either an evidentiary process designed to yield a technology of legibility or as 
simply bad strategy.  
The most striking finding from the presentation and subsequent political action 
regarding the CCA was how little the whole process had seemed to matter. Presumably, the 
purpose of carrying out the feasibility study was that, with quality analysis by respected 
technicians, the county could arrive at the most rational decision regarding whether and 
how to proceed in the development of a CCA implementation plan. Observing the reception 
of the feasibility study results by environmental groups and the County Board of 
Supervisors, the actual results of both feasibility studies had exceptionally little impact on 
whether it was determined that the CCA would in fact be a good plan for the County. In a 
predictable 3-2 vote split between North and South County, the County Board of 
Supervisors resolved to pursue additional feasibility study analysis. When these results 
came back favorably in the spring, the same supervisors from North County stood firm on 
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their resolve to slough off responsibility over energy procurement to IOUs and progress on 
increased renewable content to state-level regulatory bodies.  
In the case of both feasibility studies, the results were not taken at face value by any of 
the county level politicians. This revelation raises two important points. First, it challenges 
the assumption that CCAs will sink or swim based purely on their economic or technical 
framing. As it became clear throughout the conversation among the Supervisors, the 
function of the feasibility study had not been to convince the Board one way or the other in 
terms of the viability of a CCA program, but to equip both sides with a means of legitimating 
their existing commitments to sensible budgeting and laissez-faire energy policy on one 
hand, and to renewables and progress on the other. This was done through the boundary 
work of the advisory working group, which produced a boundary object — the feasibility 
study — with its special claim on expert knowledge (Owens 2015). Salvaging this boundary 
object required that Supervisors in favor of the CCA both maintain the legitimacy of the 
feasibility study in theory and challenge the specific feasibility study as it was carried out by 
Wildan. The relatively minor role of the feasibility study in shaping political will suggests 
that we are not, indeed, trapped in a woefully undemocratic paradigm of decision-making 
where democratic processes are sacrificed at the altar of technocratic management. Instead, 
CCAs’ best chance of success lies in those actors who, when faced with roadblocks such as 
dismal feasibility studies, reaffirm their commitment to local control as the sole guarantor 
of just and sustainable futures, even if it means breaking the rules. Matters of concern may 
here direct the gathering of facts (Latour 2004). 
Second, the reception of both feasibility studies by political actors in North and South 
County demonstrated not simply the steadfastness of those politicians, but also the failure 
of the feasibility studies to manifest any real expert consensus as to whether the CCA could 
be beneficial or even workable in the county. Inspired by Jasanoff’s work on scientific 
advisory bodies, I argue that the failure of the feasibility studies to produce expert 
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consensus may demonstrate inattention to building consensus between CCA advocates and 
North County actors in the lead up to the study. For Jasanoff, negotiations are central to 
building consensus that political actors can abide by. Had CCA advocates mobilized energy 
democracy narratives of local control and community self-sufficiency or emphasized how 
CCAs can diminish the importance of state-level bureaucracy, which may be more likely to 
resonate with conservative actors than claims for environmental concerns, the CCA may 
have secured consensus from all parties (1990).200 From there, the feasibility study — at 
least the favorable one — may have manifested expert consensus. Instead, the only 
consensus reached was between the CCA advocacy groups and the liberal politicians from 
South County. The tactics of strategic planning of energy democracy advocates may have 
helped produce expert consensus in acceptance of the second, favorable study. As it stands, 
boundary work through the production of the feasibility study was insufficient to resolving 
controversy vis-à-vis the feasibility of the CCA program in Santa Barbara County. 
1. The Wildan Study, Summer-Fall 2017 
On October 3rd, 2017, the County Board of Supervisors hosted the presentation of the 
CCA feasibility study conducted by Wildan. This moment had been a long time coming. So 
much money and so much labor had been crystalized there to hang over Jennifer Cregar, 
the project lead, who sat with a neat stack of presentation notes, her hand over the space 
bar of the County computer. 
Cregar began with an overview of the tri-county regional CCA movement as it had 
gathered steam in the preceding years. In December 2015, the first CCA advisory working 
group meeting was held, and that winter the feasibility study request for proposal (RFP) 
was issued.201 In May 2016, Wildan, with EnerNex, engaged to perform the CCA feasibility 
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study.202 Almost a full year later, in the winter and spring of 2017, Wildan released the draft 
feasibility study for review by the advisory working group.203 That summer MRW, another 
consultant group seasoned on CCA feasibility studies,204 conducted a peer review, and the 
staff, comprised of fifteen members from eleven jurisdictions,205 began reaching out to 
other CCAs in the state for support and to check in about vetting some of the models Wildan 
had used.206 The advisory working group oversaw the feasibility study and assisted with 
outreach to community leaders and other CCAs, then they formed Central Coast Power.207 
In addition to the advisory working group, the California Community Choice Association 
(CalCCA) played a crucial role in helping to navigate regulations issuing from the CPUC.208  
The study carried out by Wildan was designed to determine simply whether the project 
could be economically feasible. To be feasible, a CCA program must have power costs 
competitive with IOU rates, and the enterprise must be financially viable in the long-
term.209 Here, keeping costs low for customers is not simply an abstract dedication to the 
bottom line. Instead, this commitment to keeping costs low is baked into CCA policy. Unlike 
IOUs, which have enjoyed a natural monopoly in their territories since the early twentieth 
century, CCA customers may always opt out of the program and resume use of IOU-
procured energy. This stipulation in the CCA enabling legislation, AB 117, means that CCAs 
must remain rate competitive to keep their customers. While not a qualification for a 
project’s feasibility, discourse on the CCA tended to tout the programs’ low impact on 
consumers, and ideally a CCA customer would not notice a change with the transition to a 
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CCA procurement model.210 Thus, by the logic of a feasibility study, if a project cost too 
much, or otherwise caused consumers to blink, its pursuit would not be recommended by 
the staff. Insofar as political actors take the results seriously, a feasibility study locks actors 
into the iron cage of market logics and the race to the bottom.  
Cregar noted that, to get an unbiased perspective, when they issued the RFP for 
consultants to perform the feasibility study, they only selected firms that would promise not 
to take on subsequent CCA implementation work within the tri-county region.211 This, 
according to Cregar, would guarantee that the study would be purely factual, though it also 
limited the applicant pool for firms. The assumption underlying this logic is that firms that 
have skin in the game could not be trusted to deliver honest results, and conversely that 
they could trust a study insofar as it was objective. This study would stand on reason alone 
and not be tainted by interest or, for that matter, strategy. Taken as a whole, the structure of 
and discourse surrounding the feasibility study cleaved toward eco-modernist 
considerations that focused on keeping rates low, minimally impacting consumers, and 
favoring adherence to market logics over strategic interventions on project modeling. 
The feasibility study included an analysis of twenty-four different scenarios, including 
eight city and county combinations and three renewable energy content levels, covering a 
ten-year study period from 2020-2030, and a pro forma assessment of power purchase 
costs, operational costs, a reserve contingency fund, and debt service.212 Wildan also 
included a greenhouse gas emissions comparison and a risk analysis.213 By now all the key 
actors, including staff and public stakeholders, knew the results. They didn’t look good.  
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2. Drivers of Infeasibility 
The results of the first feasibility study conducted by Wildan and peer reviewed by MRW 
was unexpectedly negative and hotly contested. The project lead, Jennifer Cregar, indicated 
to the Board that the feasibility study varied from what other communities had 
experienced.214 According to Cregar, the primary drivers of program infeasibility could be 
broken into three categories: complications of managing two IOUs, large upfront capital 
costs, and nimble IOUs.  
Contra conventional wisdom regarding economies of scale, these first two drivers of 
infeasibility essentially concern the inefficiency of creating a large service area. First, 
working with two IOUs in one CCA would mean that the CCA would have to compete with 
two different rates, and navigating their billing systems had proven complicated.215 Next, 
the upfront capital costs of a CCA covering such a large service area would require not just a 
bank loan, but a debt issuance.216 Here, a large serve area meant a complicated ledger and a 
big risk up front if the project flunked. On the other side, because power costs and exit fees 
were by far the biggest costs of the CCA program, and those would vary depending on how 
many people are in the program, economies of scale mattered comparatively little in 
reducing costs.217 Biting off a large service area had not significantly helped to mop up the 
fixed costs of the CCA either, such as program staffing, since those costs were not major 
determinants in the Wildan feasibility study.218 
The other driver of infeasibility concerned IOUs and their influence over ratepayer bill 
structure. While never explicitly framed as war maneuvers, Cregar offered that IOUs had 
used their time since early exploration of the CCA to adjust their own models, such as by 
shifting costs from generation to transmission in the years leading up to the study. Because 
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a CCA uses territorial IOUs’ transmission services, transmission costs would remain the 
same for either CCA or IOU customers.219 Generation costs vary widely for both IOUs and 
CCAs, and they are determined by market forces. Increasingly since deregulation, IOUs 
have moved away from building their own generation facilities, and generation now 
represents a pass-through cost, so under a CCA program, their role as procurers of energy 
would simply shift to CCAs. While in PG&E territory the transmission and generation fees 
are roughly equivalent, in SCE territory, transmission fees constitute the bulk of the bill.220  
According to Wildan, over the past four years, SCE’s generation charges have gone down 
13%, while transmission charges have gone up 89%, which Cregar suggests could be an 
intentional adjustment to make themselves more competitive against CCAs.221 By 
strategically adjusting their models to report higher transmission costs, IOUs can force 
CCAs into competition with artificially reduced generation costs while keeping transmission 
costs — which must still be paid to IOUs — artificially high.222 This concept is illustrated in 
Figure 8. 
Moreover, IOUs have been able to work through the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) to increase power charge indifference adjustment (PCIA) costs.223 This 
“exit fee” is designed to compensate IOUs for stranded energy contracts when local 
governments depart from IOUs. Especially since the electricity crisis of 2000-2001, IOUs 
have been required to engage in long-term contracts for electricity. When communities 
break those contracts, IOUs are left with energy they have contracted for, but no longer 
have customers to sell to. IOUs calculate PCIA charges by taking the amount they originally 
bought the electricity for and subtracting the amount that they could sell that energy for on  
                                                                                                                                                 
218 Ibid, (6:12:30). 
219 Ibid, (5:47:30). 
220 Ibid, (5:52:27). For this reason, a CCA in PG&E territory would be at least more feasible than in 
SCE territory (6:26:58). 
221 Ibid, (6:34:40). 
222 Ibid, (34:40). 
223 Ibid, (6:35:06). 
  171 
 
Figure 8. Original Breakdown vs. Strategic Adjustment of Generation-
Transmission Cost Distribution 
 
the day the CCA launches.224 This latter value is typically much less than the former, since 
energy prices have been going down, especially in the renewables sector; this results in a 
loss on those long-term contracts. The actual amount of the PCIA charge is a source of 
major uncertainty in CCA feasibility models and contributes substantially to overall 
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program risk.225 First, because the price of energy fluctuates constantly, the actual dollar 
amount of the PCIA varies from year to year and cannot be determined definitively until the 
CCA program launches.226 Moreover, IOUs have maintained control over how PCIA charges 
are calculated. There is a set formula for how the PCIA charge is calculated, which is 
approved by the CPUC at the utilities’ rate-setting meeting every year.227 At the same time, 
CCA advocates have often found the PCIA setting process to be opaque (Hastings et al. 
2016). Wildan’s feasibility study found that PCIA charges could be anywhere from $75 per 
year for ratepayers with standard load in SCE territory and up to $200 per year for PG&E 
customers.228 The need to factor in PCIA charges to new costs to customers forces new sale 
prices down, as illustrated in Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Generation Costs, Original Purchase Price vs. New Sale Price with 
PCIA Charge 
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Together, strategically-adjusted transmission costs and high PCIA charges squeeze the 
part of the ratepayer’s bill that goes to generation, as illustrated with the hypothetical 
Figure 10. Thus, CCAs are forced to procure energy at much lower rates than their IOU 
competitors to remain cost-competitive.229 As far as the Wildan study was concerned, that 
cost, combined with the CCA’s commitment to procure at least 50% renewable energy from 
launch, rendered the project infeasible. After attempting twenty-four different scenarios, 
Wildan found that none proved viable.230 
Figure 10. Energy Costs, with Generation-Transmission Distribution and PCIA 
Charge 
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In response to some early findings from Wildan, the CCA staff in the tri-county region 
reached out to MRW, another consultant firm with CCA experience, to conduct a peer-
review study. MRW’s study yielded a better outcome, suggesting that a CCA in PG&E 
territory could be rate competitive after a few years.231 From Cregar’s presentation, it was 
clear that there had been major discrepancies between the two firms’ studies. However, 
because MRW had not had full access to the data or the ability to run an entirely new study, 
MRW’s study was limited to surface critiques.232 This matter would drive great controversy 
in the public comment period to follow. 
While a CCA must only procure energy for those it intends to serve, and so opt-out rates 
spurred by high energy costs are not themselves a major driver of infeasibility,233 if a 
substantial portion of customers opt out of the program after energy is procured, that would 
be experienced as a loss by the CCA. According to Wildan’s feasibility study, implementing a 
CCA in the tri-county region would add an extra $16 per month to every PG&E bill, and an 
extra $20 per month to every SCE bill, assuming the CCA delivered 50% renewable 
energy.234 Supervisor Steve Lavagnino from Santa Maria scoffed that if his constituents saw 
their rates increase by even $5 a month, they would opt out.235 By all appearances, the CCA 
had been dragged under by its commitment to low costs. 
Supervisor Wolf, representing the City of Santa Barbara and Goleta, asked far and away 
the most questions of Cregar, seemingly eager to find a way for this to work in Santa 
Barbara. If she couldn’t win the fight on the county level, could she win it for her district? 
Could Santa Barbara do it alone?236 Unfortunately, Cregar informed her, the CCA-enabling 
legislation requires that if a CCA is offered to any portion of a jurisdiction’s residents, it 
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must be offered to all of its residents; thus, a CCA only for South County, in SCE territory, 
would be illegal.237 Regardless, given SCE’s drop-dead low generation rates, a CCA in South 
County would likely be one of the least feasible options.238 
From here, Cregar on behalf of the staff presented four options to the Board. The first 
option was for the tri-county region in question to pursue membership in two existing CCA 
programs. Monterey Bay’s CCA in PG&E territory would welcome North County at no cost, 
though the CPUC would charge up to $50,000 to file an updated implementation plan.239 
The portion of the experimental CCA region lying in SCE territory would be welcomed by 
the Los Angeles CCA, but would require a $4 million loan to cover incremental power 
costs.240 However, there could be no guarantee that the CPUC would sign off on the split 
county approach, and for the project to be legal they needed the CPUC’s consent.241 More 
importantly, insofar as CCAs are designed to give communities greater local control and 
opportunities for local generation, no such guarantees could be made should Santa Barbara 
County be divided and flung toward two separate CCAs with their own political histories 
and experience in the world of CCAs.242 The second option, to form a new CCA program, 
was explicitly not advised by the staff, given the results of the feasibility study.243 Option 
three entailed further exploration of a CCA in the future, but with no commitment at 
present.244 Here, communities could wait for certain regulations to solidify, and for markets 
to stabilize.245 Finally, option four would stop CCA exploration entirely.246 A man sitting in 
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the row in front of me next to the consultants from Wildan and MRW leaned in and said, 
“Twenty bucks on option three?" They nodded, and he left.  
3. Feasibility as a Technology of Legibility 
After the presentation by Cregar and the first round of inquiries, the Board turned to 
public comment. Every single speaker who approached the podium was openly critical of 
the feasibility study results and urged the Board to push ahead despite the negative results. 
But while the speakers questioned the results of this particular feasibility study, they did not 
challenge the results of the feasibility study simpliciter. Claiming that Wildan’s initial study 
had been flawed, and that the data compiled by Wildan should be released for more in-
depth analysis by both other consultant firms and public stakeholders, the public urged the 
Board not to give up yet. In this way, they were able to throw out the negative results of the 
study while retaining the feasibility study as a boundary object produced to legitimize 
claims to expertise (Owens 2015). 
Local conservative radio show host Andy Caldwell, by all appearances the only attendee 
in the room dedicated to the destruction of the CCA program,247 had left early, leaving Brian 
Stevens to deliver the first remarks. Stevens, a retired energy consultant, had worked for the 
American Public Power Association for thirty-five years, and he argued that Wildan’s 
projected cost of renewables had been too high, that they were outdated, and that the 
projected PCIA charges were too pessimistic.248 Further, if a CCA would be feasible in North 
and South County separately, then it would stand to reason that it would be feasible 
together — the solution was to find a better contract similar to what the Monterey Bay and 
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LA CCAs had found.249 Stevens’s comments gestured to market errors, and so he reinscribed 
rather than challenged the underlying logic of the study. 
David Turner from the World Business Academy, which has been working on plans for a 
local microgrid for years, took a different tack, arguing that public review of the data could 
solve the infeasibility crisis. Turner declared that the situation “cries out for a public peer 
review period where other consultants are allowed to examine the data” for use in their own 
models.250 Apparently, MRW had been unable to do a full analysis because Wildan’s models 
had varied so severely that MRW couldn’t properly extrapolate their results.251 Turner threw 
in for at-risk contracting and using a single, unified RFP process, and open access for public 
stakeholders to Wildan’s data.252 
Amelia Carr of the Sierra Club asserted that the biggest problem with the feasibility 
study was that Wildan’s models ran counter to real-world experience, which we know 
because there are plenty of successful operational CCAs.253 First, Wildan planned for a 
starting staff of forty-five people, four times the size used by other CCAs at launch.254 
Second, Wildan created a reserve fund that would keep growing, even after its target funds 
had been reached.255 Third, the cost of renewables was projected to be twice as much as 
market rate: “It should be around $40 per megawatt hour, not 80 – half.”256 Here, and just 
for a split second, Carr shot a resentful glance at the advisory working group. MRW only 
partially amended the model, but even they found that the CCA would be feasible from day 
one.257 Carr also recommended a public workshop and a new study with MRW, and 
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suggested at-risk contracting.258 Carr concluded, “This is happening. This is happening 
everywhere. [...] We should not be left behind because of one faulty study and some faulty 
assumptions.”259 Regarding her concern at being “left behind” compared to other regions, it 
is perhaps important to remember that Carr holds a position at a national environmental 
NGO with a national campaign to reduce local emissions.  
Michael Chiacos from the CEC called the results “alarming” and suggested that they 
should pursue a more comprehensive review, arguing that MRW hadn’t updated the figures 
in their model, but had simply commented on Wildan’s.260 Sigrid Wright, also from the 
CEC, argued that they would need more due diligence and asked for another month for 
experts to review the two thousand page study, as well as for open access to the data used by 
Wildan.261 At the same time, Wright shifted her tone to say that, “for us, [the CCA has] 
always been a tool, not a goal.”262 Thus, as actors generally scrambled to salvage the 
feasibility study process and the intention to form a CCA, some players began to clear space 
for compromise should the tactic of achieving environmental and community goods 
through local control fail. 
Diane Boss, speaking not on behalf of the CEC board, but as a former member, declared 
that it was hard to believe the results, and that if SCE’s rates were the problem and the Los 
Angeles CCA is going ahead, it’s a good indication we should look at the numbers more 
closely.263 Ken Hough from Santa Barbara County Action Network (SBCAN) made a video 
call from Santa Maria to express SBCAN’s support for Option 3 as well and urged that 
another panel of experts be called upon to pursue additional studies.264 Finally, Benjamin 
Ikhart from Green Power, who has been working with Monterey Bay Community Power, 
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offered that the general trend in technical and feasibility studies for all CCAs is that they 
have been conservative, citing Marin and Sonoma as CCAs that had faced considerable 
opposition from PG&E and yet had outperformed their studies.265  
The public, insofar as this arrangement of business leaders and environmental NGO 
chairs could be regarded as a fair approximation of the public, communicated their resolve 
to continue exploration of the CCA. But while they admitted that this particular feasibility 
study was illegitimate, they carefully upheld the legitimacy of the feasibility process itself. 
Put another way, they defended the boundary work being done by the feasibility study 
(Owens 2015), which constituted an important technology of legibility (Scott 1998). When 
regarded as a manifestation of expertise, a successful study could do boundary work by 
demonstrating to CCA detractors that the plan penciled out, and that local control over 
energy that would be good for communities and good for the planet was not only virtuous 
but could be economically viable. The process of the feasibility study was to gather evidence 
for this claim so that the study itself could be used as a technology of legibility. When the 
search returned with unfavorable evidence, advocates had to find a new way to secure the 
project’s legitimacy, and so they critiqued Wildan’s search for evidence and asked for a 
second opinion. To be sure, advocates had presented a litany of errors with the study, and 
so this analysis should not suggest they themselves were dreaming up unfounded criticisms. 
However, that advocates were not willing to take the feasibility study at face value suggests 
first that their search for facts was directed by values, and second that they regarded the 
feasibility study as an important tool in realizing those values. 
4. Assessing Goals and Strategies as the Rubber Meets the Road 
Between the time when the public stakeholders were informed of the results of the 
feasibility study and when Cregar gave her presentation before the Santa Barbara County 
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Board of Supervisors, I was able to conduct private interviews with three key players in the 
environmental NGO landscape of Santa Barbara County. These interviews provide an 
opportunity to see how actors respond to market-based challenges to the notion that 
environmental concerns can be won through local control. In a word, how do different 
actors grapple with the eco-modernist constraints embedded in CCA policy? While the 
statements made by CCA advocates during the County Board of Supervisors Meeting largely 
maintained that CCAs could in fact be used to secure environmental and community goods 
through local control and at competitive rates, these private conversations revealed a wider 
range of positions about the results of the feasibility study and next steps that should be 
taken.  
These interviews suggest that CCAs are best understood as rough assemblages of 
disorderly commitments and that, when tested, those commitments may splinter. While 
CCA advocates tend to perceive CCAs to be well-suited to achieve environmental goods 
through local control, not all actors see local control as an essential mechanism to secure 
those environmental goods. When these actors must contend with the eco-modernist 
constraints within CCA policy, they more readily abandon energy democracy aspirations, 
which would subvert the existing centralized energy system and assert local resilience, in 
favor of an approach to secure environmental goods by themselves. Here, CCAs are 
presented as “just a tool” to get higher renewable content, and the dramatic organizational 
transformation made possible through CCAs is downplayed. Other advocates reasserted 
their commitment to the CCA and, in keeping with their statements before the County 
Board of Supervisors, salvage the feasibility study process as an important boundary object 
for securing legitimacy. Still another camp includes those actors who argue that, insofar as 
local actors insist on the feasibility process, only an entirely different kind of feasibility 
study could produce an actionable plan. Such a feasibility study would be based on 
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principles of active participation of stakeholders and require work with consultants who 
have skin in the game. This position resonates with the kind of strategic planning advocated 
by energy democracy advocates in earlier sections of this work. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the organization that had been invested in the CCA movement in 
Santa Barbara for longest, the CEC, appeared most ready to let go of the energy democracy 
aspirations of the CCA. Amy Parker had been involved in the CCA push at the CEC, which 
has acted as an incubator for the CCA movement in Santa Barbara for the last decade. We 
met for coffee just days after the results of the study had been released to the public, and 
she was understandably pessimistic about the future of the movement. While she 
recognized that Santa Barbara was politically ripe for movement on our renewable goals, 
inscribed fragilely as they were with the city’s “fossil-free by 2033” goal, the results of the 
feasibility study had been troubling. “I don’t know if an elected official could really in good 
faith move forward with the program given the results of the feasibility study.”266 She 
concurred with Cregar on the drivers of infeasibility but was skeptical that another study by 
another consultant would necessarily solve the political problem. “Again, if you’re looking at 
this from a political standpoint, the feasibility study was done by a consultant, and then the 
peer review was done by another consultant, and so this would, in the eyes of the 
government, be just one more consultant, so why would, you know, the talking point is, why 
would you believe this consultant more than these other two consultants?”267 Economic 
feasibility aside, Parker was concerned that the negative results of the study had effectively 
tainted the movement politically. 
Parker’s statements here marked an important shift from the position she had 
expressed at public functions in months prior. At her presentation in the Faulkner Gallery 
at the beginning of the summer, she had heralded the CCA as a singular solution to a host of 
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local problems ranging from job loss to renewable energy goals. With the negative results of 
the feasibility study, she had fallen back to presenting the CCA as just one strategy to 
achieve narrower goals that mostly revolved around sustainability. She stated, “There’s a 
widespread agreement that we need to decarbonize our electricity supply. But community 
choice I think is, I think, from the standpoint of CEC, is just one strategy to do so, and so, 
you know, there could be other ways to do this, and if one of those proves to be successful, 
then that would be something that we would be in support of.”268 One such strategy offered 
by Parker was SB100, a state-level initiative that would decarbonize our electricity by 
2045.269 Parker admitted that the legislation had failed. When I suggested that “2045 is a 
ways from now,” she retorted, “It is a ways from now, but it would definitely accelerate the 
decarbonization of the electricity for the entire state. [...] I love the idea of local control and 
local build-out, but. But I suppose a top-down approach could also provide the same 
greenhouse gas reduction.”270 Here, not only was Parker willing to put her hopes in a failed 
measure and a far-off goal, but the state-level initiative would actually decenter local control 
as the path toward sustainability. Sigrid Wright from the CEC had also delivered a public 
comment stating that the CCA was just a tool to get higher renewable content. While the 
remarks of both Parker and Wright should be taken in the context of the negative results of 
the feasibility study and should perhaps be regarded as a strategy to switch tactics while 
preserving the goal of securing high renewable content, their compromises on local control 
were disappointing and seemed to betray the energy democracy potential of CCAs.  
While the pursuit of these environmental goals might be well-intentioned, by discarding 
local control, such solutions would fail to meaningfully challenge the prevailing centralized 
energy system to secure local resilience. As Amelia Carr from the Sierra Club noted in a 
subsequent interview, the kinds of state-level legislative solutions advocated by Parker will 
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not allow Santa Barbara to move as aggressively toward sustainability goals, and other local 
benefits would also remain unrealized. As such, advocates for local control and 
environmental goods should remain committed to the project. Carr, a representative from 
the Los Padres chapter of the Sierra Club, was brightly confident during our interview, and 
she had just participated in a public stakeholder meeting regarding the CCA. By this point, 
the key players had been able to digest the data and ready themselves for a spirited defense 
on the 3rd. Carr rehearsed her critiques of the Wildan study, that they had used old prices 
for renewables,271 that they had planned for an infinitely growing reserve fund,272 and 
moreover because “it runs counter to real-world experience where every CCA, everywhere 
else in California is feasible.”273 In sum, “If your real-world experience is counter to your 
theoretical model, maybe you should question your model.”274 From here, Carr elaborated 
on her prescriptions moving forward. But most importantly, the public needed to hash out, 
with full transparency and through rational discourse, the results of the feasibility study. 
We would need public comment, more rigorous peer review, a workshop to bring in 
community choice experts.275 Dialogue and process, with the information in the hands of 
the people, would make things right. In sum, the feasibility study had to be taken out of the 
demonstrably incapable hands of Wildan and placed in the realm of popular debate. By 
salvaging the feasibility study, the project, too, could be salvaged. The boundary object of 
the feasibility study still had merit and could be used to demonstrate expert consensus. But 
first, some negotiations and conversations would have to be carried out among 
stakeholders. This approach to building expert consensus resonates with Jasanoff’s work on 
scientific advisory committees (1990). Here, technical matters may be resolved best through 
the assertion of expertise, but also through building consensus collaboratively. 
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Still another CCA advocate adopted a related but more extreme stance. Chloe Becker 
from the CACE, who had also been on the community steering committee of the local 
Central Coast Power initiative, was prepared to critique the entire feasibility study process, 
top to bottom. The staff had produced an “objective” result, and for that reason, they had 
failed to deliver results that could move the CCA program down the court. First, instead of 
using at-risk contracting, the staff had used a consultant firm that would be paid regardless 
of the results and which would be precluded from working with the CCA in the future. 
Because they had used unbiased consultants who had no “skin in the game,” the firm had no 
particular interest in the program’s feasibility.276 For Becker, this decision, made to give the 
study process the appearance of neutrality and disinterestedness, had been a grave mistake: 
Folks interested in getting into the community choice aggregation space need to be 
aware that there are conflicts of interest among consultants in the field. Consultants 
are hired to generate these really expensive feasibility studies without any skin in the 
game. They get paid regardless of their results of the study, versus at-risk 
contracting, which basically allows consults to do these studies and receive payment 
after they've developed a workable, feasible program in their study [...] So, when you 
hire a consultant to do a study [not at-risk], they have no incentive to come up with 
a good result, or even an accurate result, if they get paid no matter what. You're not 
necessarily gonna get the same high-quality result.277 
For Becker, when consultants are paid for their work regardless of the results, payment 
operates as a perverse incentive to do work ineffectively and allows firms to wash their 
hands of a project as soon as the results come in. It might rightly be pointed out that at-risk 
contracting carries its own perverse incentive to dream up favorable results where none 
may exist. The point here is that, whether an entity engages in at-risk contracting or not, 
there is no such thing as disinterestedness. From here, the best we can do is follow the 
interests that most align with our own and allow our concerns to direct our gathering of 
facts (Latour 2004). 
                                                
276 Interestingly, Becker referred to consultants’ lack of incentive to deliver a good result as a “conflict 
of interest.” 
277 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part I, 16:00). 
  185 
While the staff were willing to feign disinterestedness, Becker understood interest to be 
the driver of a successful program. Rather than simply assessing a plan, an at-risk 
contractor would have designed a plan from the ground up with the intention of its success. 
“We want someone who is aware of best practices, knows how to implement a program 
from the bottom up, like design a program that can work, even in a highly competitive 
area.”278 Not only would at-risk consultants have had the ability to create a program from 
the ground up, they would have had the motivation to make that program succeed.279 “We 
could have done an at-risk contract hire, and only certain consultants would have even 
volunteered to do that, right? That would narrow the number of applicants to those who are 
hardcore and advocates, right? Like, there are people in the industry who want CCAs to be 
the way of the future, they want local build-out and economic justice.”280 Taking a more 
strategic approach to sourcing contractors would have allowed the movement to build a 
committed team. 
Becker’s final comment on this matter is telling. If the point of the feasibility study was 
to disinterestedly test the mettle of a project according to its cost competitiveness, 
neutrality, and low-impact to customers, here Becker charted a very different path. Here, 
matters of concern, including such energy democracy values of local build-out and 
economic justice, would best be secured through programs designed for success by players 
who had skin in the game. The logic that players with a vested interest in the success of a 
program, understood as a suite of substantive commitments to particular outcomes, itself 
sits squarely within the framework of energy democracy. The energy democracy framework 
above all holds that actors should participate in their energy systems to ensure that public 
goods are secured. While the use of at-risk consultants is by no means tantamount to 
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participatory democracy, the logic underlying the use of at-risk consultants rejects 
neutrality in favor of interested involvement. This approach is rooted in a key tenet of 
participatory governance: actors with skin in the game will make good decisions on matters 
that concern them. 
Community choice aggregation is an awkward marriage of eco-modernist and energy 
democracy commitments. CCAs were designed to provide communities greater choice 
among electricity providers to increase competition in the market, but the means by which 
that competition was secured was through the aggregation of customers into communities 
capable of advocating for substantive commitments to local generation and higher 
renewable content. This tension creates problems for actors on the ground. The variety of 
responses to the feasibility study elicited during this series of key informant interviews in 
the wake of the feasibility study can be understood as three very different responses to a 
failed plan. When the feasibility study as an apparatus of program legitimation failed, it 
provided an important opportunity to chart how actors responded to crisis, and to which 
values those actors cleaved. When the CCAs ran up against an unfavorable feasibility study, 
Parker and the CEC appeared willing to sacrifice local control to pursue sustainability goals. 
In contrast, Carr argued that rigorous and open negotiations to build consensus could still 
salvage the feasibility study as a boundary object. Beyond this, a more radical perspective 
holds that success must be designed from the ground up by players committed to the broad 
range of substantive commitments made possible through local control. In this way, these 
interviews demonstrate the breadth of positions somehow tenable within the CCA 
movement. 
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5. The Farce of Objectivity 
“To me, the CCE is not an end in itself — the end is trying to create more renewables.”281 
Back at the County meeting, Supervisor Williams was busy trying to nudge Supervisor 
Lavagnino into at least letting the County pursue an RFP with SCE to start generating its 
own renewables. Lavagnino, representing Santa Maria, had remained incredulous, even 
condescending, to the staff. He and Supervisor Adam, also representing North County, 
remained staunchly opposed to the CCA, even with the understanding that CCA rates in 
PG&E territory would be substantially better than in SCE territory to the South. On the 
other side, South County supervisors wanted to see the CCA succeed despite the 
unfavorable rates projected by the study. Williams went so far as to suggest that, rather 
than figure out if a given proposal would succeed, the staff should construct a plan so that it 
does succeed.282 If not by his admission, this statement resonated strongly with the energy 
democracy approaches I’d witnessed during my interview with Becker. Throughout the 
ensuing conversation, it became clear that the function of the feasibility study had not been 
to convince the Board one way or the other in terms of the viability of a CCA program, but to 
equip both sides with a means of legitimating their preexisting intentions to either 
champion or challenge the CCA. Not only did CCA supporters on the Board refuse to back 
down from their support for the CCA, they nimbly tried other tactics whereby they might 
make some advances toward public power.  
After Williams’s first remarks, the next two comments came from Supervisor Lavagnino 
and Peter Adam, the two representatives from North County. Both supervisors were smugly 
hostile to the project. North County districts, serving Santa Maria, Lompoc, and environs 
are typically far more conservative than those in South County. Taken simply as a matter of 
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politics, it is perhaps shocking that North and South County have been lumped into one 
governmental territory at all. In terms of electricity systems, trying to pair them in one CCA 
is even more absurd, given that PG&E services North County while SCE covers South 
County. 
Lavagnino declared that while he had voted to fund the study, he was afraid we had 
picked favorable results before it was even completed.283 Further, Lavagnino rejected the 
notion that the public was very much interested in starting a CCA at all, declaring “My door 
is not getting beat down by people wanting to pay more for electricity.”284 While he was 
apparently all too happy to ignore Hough from SBCAN, Lavagnino had a point: there hadn’t 
been much public interest in the CCA in North County. Moreover, Lavagnino expressed 
confusion as to South County’s persistent dissatisfaction with their renewable portfolio, 
which for him demonstrated the inevitable march of progress: “It’s like we can’t hear the 
good news [...] I don’t understand why that’s never good enough.”285 “The plan’s working,” 
he added, referring to rising RPS standards. Finally, Lavagnino offered that if the staff 
found something flawed in the study, he might support having another look, but short of 
that, “I’m out.”286 It didn’t seem to matter that every single person who had come to speak 
during public comment had found at least one thing wrong with the study. Because 
Lavagnino was so ready to throw out both appeals from North County environmental and 
social justice groups, as well as the range of problems public stakeholders had brought to 
light, it is not entirely correct to read Lavagnino’s opposition to the CCA as a clear-eyed 
acknowledgement of the results of the feasibility study. Instead, Lavagnino was willing to 
look past the errors of the study, fight for the status quo, and let other actors at the state and 
corporate levels call the shots on energy questions. 
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Against Lavagnino’s self-assured, slick aesthetic, Supervisor Adam has the gruff, rueful 
indifference of a man who has never been in control but has always felt as if he should be. 
“You guys are killing me,” he said as he pouted bemusedly. “You know, this isn’t our 
responsibility.”287 Like Lavagnino, Adam suggested that the entire matter of renewable 
energy was both outside the county government’s purview and inevitable, chalking progress 
on that front up to technological determinism and centralized authorities: “It’s all 
happening. It’s all happening because of technology, because the state’s telling people to do 
other things.”288 For all this, Adam played the accelerationist at the dais, prodding the 
Board to do the wrong thing, in terms of the budget, just so they’ll learn a lesson. He 
concluded his statement by musing, “You know, I might vote for this thing because it’ll 
make me be right faster. Ya know? If it takes a third vote, maybe I’m your third vote. Cause 
it would be interesting, to watch us as we go through life here creating less revenue and 
more expenses and compounding this problem. And maybe I’ll help, I don’t know. My 
staff’ll kill me if I do,” he broke off as he smiled at the rest of the dais, who straightened in 
alarm, “Maybe there are a couple people here who would beat them to it.”289 He finished, 
“Ridiculous, we’re just fiddling while Rome burns.” Like Lavagnino, Adam viewed the entire 
CCA project as a waste of time, a fight we don’t need to pick, and a drain on resources that 
are better spent on other programs. But Adam’s statement here, both his words and his 
overall tenor, project a deeper dissatisfaction with the Board. It seemed as though his only 
power here is as a disruptor, clamoring for attention from a Board that consistently 
outvotes him and his Northern colleague. 
Following Lavagnino and Adam’s brash dismissal, Supervisor Wolf representing Santa 
Barbara picked up the energy in favor of the CCA. “I’m not giving up,” she declared, 
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explaining, “I think there’s too much invested.”290 She prodded toward alternatives, 
suggested we look at the model again, maybe look at a legislative fix to establish two CCA’s 
in the county. She doubled back on Lavagnino and Adam, reminding them that PG&E 
customers would see the greatest savings,291 and she reminded Lavagnino that “one of the 
reasons we’re good now is because we’ve been proactive.”292 Finally, she declared, “We’re 
committed to doing this, so let’s find a way.”293 With this final statement, Wolf concurred 
with Williams. We ought to allow matters of concern drive our quest for facts, rather than 
permitting technical studies to get in the way of the County’s mission.  
Supervisor Hartmann’s district covers almost the entire coastal region of Santa Barbara 
County. As such her jurisdiction ranges from Isla Vista to the North, though missing key 
Republican cities of Lompoc and Santa Maria, which are Lavagnino and Adam’s territory. A 
pleasant, pristine older woman, Hartmann began by talking about her recent experience 
flying in a helicopter over the Edison lines after the Whittier Fire, seeing the catwalk 
marked off with red and witnessing people try to figure out what to do if the power goes 
out.294 Of course, she added, we know just what would happen if the power goes out, and we 
need look no further than Puerto Rico in the wake of Hurricane Maria.295 For Hartmann, 
“Reliability296 is critical. [...] We live at the end of two frayed extension cords, one from 
PG&E and one from SoCal Edison.”297 As an effort to ensure local control and resilience, 
Hartmann echoed an earlier suggestion by Williams calling for developing an RFP for local 
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renewable generation that could be owned by the city and purchased by SCE.298 Hartmann 
reminded the staff that all the expertise built up in energy markets after the past few years 
of exploring the CCA “puts us in the catbird’s seat.”299 Like the other liberal supervisors 
from South County, Hartmann resolves that the County has invested too much to give up 
now, and that our best option is to keep driving toward a revised study while pursuing 
alternative paths toward local, publicly-owned renewable generation. 
From here, Williams and Cregar commenced a volley of questions and answers to 
hammer out the next steps for issuing an RFP for local generation. While the RFP under 
discussion here would fall short of the kind of comprehensive public power made possible 
by the CCA, the Board’s quick pivot to new tactics for generating local renewable power 
indicated their commitment to the concept.300 Kelly Hunter, the public services 
representative of SCE, approached the podium to clarify that the RFP for 100 megawatts of 
power currently being issued by SCE is simply for resiliency needs, not for everyday use. “If 
a catastrophic event took our 220 lines down, which we certainly don’t anticipate, we see no 
need to, we don’t see that happening.”301 Hunter’s comments of course came before the 
series of disasters that beset South County in December and January that winter. These 
disasters not only shook the public’s faith in the service lines coming over the mountains, 
which Hartmann had witnessed from her helicopter flight over the Santa Ynez Mountains, 
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but moreover the IOU’s legitimacy in the eyes of keen observers who connected the faulty 
power lines to the cause of the fire. When the Montecito mudslide knocked out a gas line 
and caused an explosion in the midst of a catastrophic debris flow, it seemed a signal from 
God that we were doing things wrong.  
Wolf pulled the Board’s focus back onto the CCA,302 and Williams crafted a motion:  
That we direct staff to seek out more information on other CCEs as one option. Our 
biggest option at this point though is to engage MRW and other qualified 
consultants to conduct additional analysis with adjusted assumptions as outlined in 
the peer review and potentially use a market-based approach to solicit PPA contracts 
for wind, solar, and natural gas to meet the energy demand that we would have. And 
then thirdly that we would have, do this, at least look at how we could do this Plan B, 
which would be environmental services to work with general services to issue an 
RFP for an energy consultant to analyze Santa Barbara County facilities pending 
solicitation from SCE for local electrical capacity resources, and also reach out to 
other agencies and large customers to inquire about their desire to participate in 
that planning effort.303 
Wolf gave her aye first, followed by “a reluctant no” from Adam, “a hearty no” from 
Lavagnino, and two ayes from Williams and Hartmann.304 The motion passed three to two, 
and the fight for the CCA continued, the negative feasibility study receding in the rearview 
mirror. 
6. Epilogue: The PEA Study, Summer 2018 
The failure of the feasibility study in fall of 2017 opened a space for a host of local CCA 
advocates — with shared commitments to the CCA but differential strategic orientations 
toward the feasibility study itself — to express their understandings of what kind of function 
the feasibility study served and what next steps should be taken to achieve their shared goal. 
A new study had been undertaken with a consultant firm that would likely have greater 
engagement with the CCA, which was more trusted in the field, and that could even have 
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some skin in the game. When the favorable results of the second feasibility study were 
presented in the summer of 2018, the study had still failed to produce expert consensus, 
and none of the County Supervisors had changed their positions on the CCA. The 
convergence of the outcomes of these two very different studies demonstrates a failure to 
arrive at consensus. Here, I consider that the failure of the boundary object of the feasibility 
study to produce expert consensus could be due to insufficient negotiations and consensus-
building work between CCA advocates and North County Supervisors and publics. 
On June 6th, 2018, Central Coast Power sent a communication to its listserv announcing 
that the new feasibility study results were in, and they were promising. Pacific Energy 
Advisors (PEA), the consultants hired to complete a follow-up study after the first by 
Wildan had failed to produce favorable results,  had concluded that the CCA could “offer 
cleaner electricity at a comparable rate to Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) or Southern 
California Edison (SCE).”305  According to a prior communication from Amy Parker at the 
Community Environmental Council, “PEA is considered the most highly regarded and 
experienced consultant in the CCE arena today.”306 Advocates were instructed to keep July 
17th clear for county and city meetings along the South Coast, and another Clean Energy 
Community Meeting was scheduled for July 11th at the Goleta Valley Community Center.307  
The meeting in Goleta was replete with familiar faces. Jennifer Cregar welcomed me at 
the door, and Brian Stevens was signing in as I walked in. I saw Amy Parker in line for the 
catered sandwich lunch as I entered the auditorium, and I said hello to Joseph Hayes. He 
was perturbed that the new study included the option to dip into “buckets” of energy that 
came from out of state, including unbundled RECs, and he was ornery that Das Williams 
snubbed him as he walked by. Josh Hudson was seated near Michael Chiacos, and I 
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managed to get a seat near David Turner and one of the interns from the World Business 
Academy. 
Cregar announced that the results of PEA’s study had been favorable. Unlike Wildan’s 
study, PEA’s had focused exclusively on Santa Barbara County. Since the last Clean Energy 
Community Meeting in January, Ventura had split off to join Los Angeles’s behemoth Clean 
Power Alliance, and San Luis Obispo and Morro Bay were exploring their own JPA, or 
possibly joining Monterey Bay Community Power. Like the previous study, the question 
posed by the feasibility study was, Can this program meet economic, social, and 
environmental standards at a competitive price? Since the last feasibility study, much had 
stayed constant. PCIA charges were still a major risk being hashed out at the CPUC, far 
from our sphere of influence, and though the new feasibility study had used slightly 
different models to calculate power costs, no major differences were borne there.  
The most crucial difference was in the choice of PEA as the consultant firm to conduct 
the feasibility study. According to Cregar, PEA had worked with the majority of CCAs 
currently in operation, and their consultation had been essential in getting those programs 
off the ground. Josh Hudson had intimated to me, “People have a lot of confidence in this 
company.”308 PEA was also being considered a frontrunner to manage the program going 
forward. By appearances, it seemed that the advisory working group had decided to 
strategize a bit more for the success of the program. PEA brought with them not just 
expertise and substantially more skin in the game, but also a host of alternative 
assumptions that went into their pro forma analysis. Wildan had been conservative in their 
estimates of how large a reserve the CCA would need to start operations. In Cregar’s words, 
Wildan had operated “like an IOU” in that they were risk averse and cautious, anticipating 
fluctuating exit fees and the possibility of tumultuous financial ups and downs that would 
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necessitate a large cushion of capital from day one. Wildan had projected the need for a 
start-up reserve of up to $240 million, which would require a bond. PEA recommended a 
$9.3 million reserve, a loan easily procurable at a commercial bank that could be paid off 
within a year without interest. For Cregar, the bottom line was that, “every consultant has 
their own magic ball.” But both because PEA was recognized as a bearer of expertise, and 
because they had delivered results that were favorable to Santa Barbara’s CCA advocates, 
their magic ball was worth taking seriously. 
At the same time, the program did continue to hinge on buy-in from areas in the PG&E 
service area in North County, and the firm resolve of South County cities of Goleta, Santa 
Barbara, and Carpinteria would not suffice to make a feasible program. To compete with 
SCE’s rates in their service area, the CCA’s power costs would need to be substantially lower 
than SCE’s rates, factoring in PCIA charges and hoping to make enough in reserves. Cregar 
explained that PG&E’s rates are more expensive, and so a CCA’s rates need not be as 
competitive if PG&E and SCE rates were considered in the CCA’s rates. In Cregar’s 
phrasing, PG&E had more “meat on the bone,” and a successful CCA would need to get that 
meat to make the whole program work. To be sure, North County customers paid more for 
their electricity, and so a CCA would likely mean cost-savings for them. Still, because North 
County residents did not have regular exposure to SCE rates in South County, those cost-
savings would have to be communicated to them above and beyond the clamor against 
CCAs from PG&E and local conservative representatives. CCA advocates had been trying to 
set up meetings in North County, but so far they had been unable to carve out much space 
for advocacy or discussions. 
In South County, there was a line of meetings scheduled for July, including a County 
Board of Supervisors’ Meeting, and City Council Meetings in Santa Barbara, Goleta, 
Carpinteria, and Buellton. The staff’s ask from the County was a resolution of intent toward 
financing and forming a JPA, and the ask of the municipalities was their consent to 
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participate in this JPA. Important and uncertain decisions were on the horizon, but those in 
the room expressed gratitude and hope that their project had legs.  
On July 17th, 2018, Cregar and PEA presented the results of the new feasibility study to 
the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors. The first option presented to the Board was 
to form a new JPA for a new CCA program, comprised of both unincorporated parts of the 
County and its cities. This plan would be most feasible, begin with a $9.3 million loan 
secured from a commercial bank, and use general fund money on program formation that 
would be reimbursable if launched. The program would roll out in 2021. The second option 
would create a new CCA program only for the unincorporated parts of the county. They 
could break even in the second year of operation and would only require a $6.7 million 
start-up reserve, but the program would generate less money. The County would have 
greatest operational control over this option, but it would concentrate both risks and costs 
in the County. The third option would split the County by service district so that PG&E’s 
service area would join the existing program building momentum in Monterey, while SCE’s 
service area would join the program in Los Angeles. This option would mean that North and 
South County would operate under diluted local control, but the plan would shield the 
County from some risks. At the same time, it was unclear whether Los Angeles would be 
willing to take in Santa Barbara soon, since they were still working out logistics in Ventura 
and LA Counties. The staff recommended option one. Since the report of the first feasibility 
study, the Board’s support for the CCA had remained consistent, though each Board 
member’s reasons for supporting or rejecting the pursuit of the CCA had changed to 
accommodate the new study. Thus, the feasibility study had become a different kind of tool, 
to be used differently by the Board members but with the same outcome.  
Supervisor Adam had originally opposed continuing the CCA study on the grounds that 
it was costly and unnecessary, a conclusion that had been at least partially supported by the 
feasibility study. Now that a different feasibility study had produced different results, 
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staying with his original commitment required that he challenge rather than affirm the 
validity of the feasibility study. At a minimum, he demanded that another consultant firm 
check the results of the new study to determine whether PEA’s assumptions and 
calculations were reasonable. Here, Adam contended that he was “not going to apologize” 
for observing a conflict of interest with PEA’s feasibility study and its consideration as a 
frontrunner for managing the program going forward. For Adam, PEA’s expertise and 
commitment mattered less and even undermined its objectivity. With these results, Adam 
could no longer use the study to explain his repudiation of the program, but instead was 
forced to use the subjectivity of the study to delegitimize it. 
Lavagnino had rejected the last push for the CCA due to lack of public interest, faith in 
state regulators and the IOUs in delivering green energy, and the resounding failure of the 
first study. Now that the study’s forecast was promising, he dramatically reshaped his 
critique of the program. His new strategy was to call into question the expertise of PEA, by 
appealing to the CPUC’s Green Book, a document recently released that expressed concern 
over the advance of CCAs across California. The Green Book cautioned that as CCAs spread, 
they will progressively fragment the energy procurement model (Colvin et al. 2018). 
Without a coherent and comprehensive plan, another crisis could strike. Again he 
emphasized that the system is working, and that California is making important strides 
toward green energy. In light of this progress, and the low rates Californians currently 
enjoy, no benefit ushering from the CCA would overcome the risk associated with its 
adoption. In sum, Lavagnino’s general approach to the CCA issue remained constant, 
though he could no longer use the feasibility study to legitimize his position. Instead, he 
appealed to a higher authority — the CPUC — and its expertise to explain his rejection of the 
program. 
Wolf was prepared once again to back the CCA, but on different grounds. Wolf had 
previously refused to “give up” despite the negative results of the first study, such that 
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Wolf’s commitment to the CCA bore no relation to the particular results of the study. In 
previous hearings, she had urged the pursuit of results that could legitimize the program; 
now that such legitimation had been found, she declared, “This is our time.” Hartmann had 
taken an almost identical stance as Wolf on both occasions, and now also argued that the 
coming months and years would offer additional off-ramps should reassessment be 
necessary. Williams too doubled-down on his arguments in support of the CCA. 
From here, there was conversation among the Board members as to what kind of review 
process PEA’s study should undertake. Adam requested an additional peer review before 
moving forward, which was rejected by Williams. Cregar clarified that the traditional 
process of implementing a CCA is to update the feasibility study as the group moves 
forward. Satisfied, the Board voted on pursuing the first option to form a JPA comprised of 
the County and interested cities. Once again, the Board voted 3-2 in favor of the JPA. Since 
the previous feasibility study, no actors had changed their position on the CCA. 
In sum, the expertise of feasibility consultant groups mattered for the supporters of the 
CCA insofar as they desired a set of favorable results as a technology of legibility to move 
forward with their new energy procurement function. For supporters of the CCA, it 
appeared as though the process of the feasibility study did not function to actually test 
whether the CCA would work. Instead, the study served as a boundary object that could 
serve as expert evidence to support what the County and CCA advocates wanted to do 
anyway. Likewise, for its detractors, the studies had not served to convince them of 
anything they didn’t want to believe to begin with. In either case, the feasibility study was 
taken at face value precisely when, from the perspective of advocates and detractors, it was 
favorable to do so. 
The similarities between the decisions made following the feasibility studies suggests 
two possible lessons. First, the public discussions surrounding the feasibility studies 
provides an important glimpse of how different advocates behave when the policy burdens 
  199 
of eco-modernist constraints come to bear. While some groups flirted with strategic 
compromises on energy democracy aspirations, the feasibility study process also 
demonstrated how weak those policy constraints actually were, and how pliable consultants’ 
models are, when political will could be mustered in support of substantive commitments. 
This revelation is promising to those advocates concerned that goals may be easily 
overridden by too technocratically focused decision-making. In a word, boundary work and 
boundary objects are much more contestable than sometimes imagined. As the next section 
shows, the eco-modernist policy constrains on CCAs can be quite fierce; but as the CCA 
confronts even greater obstacles in the coming months and years, advocates would do well 
to remember that actors within policymaking retain the agency to strategize and participate 
in the creation of programs, and that through strategy and negotiation, those programs may 
be made workable. 
The political response to the study also demonstrates a weakness in the feasibility study 
as a way to achieve expert consensus. While the favorable results allowed supportive 
Supervisors the legitimacy to pursue the CCA, no Supervisors changed their fundamental 
position vis-a-vis CCAs. The studies had convinced no one, though they had enabled action 
when the majority opinion had secured its boundary object. It is not within the scope of my 
data collection to determine precisely the kinds of negotiations that occurred in the 
development of the first failed feasibility study, but from the testimony of my participants, it 
is clear that consensus had not been reached among all interests in the County before the 
matter came before the Board. Crucially, North County had barely been engaged in the 
movement, and opportunities to present the CCA in language that could be appealing to 
conservatives — such as by emphasizing local control and autonomy from state-level 
regulatory bodies — were not seized. In a word, the feasibility study had been presented as a 
boundary object, with accordant claims to expert knowledge, but it had not been the 
product of negotiation.  
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E. Chapter Five: Utility Dominance and Utility Dependence 
In her statement to the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors Meeting on October 
3rd, 2017, after the results of the first failed feasibility study were presented, Southern 
California Edison government affairs representative Kelly Hunter stated, “For the record, 
Southern California Edison is completely neutral on CCE, we support customer choice, and 
we’ve hopefully worked very closely with the County on the data collection and all of 
that.”309 Hopefully, she might have said, the County is convinced that we too have done our 
due diligence. From SCE, the feasibility study required data on power costs and capacity 
requirements, but the CCA’s dependence on its incumbent IOU, SCE, ran much deeper and 
would be much more long-lasting.  
As per CCA policy, incumbent IOUs would still manage transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. As such, while CCAs may entail and even strive for dramatic transformations 
in generation and distribution infrastructure, they have the luxury of pursuing 
infrastructure projects at their own pace, and as revenues permit. Start-up costs include 
mostly power costs, which are passed on to customers, and staffing costs, which are 
relatively low. But while this strategy minimizes financial risk while carving out a larger role 
for publicly-accountable actors, it also requires continued engagement with IOUs.  
Moreover, the IOU would remain the provider of last resort in the case that the CCA 
failed to procure adequate energy or if customers decided to opt out of the CCA. Here, the 
relevant eco-modernist CCA policy constraint is the protection of existing business 
interests, i.e. the IOUs, which is legitimized through appeals to customer choice and having 
minimal impact on consumers. “Customer choice” draws on the ideology of the free market 
not simply to secure options for customers, but more importantly to keep IOUs in the game. 
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Meanwhile, as this section will demonstrate, keeping IOUs at the table poses important 
problems for CCAs.  
These material and ideological commitments that keep IOUs at the table are bought at 
great cost, since IOUs’ continued existence legitimizes PCIA charges, which as the previous 
section has demonstrated, means that CCAs must acquire energy at rock-bottom prices. By 
keeping CCAs financially starved, IOUs can thus ensure that CCAs have no revenue left over 
to engage in the kind of grid projects that would actually pose an existential threat to IOUs 
and make good on the promises of energy democracy. In this section, I evaluate the 
consequences for energy democracy aspirations of keeping IOUs at the table through the 
imposition of PCIA charges. PCIA charges exist at the nexus of two important tendencies 
within energy policy: IOU capture of regulatory bodies that protects corporatist 
arrangements between existing business interests and even oppositional movements, and 
faithful adherence to free market ideologies of choice and low costs that serves to protect 
those existing business interests. Taking the matter of PCIA charges as just one important 
and illustrative case among a broad range of tactics used by IOUs against CCAs, I examine 
how PCIA charges are legitimated both by material necessity in keeping with eco-modernist 
tendencies within CCA policy and by free market ideologies that reduce community 
members to consumers while pushing more complex interests to the side. Most 
importantly, I demonstrate how ideologies of customer choice and consumer protection are 
weaponized against the more radical, energy democracy aspirations of CCAs. These tactics 
run counter to the concept, if not the practice, of free markets, and instead build 
corporatism within energy systems. I conclude with an inquiry of corporatism, grounded 
materially in eco-modernist policy constraints, as a possible explanation for CCA advocates’ 
aversion to fully challenging IOU maneuvers or proposing more radical solutions to those 
conflicts between IOUs and CCAs that keep CCAs financially starved. In sum, I argue that 
material constraints, rooted again in the eco-modernist constraints of CCA policy, have 
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acquired among CCA advocates an ideological valence that jeopardize CCA as a program for 
energy democracy. 
1. The IOU Business Model 
Before exploring the ongoing conflict between IOUs and CCAs, it is useful to get a sense 
of the contemporary IOU business model. The chief elements in IOU operation are 
generation, procurement, transmission, and investment, and each element of that model 
interacts differently vis-à-vis CCAs. In some cases, IOUs remain unthreatened by CCAs, 
while at other points CCAs pose an existential threat to IOUs. Comprehending the IOU 
business model is essential to understanding how IOUs have crafted their opposition 
toward CCAs, in particular the tactic of keeping CCAs financially starved. Anemic CCAs are 
limited in the extent to which they may engage in the construction of DERs, which this 
analysis argues is the most serious conflict between IOUs and CCAs. 
To begin, IOUs do not generate substantial revenues from power costs associated with 
generation and procurement. While originally IOUs managed both generation and 
transmission of electricity, with California’s initial deregulation attempt, generation and 
transmission functions have been decoupled.310 Since then, IOUs have moved away from 
generation, and now often procure energy from third party energy service providers (ESPs) 
instead of generating it for themselves. Still, between PG&E and SCE, the two incumbent 
IOUs in the new proposed CCA service area, there are significant differences in their 
orientation toward energy generation. While SCE has shifted away from generation,311 
procuring most of its energy from ESPs, “PG&E is still in the generation game, so they have 
been threatened by CCAs from the get-go.”312 Additionally, since California’s initial 
deregulation attempt, IOUs have been prohibited from making money on volumetric sales 
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of electricity, and so now energy generation is a pass-through cost to IOU customers.313 For 
the same reason, SCE does not make money on procurement.314  Because IOUs do not make 
money directly from generation or procurement, IOUs, and SCE in particular, are largely 
unthreatened by CCAs insofar as they are only procuring entities.  
At the same time, IOUs make money off of generation in different ways. When new 
assets are built, IOUs apply to the CPUC to recover their costs, plus a guaranteed rate of 
return (Stokes 2015). For this reason, utilities favor large projects that they build or contract 
for themselves, and they argue that economies of scale justify these large projects (Stokes 
2015). To fit the utilities’ profit structure, especially when dealing in renewables, these 
massive plants must be located far from sites of consumption, often in desert ecosystems 
and rural communities that are not necessarily served by that production (Stokes 2015). In 
sum, because they make profit off of new capacity, IOUs’ business models favor centralized 
systems and expansion of infrastructure and shuns decentralized local generation. 
Investor-owned utilities remain hostile to distributed generation for reasons having to 
do with their transmission systems as well. Because the grid in California has not been 
made a public asset, IOUs make money on the energy that is transmitted across the grid 
(Stokes 2015). Insofar as CCAs continue to use IOU transmission lines, CCAs do not 
necessarily challenge IOU profits.315 However, as CCAs make good on their promise to 
develop and promote local renewable generation such as DERs and rooftop solar, IOUs 
have reason to act defensively. Energy transmission systems, from which IOUs generate 
much of their revenue, terminate in local substations, at which point the energy enters the 
distribution grid.316  IOUs do not make money on energy that does not travel across 
transmission lines.317 Thus, IOUs are threatened by energy that is generated within the 
                                                
313 Hunter, Kelly. February 7, 2018, (1:01:30). 
314 Ibid, (59:30). 
315 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part I, 35:00). 
316 Ibid, (Part I, 36:00). 
317 Ibid, (Part I, 35:00). 
  204 
distribution system. In this way, CCAs pose a threat to IOUs precisely insofar as they 
undermine the power over transmission that is inscribed in the macrogrid and pursue the 
development of local microgrids that decentralize power and reverse the polarity between 
sites of consumption and sites of generation.  
Local renewable generation threatens IOUs’ business models through altering the 
landscape of generation and transmission, but there are also more subtle ways that CCAs 
impact IOUs. IOUs make money from investments, such as through projects like grid 
modernization,318 and even investments from procurement. In the words of Josh Hudson, 
“There’s just so much money that flows through the utilities. […] It’s hard to trace where all 
the money’s going.”319 In a sense, because so much of IOUs’ business model is tied up in 
investments, where IOUs generate revenues is irreducible to either generation or 
transmission. Throughout my study, I was struck with the opacity of SCE’s business model. 
When described by Kelly Hunter from SCE, it was difficult to see how the IOU made any 
money at all; when described by advocates of the CCA, responses were confused, as if IOUs 
generated money by sleight of hand. 
Perhaps because IOUs depend so much on public faith crystalized in investments, 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public and local governments is paramount for the IOUs. They 
often maintain strong ties to communities through charitable divisions as a way to 
“maintain their status and legitimacy within the regulatory process” (Stokes 2015, 116). To 
that end, SCE has also worked hard to demonstrate its neutrality vis-à-vis CCAs and present 
themselves as cooperative partners. At the initial feasibility study results hearing at the 
County Board of Supervisors in fall of 2017, and in a private interview with their 
government relations representatives, Kelly Hunter, SCE has claimed that the corporation 
is “supportive of customer choice.”320 Hunter of SCE stated that, unlike PG&E, SCE had 
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“not fought any CCAs in our territory. We’ve actually partnered with them, and I believe 
we’ve had positive reviews on our partnerships in implementing those.”321 Cooperation with 
communities and local governments is an important part of their public face. 
At the same time, the history of interactions between IOUs and CCAs is fraught, and 
Samuel Jung notes that “obstructionist utility intervention has been one of the most 
significant barriers to the realization of community choice aggregators in their short 
history” (Jung 2017, 23). When asked about groups opposing CCAs, Cregar stated, “The 
IOUs are trying to protect their market share. Some of them will say publicly they’re neutral 
on it, but they’re doing things behind the scenes that would suggest they’re not.”322 In light 
of Cregar’s remark, Hunter’s assertion could be understood as performing cooperation 
while any number of more clandestine moves are made against CCAs through obfuscated 
market and legislative moves.  
In sum, CCAs pose the greatest challenge to IOUs when they become capable of 
advancing local microgrid generation and when they create new public institutions that 
operate independently of IOUs and their kept regulatory body, the CPUC. While SCE might 
feign neutrality on the question of CCAs, we can expect conflicts as CCAs develop into 
autonomous entities with institutional power of their own, such as the power to recreate the 
grid to reflect energy democracy aspirations. Further still, CCAs may pose a threat to IOUs’ 
dominance in regulatory bodies as they send ripples of regulatory change to the state level 
as well (Weinrub 2017). In one scenario offered by energy democracy scholar Al Weinrub, 
CCAs could even usher in new public institutions autonomous from IOUs to manage the 
grid (Weinrub 164). As such, it makes good sense for IOUs to beat back the specter of CCAs 
while they still have the market power and regulatory influence to do so. 
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2. The PCIA Threat 
One of the most important ways that IOUs assert dominance over CCAs is through the 
imposition of power charge indifference adjustment (PCIA) charges. PCIA charges are 
designed to compensate IOUs for their long-term contracts that are cut short prematurely 
by the emergence of new CCAs, and they are levied against those who comprise IOUs’ 
departing load. When communities break long-term contracts with IOUs, IOUs are left with 
energy they have contracted for, but no longer have customers to buy. In essence, PCIA 
charges shield IOUs from financial loss caused by customers switching to CCA services 
(Burke et al. 2005). Whereas current IOU rates contain only transmission and generation 
costs, CCA rates will contain transmission rates paid to IOUs, generation costs paid to ESPs, 
and PCIA rates, paid also to IOUs. In this way, by some estimates, PCIA charges could 
increase ratepayers’ total electricity bill by 14% (Jung 2017). In Santa Barbara’s first 
feasibility study, they were cited as a major driver of infeasibility. In this section, I will 
explicate the nature of the threat posed by PCIA costs against CCAs and demonstrate how 
the regulatory body of the CPUC has enabled the weaponization of PCIAs against CCAs. The 
simple expense of PCIA charges, along with the risk brought on by their inconsistency that 
has failed to be addressed by regulatory bodies, interact to create conditions unfavorable to 
CCAs and even fatally damaging to prospects for developing distributed energy resources. 
Power charge indifference adjustment charges are concerned with energy contracts 
rather than actual energy bought and sold,323 and so CCA customers do not need to 
compensate IOUs for the entire cost of the energy contracted for. Instead, IOUs calculate 
PCIA charges by taking the amount they originally bought the electricity for and subtracting 
the amount that they could sell that energy for on the day the CCA launches.324 PCIA 
charges are kept high in part because IOUs have been encouraged to engage in long-term 
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contracts, which are driven by a number of policies. During California’s deregulation 
experiment, one of the most important missteps was allowing the electricity market to be 
dominated by expensive short-term sales that were secured under crisis conditions by 
CAISO. Thus, in the wake of deregulation, IOUs were incentivized by the CPUC to pursue 
long-term power purchasing (Burke et al. 2005). Further, in an effort to stimulate growth in 
the renewables sector, the state has instructed IOUs to engage in long-term renewable 
energy contracts.325 In the minds of SCE, their “hand was forced into those contracts at that 
time no matter the cost.”326 The CPUC must approve all contracts, and it can issue directives 
to procure capacity, a process that is informed by CAISO.327 Because renewable energy costs 
have declined significantly over the past several decades, IOUs are still saddled with twenty 
and thirty-year contracts for energy that is now significantly cheaper.328  
Figure 9. Generation Costs, Original Purchase Price vs. New Sale Price with 
PCIA Charge 
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That difference in price over a twenty or thirty-year period is reflected in PCIA charges, 
diagrammed in the reproduction of Figure 9.329 At the same time, in an effort to hedge risk 
against prices changing in the market, IOUs also engage in short-term and mid-term 
contracts, meaning that energy contracts range from one year to eight years to twenty or 
thirty years.330 IOUs that ride more on the current market, such as SCE, will lose less money 
in departing load than IOUs such as PG&E, which has engaged in longer term contracts, at 
least where energy prices continue to decline.331  
IOUs also continue to engage in contracts for energy because IOUs are required to be 
kept by CCA territories as a provider of last resort. This requirement is connected to new 
emphasis on reliability. Reliability is not synonymous with resilience, which refers to energy 
independence especially in cases of natural disasters or macrogrid outages. Instead, 
reliability refers to redundancy, so that if suddenly there is an increase in demand, enough 
energy has been procured to cover that spike.332 The conversation around reliability has 
tended to favor gas-fired plants, which are considered easier to ramp up than renewable 
sources.333 Thus, even though California currently has so much solar generation that it is 
paying other states to take the energy off our hands, that energy does not necessarily satisfy 
reliability requirements in the eyes of consultants such as Wildan.334 
While IOUs are mandated to cooperate with CCAs on paper, if IOUs engage in more 
long-term contracts, they will effectively diminish the feasibility of CCAs and mop up CCAs’ 
significant economic and community benefits along the way. Because a CCA rate must 
swallow PCIA costs as well as generation and transmission rates while remaining cost-
competitive with IOU rates, a CCA would need to “procure electricity from an ESP at a cost 
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below the market price charged by the IOUs” (Burke et al. 2005, 12). In 2016 the CPUC 
doubled PG&E’s PCIA, and it increased again in 2017 (Weinrub 2017). Wildan’s feasibility 
study found that PCIA charges could be anywhere from $75 per year for ratepayers with 
standard load in SCE territory and up to $200 per year for PG&E customers.335 In cases 
where CCAs are able to attain ESP prices below the price charged by IOUs, all savings would 
essentially go to IOUs until all stranded assets are paid for (Burke et al. 2005). In this way, 
PCIA charges limit the extent to which CCAs can pursue the principal technological 
aspiration of energy democracy: distributed energy resources. As such, SCE’s strategy 
against CCAs is aimed primarily at limiting the extent to which CCAs are capable of 
engaging in more transformative electricity arrangements. 
PCIA charges impact the feasibility of CCAs not only by raising prices for CCA 
ratepayers but by introducing uncertainty into CCA implementation plans. PCIA costs vary 
according to current market prices, and so their exact amount is difficult to predict. 
Ultimately, the actual dollar amount of the PCIA varies from year to year, and cannot be 
determined definitely until the CCA program launches.336 PCIA charges constantly fluctuate 
with the price of energy, making PCIA charges one of the biggest uncertainties with a CCA 
program.337 Knowledge regarding when long-term contracts are commenced, when they 
expire, and the effect on PCIA costs is crucial in planning a CCA program (Burke et al. 
2005). At present, “much of the information regarding current utility procurement of 
energy is kept confidential and inaccessible for those communities wishing to form a CCA” 
(Burke et al. 2005, 22). In the case of SCE, such information is effectively withheld from 
government planners because SCE representatives that interface with local governments are 
not allowed to receive information about long-term contracts, which effect PCIA rates. By 
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keeping utility and market functions separate, actors within SCE can feign ignorance of the 
company’s own operations.338 In this way, the representative I spoke with from SCE was 
able to dodge questions regarding how the company chooses to engage in short or long-
term contracts:339 “It’s separate, we keep a very separate, fine line,” Hunter concluded.340 “A 
distinct line, you might say,” she said, correcting herself.341  
PCIA charges are far from straightforward, leaving IOUs ample opportunity to adjust 
calculations to their benefit. In his work, Jung argues, “The current methodology that 
dictates the way the PCIA is calculated is not transparent and does not hold utilities 
accountable to any third-party auditor, which in turn produces a PCIA value that may not 
clearly reflect only the costs associated with procuring electricity on behalf of customers 
who have switched out of utility’s service program” (Jung 2017, 45). Actors within the CCA 
community have also often found the PCIA setting process to be opaque (Digitale 2017b). 
Carr of the Sierra Club noted that while SCE “hasn’t come out publicly against CCAs, they 
may do things behind the scenes to drive up exit fees.”342 CCA advocates “have found the 
underlying assumptions that went into calculating the different factors of the charge to be 
opaque” in the case of Sonoma Clean Power (Jung 2017, 37). Sonoma Clean Power (SCP) 
has struggled with PCIA charges since its inception. According to sources at SCP, PG&E has 
made insufficient attempts to lessen their surplus power costs to keep PCIA rates high 
(Digitale 2017a). PCIA charges can also be manipulated by IOUs by shifting costs from 
transmission to procurement, which allows them to advocate for higher fees.343 In short, 
many manipulations are possible as IOUs calculate PCIA costs, and these costs serve to 
undermine CCA program options. 
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PCIA charges are ultimately determined through formulas approved by the CPUC at the 
utilities’ rate-setting meeting every year.344 Because the CPUC sets much of the policy 
regarding CCAs, this regulatory body requires some attention now. First, it is worth noting 
that many of the risks and uncertainties associated with CCAs, as well as their solutions, 
rest in CPUC regulation. The CPUC could do much to enable the feasibility of CCAs, such as 
by shifting funds from public goods costs to CCAs, opening up long-term contracts held by 
IOUs to CCA purchase through “in-kind” power shares, and resolving some of the 
uncertainties regarding PCIA charges, or by “limiting procurement of long-term power 
contracts once a community declares its commitment to forming a CCA” (Burke et al. 2005, 
23). However, historically the CPUC has been tasked with defending the natural monopoly 
of IOUs, and this legacy persists today. On this point, CPUC President Picker is most 
eloquent:  
And the question is, where do we need to maintain that monopoly? That’s what my 
agency does. We award monopolies where there’s not a market and then we protect 
them against ruinous or calamitous competition. That’s the language that’s 
embedded in our bone and in our blood from the 1910s. There was a thought that 
that was the best way to mobilize capital – you created a monopoly and you enforced 
it (from Weinrub 2017, 156).  
Because PUCs were originally proposed by utility moguls and were designed to protect 
while legitimizing the existence of natural monopolies, it is small wonder that the CPUC has 
failed to encourage the growth of CCAs by minimizing or even stabilizing PCIA rates. 
Indeed, in shifting the terrain of struggle to regulatory bodies, IOUs have essentially moved 
negotiations to entities wherein they already have significant leverage and hold 
disproportionate influence. The CPUC, committed to IOUs, has used its power to sow risk 
for CCAs. 
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In the context of CCAs, it is worth considering two important sources of risk. On one 
hand, any new venture brings inherent risk. As Hayes of IBEW commented, any long term 
procurement brings risk, since “the world changes so much in five years.”345 This risk is still 
greater in that local governments have no prior expertise in energy procurement.346 Still, 
the risks that CCAs confront vis-à-vis caustic regulation regarding PCIA rates is different 
from the ordinary risk of operating a business, since not only must CCAs gamble on energy 
markets, but they must beat back assaults from those entities that are designed to regulate 
them. This risk is not rooted in chance, but emerges from targeted assaults from IOUs 
capable now of wielding their capture over the CPUC against CCAs. This risk is regulatory 
risk. And, unlike the risk of starting a new venture, regulatory risk is entirely avoidable.  
In Santa Barbara, regulatory risk in the context of PCIA rates, as well as other policies, is 
one of the principal concerns confronting the CCA. Shortly after the results of the first 
feasibility study were presented to the County Board of Supervisors, Cregar offered, “I think 
the biggest barrier right now is it’s a really risky undertaking.”347 Cregar proceeded,  
We’re seeing a ton of regulatory and legislative activity trying to slow the tide or stop 
it all together [...] That’s scary! ‘Cause we don’t know what the rules are going to be. 
They are not well-defined right now. They are very likely to shift radically within the 
next couple of years because of all this legislative and regulatory activity. There are 
several open proceedings with the California Public Utilities Commissions on topics 
that are significant drivers of whether or not CCE could work. The biggest being is 
looking at that exit fee, that PCIA that I talked about on Tuesday. That’s probably 
gonna be totally re-done. We don’t know what it’s going to look like.348  
PCIA charges are an important instance of how regulations managed by centralized bodies 
can keep local initiatives in a state of suspension and thereby undermine the ability of local 
actors to proceed safely with their goals. Insofar as PCIA charges are determined by 
regulatory bodies that do not answer to local actors, and are taken at face value as a 
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necessary component of a CCA program, CCA implementation plans will exist in constant 
jeopardy. 
The odious weight of regulatory risk upon CCAs should raise the ire of any CCA 
advocate, for here we see the bodies supposedly oriented toward cultivating public goods 
captured by private corporations and manifesting environments unfriendly to CCAs’ 
successful implementation. Regulatory bodies are designed to depoliticize conflict and 
resolve issues; this analysis shows that the CPUC goes beyond this basic dysfunction and 
has in fact generated risk borne by CCAs by with withholding decisions and keeping key 
questions regarding CCAs in suspense while retaining the authority to manage their affairs. 
The crucial point here is that regulatory bodies are capable of undermining burgeoning 
movements not simply by resolving policy against them, but by not resolving policy at all: 
by simply holding authority over them. Regulation by a centralized authority itself, rather 
than the substance of those regulations, is sufficient to cultivating uncertainty in this 
movement for local control. 
3. Material and Ideological Legitimation 
While PCIA charges are designed to protect IOUs, they are taken for granted as 
legitimate by actors across the board. In my conversations with supporters of CCAs, efforts 
to “keep them whole”349, referring to IOUs, were never challenged outright, though most 
participants interviewed expressed concern that the particular calculations of PCIA charges 
were opaque. Thus, like the feasibility study, while particular outcomes were challenged by 
actors frustrated by the standard operations of CCA evaluation, the fundamental purpose of 
those evaluations — to sustain commitments to cost-savings and customer choice, 
respectively — was never assailed. Moreover, even those actors who were critical of IOUs 
perceived that their continued existence was necessary to proper CCA functioning. Here, I 
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argue that PCIA rates are legitimated both materially and ideologically as actors grapple 
with the eco-modernist constraints of CCA policy as well as prevailing norms and values 
favoring the free market, which uses commitments to customer choice to keep energy rates 
low. At the same time, I argue that keeping IOUs at the table is not a manifestation of free 
market principles, but ensures corporatist relations to protect IOUs from a loss at the 
expense of actually free markets. 
In my interviews, CCA advocates communicated both material and ideological 
justifications for keeping IOUs at the table and thus embracing PCIA charges. On a material 
level, the solvency of IOUs is crucial to CCA operation. CCAs are an attractive means of 
securing public oversight over electricity because the start-up costs are relatively low. Start-
up costs are low precisely because IOUs are still tasked with transmission and distribution. 
IOUs must be kept at the table for CCA programs to achieve public power more easily, if less 
completely. As Becker argued, “It's important to offer folks the opportunity to opt out. And 
CCAs wouldn't be CCAs if they didn't, right? [...] If we wanted to do full local control, it's 
just a much heavier lift.”350 CCAs are also a political low bar to clear because IOUs are still 
relied on as providers of last resort should ratepayers opt out of a CCA, or should a CCA 
collapse. By keeping IOUs in the game, local governments can hedge their risk politically 
and financially. At the same time, while keeping IOUs solvent makes CCAs an attractive, 
low-risk option for approaching public power, keeping IOUs at the table also entails making 
concessions to their financial well-being, often to the detriment of CCAs.  
In this way, CCA advocates’ support of PCIA charges and keeping IOUs in the game is 
shaped around the structural constraints imposed by those eco-modernist elements of CCA 
policy. Eco-modernism is dedicated to maintaining existing business interests and 
ostensibly keeping markets free and open to customer choice as a way to keep costs low. 
These commitments are satisfied by keeping IOUs in the game. Shaping their strategy to 
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these structural constraints, CCA advocates do not challenge PCIA rates simpliciter, though 
they rail against how in particular they are calculated. Beyond concessions to these 
structural constraints, CCA advocates’ support for PCIA charges is also wrapped up in 
ideologies of the free market. Throughout the various forums, interviews, and presentations 
I witnessed, the rhetorical device of customer choice and the competition it supposedly 
brought to the energy system was used to promote CCAs. In this way, the eco-modernist 
constraints of CCA policy both proved a burden to the CCA and helped ideologically 
legitimize the movement. 
In real terms, however, customer choice and competition meant a closing of opportunity 
for CCAs as they scrambled to keep costs low to compete with IOUs. Far from cultivating 
competition, eco-modernist and free market ideologies crystallized in CCA policy to trap 
CCAs in corporatist bonds with IOUs and guarantee IOUs’ perpetuation. While ideologies of 
the free market abound, PCIA charges themselves ensure that IOUs are not expected to take 
responsibility for their risk. Instead, it is taken for granted that PCIA costs will be passed on 
to customers. Those customers are in turn used by IOUs as a human shield against CCAs, as 
will be explored below. Thus, while PCIA charges are legitimated by reference to free 
market ideologies of customer choice, they end up legitimizing a process whereby IOUs 
secure their seat at the table with CCAs. 
A fair amount of this discursive work is done by centering the supposed needs of the 
customer. PCIA charges, in the IOU’s framing, are a means to ensure that all customers are 
treated fairly, whether they acquire service through the CCA or remain with the IOU. 
Hunter emphasized, “While we support customer choice, and CCAs, we do think that there 
has to be equity in that departing load.”351 She continued, “We have contracted for power for 
as many people live in this area. So, if all of a sudden those, I think roughly eighty-five 
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thousand customers [leave], those left within the system shouldn’t be left holding the bag, 
per se. So, we can’t increase the costs on everyone who’s left in the system because these 
people decide to leave.”352 In SCE’s framing, the energy that SCE has contracted for must be 
paid for, even though no actual energy or money has changed hands.353 Rather than take the 
loss on the defunct contracts themselves, SCE presents only the possibility that they would 
distribute the cost among their remaining customer base or among the CCA customer base. 
From here, SCE performs fairness by distributing that cost among CCA customers. Rather 
than take the loss on risky long-term contracts themselves, SCE passes that risk along 
directly to those who break the contract by remaining in the CCA. 
This solution diverges significantly from that set of capitalist values attuned to risk and 
reward. Hunter explained PCIA charges from the perspective of the IOU through an analogy 
of a lunch party at a restaurant. Here, any resonance with free market thinking vanishes. 
Hunter explained,  
If you were all at a restaurant with seven or eight friends, and we all ordered food, 
and two or three people got up before the bill came, now everybody else has to share 
the tab of what’s left. And they just left without offering any money or leaving. So, 
we just wanna make sure they pay their fair share. So you’re leaving the system, fine 
[...] You’re fine, you can leave, yeah, we’re not holding you hostage here. You can 
leave. But you gotta pay your fair share. Before you leave. [laughs].354 
The first problem with Hunter’s analogy is that SCE continues to engage in long-term 
contracts for energy. As such, there is no clear timeframe in which PCIA charges may be 
sun-setted. Thus, PCIA charges will not simply be paid once “before you leave.” I pressed 
Hunter on this issue:  
MBC: It seems like if you have more long-term contracts, then that would make it 
harder for a CCA to establish, right? Because you’ve put out that much more money, 
and so that’s like, continuing with your analogy, that’s like, right before everyone 
gets up to leave, ‘Hold on, let’s order champagne!’ You know? 
                                                
352 Ibid, (49:00). 
353 Romano, Mary. September 20, 2017, (21:00). 
354 Hunter, Kelly. February 7, 2018, (49:30). 
  217 
KH: Right. Right, it is. And like I said, I mean, we, these contracts are entered into, 
in good faith, for all of our customers that we have. And so, if whenever people cut 
out, we just can’t leave the rest of the ratepayers holding the bag. Because I mean it 
is ultimately the ratepayers that are paying.355 
While Hunter did not disagree that PCIA charges make it harder for CCAs to become 
established, she asserted once again that, regardless of the decisions of the IOU, ratepayers 
would be responsible for the contracts engaged in by the IOU. If free market ideology rests 
on the myth that rewards are won through risk, and that risk bears its own responsibility, 
the PCIA charge is actually a subversion of the free market. 
Hunter notes that the diners in her analogy are not hostages, while also recognizing that 
PCIA charges make it hard for diners to leave. Her analogy is clearly flawed, and can be 
amended in the following way. Imagine instead a group of diners who can only acquire food 
by going to a restaurant. They have their own kitchens at home, of course, but they can only 
use their kitchens between certain hours, and they don’t have refrigerators to store food, so 
they may as well eat out. There is only one restaurant in town. The manager of the 
restaurant counts the number of people who come into the restaurant and orders the 
kitchen to begin preparing meals before the diners even have a chance to sit down. Just 
then, a few of the diners see that there is a new restaurant across the street with comparable 
prices and more ethically-sourced food, and they decide to check it out. The manager of the 
restaurant declares that, if they leave, they’ll be forcing all the other diners to split the cost 
of the entire meal, which they hadn’t even ordered. Before they can freely leave, the 
manager demands that they pay for their share of the meal, or else the diners who stay at 
the first restaurant will be left holding the bag. This scenario resembles little the free 
market, and instead brings to mind a Kafka-esque authoritarian hellscape that many, I 
imagine, would be very happy to leave behind. 
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4. We Are More Than Consumers 
PCIA costs are designed in part to keep IOUs whole to allow customers to opt out of the 
CCA to the incumbent IOU, thus enabling customer choice. As has been demonstrated, the 
ability for customers to opt out of CCAs forces CCAs to pursue rock-bottom rates. This 
commitment is both perfectly in line with eco-modernism, in that it is a business model 
designed to be minimally impactful to consumers while maintaining existing business 
interests, and it allows the IOUs to hide behind the will of the market as CCAs scramble to 
cut costs. Meanwhile, all other substantive commitments of CCAs are made secondary as 
the free market precludes all but the cheapest options. As a result, PCIA charges starve 
CCAs and limit their capacity to engage more expensive projects that deliver social benefits 
such as DERs. What’s more, consumers are used as a kind of human shield, as the motives 
of predatory IOUs are recast as measures to protect the low rates of their customers. With 
this flattening of public concerns to the availability of cheap, abundant energy, homo 
politicus is replaced by homo economicus. In this section, I will complicate the subjectivity 
of the community member and suggest that while an economic system designed to pitch to 
the bottom line may satisfy narrowly-defined consumer demands, such systems are 
injurious to members of the public as complex agents and to workers in particular. I argue 
for community members’ reconstitution as effective political actors, capable of holding 
complex assemblages of commitments, an aspiration made a bit more possible through the 
implementation of CCA. 
Dogged commitment to low rates for energy will not deliver local jobs, a modernized 
grid, rigorous renewable standards, or anything like energy democracy. Still, from the 
perspective of actors on both the IOU and the CCA side, as well as politicians and 
policymakers, low rates gained through adherence to the bottom line is the standard for 
customer satisfaction. It is worth interrogating this assumption. On one hand, low rates are 
good for consumers, particularly those who are economically marginalized, and many 
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ratepayers are in such financial straits that an extra $15 on their electricity bill could 
become a concern. Further, customers are used to seeing low rates on their bills, and if they 
see their rates go up, they might exact revenge on politicians — especially if they are 
prompted by IOUs. At the same time, ratepayers are more than consumers. They are 
community members who may desire resilient communities with energy sources close to 
home and under their control. They include people fighting for a livable planet. High energy 
consumption patterns that now imperil the climate feed off of a legacy of cheap, abundant 
energy, to which continued dedication will jeopardize both habitable planetary conditions 
and, I argue, the successful implementation of a CCA. From here we must ask, what are we 
willing to trade to secure low energy bills and preserve the free market? 
Focusing entirely on the community member qua customer also invisibilizes the 
community-member qua worker. The technological and infrastructural promise of CCAs is 
that they will provide the revenues and expertise for communities to engage in local build-
out, which will incur economic benefits to communities in general and building trades 
workers in particular. In my correspondence with Joseph Hayes of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 413, he affirmed this connection between 
labor and environmental concerns vis-à-vis CCAs: “Good paying local union jobs are critical 
to community sustainability across the board.”356 The IBEW worked closely with 
environmental groups and Supervisor Williams’s office to ensure that local generation was a 
priority with SB350, and they have long been engaged in the push for the CCA.357  
CCAs bear the potential of uniting labor and environmental concerns by manifesting a 
new push for local renewable generation. However, if CCAs are kept anemic, they will be 
incapable of making good on those promises.  Further, environmental commitments that do 
not bear with them prescriptions for local power may actively endanger workers’ job 
                                                
356 Hayes, Joseph. Email Correspondence. May 3, 2018. 
357 Hayes, Joseph. October 19, 2017, (30:00). 
  220 
security. To achieve energy portfolio standards that appear greener, CCAs have been known 
to engage in the purchase of unbundled renewable energy credits (RECs). Unbundled RECs 
are essentially immaterial credits that become detached from actual electrons and yet are 
legible in meeting state energy standards. RECs may satisfy some renewable requirements, 
but they do not help grow the renewable energy market (Weinrub 2017). These RECs may 
be sought far from CCA service areas, such as from solar farms in Nevada and Arizona 
where land and labor is cheaper, or from large hydroelectric dams in the Pacific Northwest. 
Use of large hydroelectric from the Pacific Northwest has been such an important part of 
CCAs’ attempts to secure economic feasibility while meeting environmental standards that 
CCAs have increasingly tended to emphasize GHG-free energy sources, such as large 
hydroelectric, rather than renewable sources.358 Clean sources of energy acquired from 
outside the state is a cheap option for financially-strapped CCAs, or those just trying to find 
their footing, but they fail to promote local job creation, enable companies to build where 
labor and land are cheap, and do not necessarily increase demand for renewable energy in 
those out-of-state sites. 
Pitching to the bottom line might protect consumers, but it hurts workers. In our 
conversation, Joseph Hayes from IBEW Local 413 spoke more of the “bottom line” than any 
other participant. His commitment was not to the bottom line as ideology, but as a very real 
— and very threatening — constraint. For IBEW, the sometimes-plastic logic of the market 
becomes the concrete fact of labor cuts. This is to say that, while IOUs may alter their 
calculations and politicians and advocates may charge ahead despite warnings from 
feasibility studies, workers are much more vulnerable to the accountant’s ledger. The 
impacts of imprecise calculations are indirectly borne, if at all, by politicians, technocrats, 
activists, and corporations. Should the program be implemented and fail, smear campaigns 
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and the ideological prism — not the market — will enact the scourge against politicians. 
Activists and technocrats might also catch heat, which can easily be distributed through 
bureaucratic networks, as is their latent function. Corporations, of course, have suffered and 
even caused much greater havoc than a few stranded assets, and the IOUs in question have 
always weathered the storm. Even customers, saddled with higher energy bills, will in most 
cases be able to either pay the charge, reduce their consumption, or opt out. In all cases, 
however, and with every downward swing of the market, labor must squirm under the 
pendulum. 
What matters from the standpoint of labor is whether the entities tasked with enlisting 
IBEW labor can abide by their own bottom lines while still employing local union labor. 
Here, for the IBEW workers, instruments and measures such as the feasibility study or the 
calculation of PCIA rates must be taken at face value because those instruments and 
measures become real as soon as IOUs and CCAs use them to determine and legitimize the 
next quarter’s expenditures. In our conversation, Hayes insisted on the realism of the PCIA 
calculations and the energy contracts they are based on. He emphatically stated, “That’s real 
money that’s out there.”359 Before I could press him on the point, he retorted, “Let the 
accountants freakin’ shuffle it off the way they do, but that’s, that’s on the table.”360 From 
here, Hayes took aim at the supporters of the CCA who remained unconvinced by the 
results of the study and defended the legality, if not the legitimacy, of the PCIA calculations: 
The advocates for CCA and Community Choice Energy, are like, well, if we could just 
lower that part of the thing, we would have been feasible! Well, yeah, but you can’t 
pretend that that money’s not on the table, because it really, really is. So, that’s what 
it’s all about. And it’s not like just Edison saying, ‘Oh, you guys are gonna have to 
kick us down some dough,’ right? No, that’s all regulated at the PUC. They know 
exactly how those formulas work. And those formulas are set by law. So they can’t 
manipulate that stuff. One thing that they can do to shift stuff around in their favor, 
is what they have been doing with the generation and the distribution, but they’re all 
doing that within the lines of the law. So, but they have to protect their investments, 
                                                
359 Hayes, Joseph. October 19, 2017, (1:00:00). 
360 Ibid. 
  222 
right? Remember that bottom line. Never forget the bottom line.361 
What is perhaps most striking here is that Hayes levels his criticism against IOU and 
government accountants as well as CCA advocates for denying a kind of market realism. 
While others can “shuffle off” charges and hopefully appeal calculations, he must take them 
seriously. Hayes enshrines the PCIA charges in legitimacy not because of some abstract 
dedication to the market, but because the bottom line is taken as legitimate by those actors 
who hold the fate of labor in their hands. In sum, appearance must be taken as reality. 
For all this, Hayes expressed no trust or fealty to the IOUs, though he was concerned 
with protecting their investments, knowing that without investments there would be no 
labor. He clarified, “I’m not here to defend the utility companies, right, but I definitely want 
to ensure that if those investments aren’t protected, then the company’s gonna protect that 
bottom line at all costs, right? So, like, where do you think if you’re a, where are you going 
to cut? You’re gonna cut jobs. You’re gonna cut people. And those people lose jobs, those 
people that lose jobs lose their income, and that’s where we, that’s where we’re coming 
from.”362 Here, a commitment to business-as-usual is not made on the grounds of ideology 
or how to maintain political salience or even abide by the structural constraints of a CCA. 
Maintaining business-as-usual is important because that’s how a union leader makes sure 
people don’t lose their jobs. 
At the same time, Hayes was not value-free in his orientation toward IOUs and CCAs. 
Against the bottom line of the IOUs, Hayes asserted his own bottom line: a commitment to 
build energy efficient systems. “So our bottom line, our interest is — besides being 
Californians, besides being citizens of this county, but as members and as electricians — we 
want to build the resources that are in demand. We want to build storage, we want to build 
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generation, we want to rebuild the grid.”363 But if CCAs are not made financially viable, they 
will be incapable of making good on their promise of local build-out. Whether the labor 
comes from IOUs for the maintenance of transmission lines or from CCAs through local 
renewable generation projects, the IBEW needs entities with money to keep them working. 
In a follow-up email after the interview, Hayes argued, “If you can’t prove upfront that you 
can do it cheaper and still charge comparable market rates, then there are no revenues to 
reinvest. [...] If there are no investment dollars, then there are no projects being built, which 
means no jobs are created.”364 If CCA programs are kept anemic, they will fail to deliver on 
their energy democracy aspirations. 
At the end of our interview, Hayes asserted that regardless of the outcome of the next 
feasibility study, his union would keep pushing for renewables built locally. That, in turn, 
would require pushing against corporations that would rather build out of state than hire 
local union labor:  
JH: “We’re still gonna be pushing those same interests and make sure […] they’re 
not gonna build it in Arizona, like I said. Because they will – because why?  
MBC: Bottom line.  
JH: That’s right! I knew you were paying attention. [They high-five.]365 
 
From here, it is worth considering what kind of impact the success or failure of organized 
labor would likely have on communities on the South Coast. Building trades jobs, clean or 
otherwise, are few in number, are comprised of temporary projects, and can rarely be 
accomplished entirely through local labor in the first place. In what way, then, is organized 
labor crucial to energy democracy? 
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During my interview with Hayes, the conversation meandered over to the topic of 
landlords. Hayes and the IBEW had been invited by now-Mayor Cathy Murillo to table at an 
affordable housing symposium in Santa Barbara. Hayes had shown up, “flying IBEW flags 
and talking to people about entering into the trades to make a living.”366 He continued, “If 
you think about it, the high cost of living down there, the conversation was always about 
that one thing inside of it, like, what are we gonna do about the high cost of rent. And the 
other part of that conversation is what are you gonna do about providing people with jobs 
that pay enough to pay that kind of rent or to purchase the property.”367 Unions are a way to 
achieve a professional wage, insurance for workers and their families, a retirement savings. 
For Hayes, these were not separate issues from the high cost of housing. When it comes to 
protecting communities against the rising cost of living, consumer protections are only half 
the solution. We would need worker protections, too. 
The problem regarding housing is analogous to how some CCA advocates regard 
economic viability and cost-savings. Most of the discourse surrounding CCAs and their cost 
revolves around the consumer. It is the consumer who must be protected, the consumer 
who is used as a human shield by corporations, the consumer whose purse must be 
appeased. By Hayes’s framing, this picture is incomplete. For a community to be 
economically resilient, they need good jobs, too. That’s what Hayes is in it to protect. In 
sum, the citizen is a complex assemblage of interests irreducible to access to cheap, 
abundant energy. As such, the citizen must interact with an energy system that regards 
them as more than a consumer, as more than homo economicus. They must retain the 
power to navigate that assemblage of interests of their own accord. This requires that they 
be reconstituted as political agents. The creation of a community choice aggregation is one 
modest step toward realizing that agency. 
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5. The False Concern for Customer Satisfaction 
Much of the discourse surrounding energy suggests that CCA policy is designed to keep 
rates low through customer choice and free markets. At the same time, it is worth asking 
whether the tail wags the dog, or to what extent customer choice and low rates are actually 
weaponized against CCAs to protect IOUs. A test here would be to actually examine in real 
terms the electricity rates predicted by even the worst case scenario feasibility study 
conducted by Wildan, to consider whether these rates are likely to be borne out and whether 
the increase would even be noticed by ratepayers, and finally to explore alternative 
strategies to keep rates low that do not rely on free market logics. 
First, the feasibility study conducted by Wildan predicted a rise in energy rates, but not 
necessarily an increase that would substantially impact consumers or that could not be 
absorbed by simple shifts in energy consumption. At the October 2017 feasibility study 
discussion at the County Board of Supervisors, Lavagnino insisted that his constituents 
would not be willing to pay even $5 more on their bills, much less the $15 ratepayers would 
likely pay in PG&E territory if the CCA went through, according to Wildan’s model.368 The 
suggestion that ratepayers would balk at paying even an extra $15 a month for 
democratically controlled energy says much more about consumers’, politicians’, and IOUs’ 
acclimation to cheap, abundant energy than to the exorbitant cost of CCA-delivered energy. 
Moreover, Williams was quick to point out that, if customers took advantage of energy 
audits and other efficiency programs offered by IOUs, “most customers could save fifteen 
bucks right now.”369 If the dedication to low prices on energy is disingenuous, it is likely that 
abiding by free market principles operates as a cover for maintaining the status quo, here an 
energy market dominated by IOUs. 
                                                
368 Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors Meeting. Santa Barbara County Administrative 
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Structurally, the threat that customers might opt out of CCA services poses enough of a 
risk to CCAs that they are forced to lower their rates to be competitive with IOU rates. At 
the same time, it is worth questioning to what extent the risk of opt-outs is a foregone 
conclusion, or simply a boogeyman designed to hamstring the more ambitious energy 
democracy aims of CCAs. During deregulation, only 1% of customers chose to change their 
ESP (Wasserman 1999). In light of consumer’s relative ignorance over changes on their 
electricity bills, it seems outlandish to think that consumers will en masse quit programs 
they are opted into from the beginning. Even more outlandish is the proposition that 
ratepayers would swarm to city council chambers and supervisors meetings to assail their 
elected representatives. It is much more likely that IOUs would mobilize campaigns against 
representatives who advocate for CCAs. In that case, the political concern shifts from rates 
to how concern over rates can be weaponized by IOUs using appeals to free market values of 
rate competitiveness and customer choice. 
Insofar as advocates and politicians are concerned about keeping rates low, it would be 
entirely possible to restructure energy rates to protect financially vulnerable customers. 
Currently, the flat-rate structure of energy rates guarantees that ecocidal commitments to 
cheap, abundant energy can always be reframed as pro-consumer, or even as a salute to 
economic justice. In this way, the poor are used as a human shield to protect corporations 
against public power. A simple solution to this problem would be to design a rate structure 
that prices energy according to income. In the case that rates become substantially more 
burdensome for high-income ratepayers, under current CCA policy those ratepayers could 
opt out to the incumbent IOU and undermine the economic feasibility of CCAs. Here, 
customer choice once again could be used to make public power heel. It is worth 
remembering that customer choice has legitimized structural constraints to keep IOUs 
solvent. It is also worth remembering that customer choice was never provided for by IOUs, 
and that now IOUs are weaponizing customer choice against energy democracy. Surely the 
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ability to participate in decisions about where a community’s power comes from is a higher 
form of choice than the narrow choice provided for in choosing between an IOU and a CCA. 
Thus, insofar as our concern lies in protecting the choice of the citizen, it makes good sense 
to sacrifice the choice between IOUs and CCAs to preserve the choice promised by the 
energy democracy aspirations of CCAs. In a word: get rid of opt-outs, and make the rich pay 
more for energy. In the case that the financial viability of IOUs is undermined by cutting 
them out of procurement entirely, it is worth remembering that IOUs are only viable today 
because they were handed natural monopolies over a hundred years ago, operate with 
regulatory protection from the CPUC, and have been bailed out and protected from liability 
by the state of California. The public already owns IOU infrastructure. It’s time we act like 
it. 
These solutions are, of course, not being entertained. That they are not is proof that our 
commitment is not to low rates, but to the concept of the free market. Free market 
ideologies have been weaponized against public power and crystalized in policy constraints 
that favor IOUs. To be sure, the political will needed to enact the aforementioned policy 
changes amount to cutting the Gordian knot of IOUs’ dominance. At the same time, this 
analysis has shown that if CCA advocates are committed to goals beyond cheap, abundant 
energy, they would do well to cast off the language of cost-savings and free market 
commitments entirely in favor of a more robust substantive program of energy democracy.  
Short of total insurrection, there are more subtle ways that CCAs can undermine the 
logics of the free market and disabuse their movement of the fetters of eco-modernist 
commitments to low costs, minimal consumer impact, and customer choice. The first 
strategy, which has some traction, is to allow for “in-kind” power rulings, which would allow 
CCAs to benefit from long-term power contracts that they would essentially buy directly 
from the IOUs (Burke et al. 2005, 14). In this way, no contracts would be broken, and no 
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one would be left holding the bag. Alternatively, IOUs could simply be made to bear the 
brunt of stranded contracts. Not all is fair in the free market.  
An important shift could even be made rhetorically. Becker suggested that a pitfall of 
CCAs, “especially for SoCal Edison territory, is talking about CCAs as if they’re going to 
necessarily save ratepayers money. I think we need to be talking more about jobs, justice, 
and community benefits. Because in competitive areas we can't necessarily save a bunch of 
money for our ratepayers.”370 The suggestion here is that if CCAs offer substantive benefits 
to their communities, if they are presented with political options, they will be liberated from 
thinking in purely economic terms. At the same time, Becker admitted that if CCAs 
“charged them a third more than what they are used to charging, they're gonna opt out, and 
our program will fail. So, there's an important reason that we focus on the economics of 
it.”371 What this suggests is that while market factors should enter into a CCA plan, market 
forces need not occupy a supreme position in the calculation. Becker suggested that the CCA 
could even work if it were more expensive in the beginning: “If we can come up with some 
plan that seems like it will work even if, say, we plan for seventy percent retention of 
customers, [...] I think it could still be a really vibrant program that we're proud of and 
there's a chance people could opt back in later.”372 When the free market is not taken as a 
given, other creative solutions to creating successful CCA programs become feasible. This 
section has shown how, insofar as IOUs command the market, the illusion of the free 
market serves IOUs against CCAs, and eco-modernist constraints within CCA policy are 
revealed not as ways to protect consumers and keep rates low, but to keep IOUs at the table. 
If CCAs deserve support, it is foolish to leave their success to the machinations of a captured 
market.  
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6. Corporatism as Fact, Corporatism as Value 
Standing up to IOUs and recognizing that PCIA rates are a device to keep CCAs in check 
would require that CCA supporters dispense with the notion that IOUs are doing anyone 
any good but themselves. Yet, in my conversations, I found many advocates of CCAs who 
seemed unwilling to mount a full critique against IOUs. In this section, I will examine three 
statements from CCA advocates vis-à-vis IOUs and explore how corporatism may explain 
why some CCA advocates seem incapable of confronting the hegemony of IOUs on the way 
to proposing more radical agendas. Corporatism is understood here as a form of inter-party 
relations wherein interested parties gain control over decisions by securing themselves a 
seat at the negotiation table (Neumayer 2003). Once parties have a seat at the table, it 
becomes difficult to make decisions that negatively impact any parties present. While in the 
context of CCAs corporatist relations between CCA advocates and IOUs begins as a material 
necessity and eco-modernist policy constraint legitimated by narratives of customer choice, 
I argue that corporatism gains an ideological valence as actors grow accustomed to working 
together and eventually come to believe that they share the same interests. The myth of 
shared interests here drains the radical potential of CCAs and can prove fatal to its 
aspirations toward energy democracy. 
In my conversation with Jennifer Cregar, she framed the relationship between CCAs 
and IOUs as fundamentally cooperative. She clarified: 
I think that any CCA provider still has to work very, very closely with the investor-
owned utility in their shared footprint because the CCA only has the authority to 
take over the supply piece. [...] They kind of have shared responsibility and 
obligation to the customers that they’re both mutually serving. So, I think, you 
know, CCA is a way to certainly enable more of the local voice to be heard, but it 
doesn’t do that to the exclusion of the IOU.373 
Here, Cregar offered a statement of commonality with the IOUs. In essence, CCAs and IOUs 
have to work together, and their relationship is both materially necessary by virtue of the 
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IOUs’ control of the grid and morally necessary by virtue of their shared customer base. 
Because the two entities are forced to work together on behalf of ratepayers and toward the 
common goal of keeping the lights on, it is unsurprising that CCA advocates — especially 
those in government staff positions — do not adopt an overtly hostile orientation toward 
IOUs. Moreover, as this chapter has illustrated, IOUs are very much in a position to capsize 
CCAs if they intend to. For these reasons, it may benefit all actors to play nice. 
Like Cregar, Amelia Carr of the Sierra Club argued that maintaining the viability of 
IOUs was essential to running the grid, even if they were manipulating PCIA rates at the 
CPUC. Carr stated, “They’re working it out, that’s why they’re having their influence with 
the Public Utilities Commission, making sure they’re still viable — and we want them to be 
viable, too. We wouldn’t want to drive the utilities out of business. They’re the grid.”374 
Later, I asked a more targeted question about IOUs’ approach to local solar and energy 
efficiency programs. Had IOUs not undermined decentralized energy production, and did 
they not have a persistent interest in buoying energy consumption? Carr became careful 
with her language: 
I don’t want to get down on utilities, either. I don’t, I don’t, I just — I don’t hate 
utilities, I don’t. I’m just noting that from, generally speaking, it’s always better — 
well, two things. It’s better to have energy efficiency first, it’s always the cheapest 
thing to do. And two, in certain states, utilities are passing bad laws that disincent 
local solar build-out. Those are both true things. Those are both true things. That’s 
what I would say about it.375  
Rather than put local renewables and energy efficiency into direct conversation with IOU 
maneuvers, Carr began by pedaling back her critique of IOUs, then broke her argument 
against IOUs into two statements that were “both true.” It was puzzling to hear an advocate 
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of CCAs, especially one who stood on the “outside” of CCA governance-to-be, refrain from 
openly criticizing IOUs. The statement prompted me to consider that there could be deeper, 
perhaps ideological reasons that some CCA advocates did not mount more sweeping 
criticisms of IOUs. 
In an interview with the Community Environmental Council’s Amy Parker, she mounted 
a spirited defense of PCIA charges and in so doing provided another instance of a CCA 
advocate protecting IOUs. Parker argued, “You need to compensate the utilities for the 
revenue that they will have lost because they bought this and entered into long-term 
contracts thinking that they would have this certain number of customers.”376 At that 
moment, Parker raised her voice and stated,  
In Amy’s opinion, not Community Environmental Council’s, in my opinion, at its 
core, it’s not necessarily a bad thing because, I mean, utilities have to be regulated, 
right, and I think that they should be made whole for the purchases that they made 
on behalf of all of their customers. Otherwise, the remaining customers that were 
with the utilities would really be price-gouged.377  
With this statement, Parker moved beyond the typical justification that IOUs must be kept 
whole because they are essential to CCA operations. Instead, she claimed that IOUs should 
be kept whole because they are regulated.  
Parker’s statement opens up to an important insight about regulation. Regulation of 
IOUs does not simply protect the public under conditions of monopoly; it also ensures the 
protection of the monopoly. In this way, regulation can be understood as an arrangement 
that protects parties involved by locking them into corporatist bonds. In a word, IOUs will 
be kept at the table, and insofar as that is the case, their interests will be protected. While 
corporatist arrangements incentivize cooperation, they also narrowly circumscribe options. 
Corporatist models discourage exploration of both solutions lying outside the reach of 
institutional expertise and problems residing at the root of those institutions (Hukkinen 
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1995). The result is institutional inertia, such as the corporatist loop that locks even CCA 
supporters into defending PCIA charges.  
By retaining control over the grid, IOUs have ensured that they will have a seat at the 
table in CCA operations. Through this corporatist framework, enshrined by the material 
necessity of mutual responsibility to customers, CCA advocates are limited in the critiques 
they can level at IOUs, and their capacity to entertain solutions to issues that plague CCAs is 
weakened. If CCAs cannot meaningfully confront and do away with PCIA charges, their 
ability to speak to energy democracy commitments will be hamstrung.  
These corporatist bonds likely constitute an important part of SCE’s strategy. Early on 
in the history of private utilities, Samuel Insull had the insight to know that, in order for 
IOUs to warrant their monopoly status, they would have to legitimize themselves to the 
public. One means by which SCE has legitimized itself is by making itself indispensable not 
just to the proper working of electrical infrastructure, but to community organizations. SCE, 
for one, has positioned itself on a host of community boards. During our interview, Hunter 
could positively not be stopped when asked about the company’s interface with the 
community: “We interact philanthropically, and I serve on various boards on a regular 
basis. You name it, from Boys and Girls Clubs in the area to United Way to Girls, Inc. to 
Community Environmental Council. [...] We have a partnership with Red Cross called 
Prepare SoCal that we work with to prepare people for disasters and respond to 
disasters.”378 She paused, and as I began to ask my next question, Hunter interrupted me, 
gushing, “Sorry, Chambers of Commerce, I mean, business organizations — the list goes on 
and on.”379 From here, it is either the case that SCE cares that deeply about the community, 
or SCE cares to appear that deeply caring. Regardless, these interactions with the 
community cultivate good feelings between the people and the IOU. These bonds ensure 
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that no group in particular has any interest in weakening their power. Moreover, if SCE is 
jeopardized by CCAs, the IOU will no longer be able to sponsor these organizations, 
including the Community Environmental Council itself. SCE’s community involvement 
ensures that, if CCAs were to bring down IOUs, they would raise the ire of a host of 
community groups along the South Coast. 
Later in my fieldwork, I would see Hunter from SCE sitting at the Santa Barbara City 
Council Meeting on October 31st alongside members of the Sierra Club and the CEC, to 
which SCE was a major donor.380 It would occur to me that the most important ideology 
plaguing CCA supporters and obfuscating more revolutionary solutions to public power was 
not a dedication to the free market through necessity, but to business-as-usual through 
corporatism. In the fight for energy democracy, corporatism is a dead end. Capitulation to 
powerful corporate interests locks CCAs into relations that fall far short of energy 
democracy as CCAs are kept financially starved. The success of CCAs in bringing about 
transformative change through dedication to substantive commitments to local generation 
and renewable energy hinges on those CCAs’ ability to escape free market discourses, 
challenge the paradigm of cheap, abundant energy, and eject IOUs from corporatist 
relations.  
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III. Conclusion 
In my conversation with Brian Stevens, the retired public power and federal regulatory 
manager, he warned that, in the field of electricity, “Each Big Mistake creates the seeds, the 
Big Conditions, for the next Big Mistake.”381 Today’s decisions will have repercussions that 
will become unmanageable, unfurling across the decades. Inspired by Stevens’s warning, in 
conclusion I conduct a pre-mortem by asking: “Imagine that we are a year in the future. We 
implemented the plan as it now exists. The outcome was a disaster. Please take 5 to 10 
minutes to write a brief history of that disaster” (Kahneman 2011, 264).382 This exercise can 
help participants and decision-makers recognize overconfidence and groupthink, and it 
unleashes the imagination to root out unseen problems. In this case, I have taken 
substantially longer than “5 to 10 minutes” to consider the possible impending failures of 
the CCA in Santa Barbara County. Failure here means both failure to be established and 
failure to deliver on local renewable generation, which I take to be a principal good of CCAs. 
My considerations, and some possible solutions, are recorded here. 
~ 
“Community choice aggregation failed because there wasn’t enough 
interest in North County.” As demonstrated by Jennifer Cregar’s presentations at the 
Clean Energy Community Meeting and County Board of Supervisors Meeting in July 2018, 
North County buy-in is essential to constructing a feasible program. Because rates in PG&E 
territory are higher, bundling in former PG&E customers can help level out the costs of the 
plan and make for a more competitive program. Yet little interest has been cultivated in 
cities in North County, at least as of this writing, and North County Supervisors have 
dragged their feet on the CCA.   
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One possible solution is for advocates to reach out to North County with concrete 
reasons to be excited about community choice. Talk of higher renewable content alone will 
win over neither North County residents nor Supervisors. However, promises of local build-
out with local jobs has material resonance in North County. This strategy draws on insights 
from energy democracy; as Al Weinrub argues, communities must be extended reasons to 
care about participating in their energy systems. We can do this by designing our CCA 
program from day one with specific projects in mind that can benefit local communities. 
Strategic planning at fine levels of granularity is here more promising than abstract 
technical feasibility studies. 
Bringing in North County will also require framing CCAs in conservative discourse. One 
area of overlap between energy democracy and conservative values is the desire for respite 
from state-level regulation. CCAs may even be fruitfully conceived of as a departure from 
bureaucratic management. When priorities for local control are satisfied, conservative 
actors may be free to pursue environmental concerns. Ongoing conversations between CCA 
advocates and North County politicians may also constitute the kinds of consensus-building 
negotiations that Jasanoff names as essential for manifesting consensus that will be deemed 
legitimate by program implementers. Once these negotiations occur, we might be more 
likely to see plans and feasibility studies that are taken seriously and trusted by actors 
across the board.  
~ 
“Community choice aggregation failed because local politicians were 
worried about the possibility that CCAs and local generation would mean 
higher rates.” So long as community members are reduced to consumers with narrow 
interests in cheap, abundant energy, CCA movements will be hamstrung. This fear stunts 
the political will of some county politicians, but these concerns should not be taken at face 
value. Research should determine to what extent consumers are likely to opt out of CCAs, 
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even if rates increase, and the findings should be communicated to local politicians. 
Support for CCAs on more substantive grounds can also be built up in communities, and 
this public pressure could help boost the political will of politicians to pursue CCAs and 
local generation programs, even if they mean higher rates.  
To help legitimize higher rates, advocates can also create new ways to assess the energy 
they procure. For example, a new measure of local ecological and economic resilience could 
be created, which weighs an energy source’s environmental sustainability and proximity to 
end-use. This metric would bring local control and environmental concerns together into a 
single unit, perhaps called an energy independence number (EIN). Norms and standards 
could be developed around this indicator, affording CCA advocates a new terminology with 
which to advocate for clean local solutions. 
~ 
“Community choice aggregation failed because the movement lost 
momentum.” As IOUs and the CPUC work to slow and undermine the implementation of 
CCAs, it is likely that the movement will lose steam in communities, institutionalized 
environmental groups will seek strategic compromises, and government insiders will look 
for other ways to satisfy demands for higher renewable content. This tendency to abandon 
the movement may even be exacerbated since the RPS mark was recently raised to 100% by 
2045. With some environmental concerns met, the movement for energy democracy might 
start to flag. 
This problem might be solved by emphasizing the benefits of CCAs that lie outside these 
environmental concerns. Here, CCAs should be billed as a strategy to gain local control over 
energy, to create opportunities for participation and public power, and to incur local 
benefits to communities. CCA advocates should publicize proposed and potential projects to 
communities with vivid descriptions of where they will be sited, how many people might be 
employed, how resilient the systems will make us, and what kinds of community programs 
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the projects might fund. These goals must be made concrete to have public resonance. In 
general, communities must be given reason to care about CCAs beyond narrow 
environmental aims.  
~ 
“Community choice aggregation failed because they couldn’t engage in 
local-build out.” CCAs are likely to fail to engage in local build-out insofar as they are 
kept financially starved by IOUs, especially through the implementation of PCIA charges. 
Even where PCIA charges do not flunk programs entirely, they can make programs anemic. 
If local build-out fails to become a part of CCA programs, communities are not likely to have 
a stake in their energy systems, and the participatory potential of CCAs will be undermined. 
In turn, CCAs may face a crisis of legitimacy, and their effectiveness and purpose might be 
called into question.  
In order to achieve local build-out, CCAs must solicit the insights and participation of 
“outside” energy democracy advocates and the community at large who will build local 
generation projects into strategic program design. In the same vain, at-risk consultants 
should be used whenever possible to ensure that all negotiators and actors have “skin in the 
game.” Once the CCA becomes established, the CCA can create community advisory bodies 
so that laypeople can also engage in decision-making. The CCAs can help maintain technical 
workability with layperson participation by employing free-floating experts whose task 
would be to advise CCA decision-making bodies. 
~ 
“Community choice aggregation failed because it faced too much opposition 
from IOUs and the CPUC.” CCA advocates must recognize that IOUs and the CPUC are 
likely to purposefully keep CCA programs anemic. These machinations must be brought to 
light and openly opposed by CCA advocates. CCA advocates can also pursue outright 
oppositional campaigns against IOUs. The wildfires of 2017 and 2018 have been caused in 
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no small part by faulty transmission lines that stretch across dry wilderness full of dead and 
desiccated vegetation, and IOUs are facing a crisis of legitimacy for failing to take their 
systems offline when they become overloaded. By undermining the legitimacy of IOUs, CCA 
advocates can undercut their power at the CPUC and frame their own microgrids as a dual 
power solution to the problem of IOU hegemony.  
To confront the power of IOUs at the CPUC, CCA advocates can also connect with 
CalCCA, an advocacy group that has been incredibly important in challenging IOU capture 
of the CPUC and pushing for CCAs on the state level. Of principal concern should be the 
stabilization of PCIA rates. By communicating and coordinating horizontally across 
California, advocates can mount an important challenge to IOUs statewide. 
~ 
These likely roadblocks and their solutions have much to do with the fundamental 
internal contradiction between eco-modernism and energy democracy within existing CCA 
policy. In this conclusion, I have presented solutions that emphasize the power of energy 
democracy in overcoming obstacles such as high energy rates, lack of buy-in from 
politicians especially in North County, and waning interest in the movement. I have 
emphasized, above all, localism, participation, consensus-building, and the strengthening of 
horizontal bonds across CCAs to fight centralized authority at the CPUC. Seizing these 
solutions requires that we recognize and challenge that contradiction, that we deepen the 
engagement of community members by giving them concrete reasons to believe in our 
project, that we regard them as democratic subjects rather than de-agentified consumers. It 
requires, most of all, that we repoliticize, relocalize, and democratize our energy system.  
The purpose of this project has been to determine the aims of the CCA in Santa Barbara, 
and to explore under what conditions those aims might be met. In pursuit of answers, I 
conducted a year of in-depth interviews and participant observations as researcher and 
advocate, which allowed me intimate engagement with the field and closeness with the 
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participants. While actors may be more or less committed to the specific aims of energy 
democracy and occupy different positions in the movement, broadly speaking they envision 
local control as a means to achieve substantive goals such as local renewable generation and 
cost-savings. I argue that those actors who have the most ambitious and full-fledged 
understanding of the promises of the movement, are committed to generating positive 
socio-technical change in the energy system through energy democracy: energy systems are 
technologically decentralized through DERs and organizationally refashioned as matters of 
public concern through CCAs.  
I have shown how CCA policy is a disorderly bundle of contradictions, reaching toward 
energy democracy yet hobbled by eco-modernist constraints. These constraints manifest in 
structural impediments such as dogged dedication to economic feasibility, persistent and 
unpredictable PCIA charges, and entrenched corporatist negotiation, as well as ideological 
conceits to customer choice and cost competitiveness. As such, I argue that in order for the 
energy democracy aims of the CCA to be met, advocates must use insights from the energy 
democracy framework to move through eco-modernist constraints. In the literature review, 
I argue that the energy democracy framework offers important theoretical and practical 
tools for creating a new energy system. The energy democracy framework draws on 
critiques of bureaucratic governance (Habermas 1962; Landa 2009), arguments for 
participation and decentralization (Goodman 1965; Flacks 1988), and ideas about how to 
build consociative communities (Bookchin 2005). In short, the energy democracy 
framework insists on building decentralized socio-technical networks hosting participatory 
models of energy system decision-making (Weinrub 2017; Kristov 2018). Such 
democratization can enable strategic planning so that energy systems can be made to work 
for us, resulting in local economic and environmental resilience. What’s more, as energy 
systems are democratized, they can bring science and democracy into conversation with 
each other, yielding expert decisions that work for people and are held as legitimate (Owens 
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2015). In this way, and as shown in this conclusion, the energy democracy framework is not 
simply a dreamy aspiration, but a real strategy for working through the contradictions 
inherent in CCA policy and manifesting workable programs. 
In studying the CCA case, I have also endeavored to make a larger statement: democracy 
and capitalism cannot coexist. Ideological and structural elements of capitalism, surfacing 
here as eco-modernist policy constraints, render public democratic power anemic and all 
but untenable. Structurally, capitalism has concentrated power in regulatory bodies so that 
it may set the rules of the game and starve alternative projects. Ideologically, it has given 
powerful corporate actors the rhetorical tools to bend systems to their will while using the 
citizen — flattened to consumer, desiring cheap, abundant energy, voiceless — as a human 
shield. Capitalism is the constraint of democracy, and one cannot flourish without 
destroying the other. 
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Appendix 
A. Interviews: The Players in Santa Barbara County 
Chloe Becker, California Alliance for Community Energy. September 8th, 
2017: I conducted my first interview with Chloe Becker, a representative from the 
California Alliance for Community Energy (CACE), to get a sense of the key figures, groups, 
and issues surrounding the CCA movement in Santa Barbara County, as well as to gain 
candid insights as to the promises and pitfalls of the program. The CACE works to support 
CCA efforts across California through legislative action383, and they have worked to connect 
energy democracy-minded CCA advocates throughout the state. For example, Becker was 
responsible for inviting Joe Galliani, an important supporter of local energy in Los Angeles 
who led South Bay’s CCA program, to the first forum in June 2017.384 Additionally, Becker 
was one of the community steering committee members for the local Central Coast Power 
initiative, which officially represents staff members and, to a lesser extent, community 
advocates working toward the CCA.385 Becker has also long been a fixture in the 
environmental justice community in Santa Barbara. She affirmed common CCA goals such 
as local control, renewable generation, local build-out, and cost-savings, but she was 
particularly committed to the social justice benefits that could be incurred to communities 
affected by environmental racism when energy revenues are kept local.386 Our conversation 
was the most familiar of my interviews, and Becker readily posited core values of 
“community oversight” and “transparency.”387 Above all, she appeared motivated by energy 
democracy and social justice concerns. 
~ 
                                                
383 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part I, 20:00). 
384 Ibid, (Part I, 33:00). 
385 Ibid, (Part I, 5:00). 
386 Ibid, (Part II, 2:00). 
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Amy Parker and Josh Hudson, Community Environmental Council. 
September 14th, 2017 and May 8th, 2018: The Community Environmental Council 
(CEC) is the most long-lasting CCA advocate in Santa Barbara County. The organization had 
worked on the project for a decade388 since, in 2007, they had identified CCA as a way to 
achieve “Fossil Free by ’33” goals.389 In 2017, the CEC put $50,000 toward the first 
feasibility study.390 The CEC launched just after the 1969 Santa Barbara Oil Spill and has 
focused on local solutions to climate change, such as promoting local food, increasing 
bicycle access, decreasing car use, reducing plastic use, and increasing local renewable 
options and energy efficiency.391 They consider themselves to be a “research-based 
organization,” but they also engage in “advocacy work to promote policies that are in line 
with [their] mission.”392 I decided to interview CEC’s Amy Parker, who had worked on the 
CCA, with the purpose of exploring the role of the CEC in developing the movement for the 
CCA in Santa Barbara, and to understand their perspective on the promises and pitfalls of 
CCAs. Perhaps because the results of the first feasibility study had recently come back 
unfavorably, Parker was somewhat cynical about the future of the CCA. After this interview, 
I got the sense that the CEC was positioning itself to abandon the CCA project altogether. I 
later compared my interview data with the much more optimistic statements made by CEC 
actors during city and county governance meetings and decided to amend my earlier 
analysis. In part because I was concerned that this first interview had been troubled by the 
bad news about the study, I decided to interview another participant connected to the CEC, 
Josh Hudson, in May 2018. In this interview, Hudson was much more optimistic, perhaps 
because the next feasibility study — which turned out to be favorable — was in the works 
and set to be released within the month. Among other things, this interview was useful in 
                                                                                                                                                 
387 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part II, 2:00). 
388 Cregar, Jennifer. October 6, 2017, (24:00). 
389 Hudson, Josh. May 8, 2018, (30:06). 
390 Ibid, (30:32). 
391 Parker, Amy. September 14, 2017, (7:00). 
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demonstrating the deep connection between CCAs and local renewable generation such as 
DERs.  
~ 
Mary Romano, Lancaster Choice Energy. September 20th, 2017: Early in my 
study, I had planned to conduct a number of interviews with CCA advocates across the 
state. I soon realized that my project would be more feasible if I kept my work local, but 
before I reduced the scope of my work I was able to travel to Lancaster for an interview with 
Lancaster Choice Energy’s Mary Romano. This interview was useful in that I was able to 
learn how CCAs have networked across the state to share resources and knowledge and to 
create expertise. The Lancaster case is anomalous in that its CCA is comprised of a single 
municipality with a conservative constituency led by an autocratic mayor. I anticipate that 
this interview will become important as I engage in work on CCAs across the state, as well 
as explore connections and conflicts between conservatism and ecological resilience. The 
participant seemed motivated to uphold Lancaster’s success as a CCA champion and to 
demonstrate that such programs are within reach for motivated cities. 
~ 
Amelia Carr and Jon Ullman of the Los Padres Chapter, Sierra Club. 
September 29th, 2017 and July 17th, 2018: I reached out to the Sierra Club’s Amelia 
Carr next in hopes of learning how other prominent, institutionally-oriented environmental 
groups in town had contributed to local CCA advocacy. In particular, I wanted to know to 
what extent such groups had been instrumental in crafting the project locally. In contrast to 
my recent interview with Parker from the CEC, Carr was cheerful and optimistic about the 
future of the CCA, having just come from an apparently productive meeting about the CCA. 
She was eager to give insights, information, and further contacts, and she contributed 
greatly to my background knowledge of the CCA. Her principal motivation seemed to be the 
                                                                                                                                                 
392 Ibid, (7:30). 
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successful implementation of a viable program to bring higher renewable content to the 
Central Coast through the mechanism of CCAs and local control.393 Interestingly, the Sierra 
Club’s advocacy had not emerged from local concerns, but from a national campaign 
undertaken by the Sierra Club to secure 100% renewable goals in municipalities as a 
response to flagging commitment to environmental concerns as the federal level.394 
 I was able to interact more informally with another Sierra Club representative the 
following summer. In between county and city meetings over coffee, we shared ideas about 
strategies for positive environmental change. Most tellingly, his statements revealed an 
important tension within liberal environmentalism. On one hand, he promoted “grass-tops” 
advocacy by key leaders and argued that decision-making centralized in relatively 
undemocratic bodies could effectively moderate local ecocidal tendencies; on the other 
hand, he voiced deep concerns about how key leaders wielding great centralized power 
often run amok of local resilience and can be easily bought by developers and oil interests. 
This brief, informal interview helped sensitize me to the Sierra Club’s under-strategized 
approach to positive environmental change and complicated their commitment to local 
control as a vehicle for achieving such substantive ends. 
~ 
Jennifer Cregar, County of Santa Barbara Community Services 
Department. October 6th, 2017: Jennifer Cregar was the General Project supervisor of 
the Santa Barbara County Energy and Sustainability Initiatives Division, and the 
coordinator of the regional advisory working group. She had been hired from Texas to 
oversee the feasibility study395, and she had been working on the project in Santa Barbara 
since May 2016.396 She was perhaps the most prominent public advocate for the CCA in 
Santa Barbara, appearing at all major events, and leading most presentations of the 
                                                
393 Carr, Amelia. September 29, 2017, (27:00). 
394 Ibid, (19:30). 
395 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (4:30). 
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feasibility studies as they came out. I spoke with her to understand the county staff’s 
motivations for undertaking the CCA, as well as to better comprehend the challenges facing 
the advisory working group after the negative results of the first feasibility study. In our 
conversation, Cregar was, as always, articulate and poised. As I anticipated from an 
interview with such a prominent figurehead of the movement, her responses were often 
somewhat guarded. Still, the interview corroborated much of what Becker had 
communicated regarding the inside-outside split within CCA advocacy and the technical 
focus of the feasibility study. Rather than involve outside actors in the process of project 
planning, Cregar’s general approach to community stakeholders, including environmental 
and labor advocates, had been to “keep them in the loop, keep them informed of our 
progress, [and] have some say in terms of how our studies are scoped.”397 Her insights were 
also incredibly useful in clearing up technical questions I had about the CCA process. I was 
also able to get a sense of the depth of her commitment to positive environmental change 
and to California as a harbinger of that change. In her words, “I hope that what we’re doing 
at the state level [for example by enabling CCAs] has a national and international effect. I 
mean, that’s why I moved back to California. This is world-changing. What happens in 
California sets a trend for the world, from an environmental perspective, and a social 
perspective. So I wanted to be part of that.”398 
~ 
Joseph Hayes, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 413. 
October 19th, 2017: While Becker had first recommended I meet with him, I was 
introduced to Joseph Hayes from the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(IBEW) Local 413 by two old friends of mine who are electrical workers in the area. Unlike 
some IBEW chapters with closer ties to IOUs, Local 413 is pro-CCA, contingent on the 
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397 Ibid, (24:30). 
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CCA’s focus on local build-out.399 He had worked with Cregar and Becker in the early CCA 
project planning, and he is recognized as a progressive leader in union circles locally. The 
interview was held at the IBEW Local 413 Union Hall in Buellton, CA, and Hayes was kind 
enough to give me a tour of the facility, which included a suite of classrooms and a hands-on 
training warehouse where union electricians could teach apprentices. Our conversation 
demonstrated to me the depth of care that Hayes had for his union brothers and sisters, as 
well as his commitment to local progressive politics. For Hayes, “Good paying local union 
jobs are critical to community sustainability across the board.”400 While he championed 
local renewable generation, he rather cynically returned to the refrain that IOUs would 
continue to pitch to the bottom line in their transmission projects and grid modernization 
work, and worried that IOUs’ loss in revenues to CCAs could hurt workers. For all this, he 
was proud to work with environmentalists who cared about union jobs, and he remained 
committed to the CCA and had tremendous respect for county staff. 
~ 
Kelly Hunter, Government Relations, Southern California Edison. February 
7th, 2018: Kelly Hunter, a government relations representative of Southern California 
Edison (SCE), approached me to offer an interview after the Santa Barbara City Council 
Meeting on October 31st, 2017, as the results of the first feasibility study were being 
presented to the council. I spoke with her to gain insight as to the IOU perspective on the 
CCA, and in particular how she anticipated SCE’s business model would change with the 
movement for CCAs across the state and the possible threat of DERs encroaching on the 
macrogrid.401 At the October 3rd County Board of Supervisors Meeting, she had asserted that 
SCE remained neutral on CCAs, but I wanted to dig deeper. From my work researching 
                                                
399 Becker, Chloe. September 8, 2017, (Part I, 22:00). 
400 Hayes, Joseph. Email correspondence. May 3, 2018. 
401 In our interview, Amy Parker commented that, “So [IOUs] aren't as threatened by CCA, in my 
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CCAs in PG&E territory, I knew that IOUs often put up a fight against CCAs. I wanted to 
understand why SCE’s tactics were so different and test my hypothesis that SCE was less 
threatened by CCAs because, unlike PG&E, they had shifted their business model away from 
generation.402 Hunter possessed calm command of useful if obfuscating metaphors when 
explaining, for example, the purpose of PCIA charges, and by and large remained on script. 
It was interesting to learn of SCE’s supposed concern for community and customer, from 
their commitment to low electricity rates on behalf of the consumer, to their engagement 
with a wide range of community service groups, to their dedication to electrify more and 
more of their customers’ lifeworlds to increase sustainability. For this work, I only 
interviewed a representative from SCE, but in future work I will interview PG&E 
representatives as well. 
~ 
Michelle and Lucas, 100% Renewable Campaign Focus Group, 350 Santa 
Barbara. March 5th, 2018 and May 6th, 2018: In the spring, I held two meetings with 
members of the 100% Renewable Campaign, who were working as part of the 350 Santa 
Barbara group. Michelle and Lucas had wanted to learn more about the movement for the 
CCA, so during the first meeting I was able to share with them the insights I had garnered 
so far. Following our first meeting, they prepared a presentation about the CCA movement 
for the 350SB Meeting on March 12th, 2017. We had an additional meeting two months later 
to talk about next steps for the summer. These conversations were useful in understanding 
how grassroots organizers approached advocacy and for gaining an insider’s perspective on 
the character and operations of the environmental activist community of Santa Barbara. 
While data from these meetings do not feature prominently in this work, I anticipate that 
these insights will be invaluable later in my work. 
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David Turner, World Business Academy. May 7th, 2018: I met David Turner of 
the World Business Academy (WBA) when we were seated next to each other at the first 
Clean Energy Community Meeting in January 2018. I appreciated his comments on the 
importance of local control and his concern that, should Santa Barbara join LA’s CCA, all 
hope of local control would be washed out. We spoke briefly after the meeting, and I 
conducted an interview with him in the spring. Central to our conversation was local 
renewable generation and the technologies of DERs, which WBA was pursuing as a way to 
achieve local resilience without recourse to the Ellwood Peaker Plant.403 Our conversation 
regarding DERs was incredibly fruitful, and he suggested I look into the works of Lorenzo 
Kristof and Al Weinrub. Through our conversation and these texts, I was able to frame 
CCAs and DERs as a libertarian technic capable of subverting the centralized, bureaucratic 
hierarchy manifested in the prevailing energy system and asserting in its place an energy 
system that privileged local resilience and participatory engagement. Here, the term 
“reversing the polarity” between sites of consumption and sites of generation emerged as an 
in vivo code that has been crucial to my understanding of the radical potential of CCAs. 
Beyond his zeal for challenging systems that just weren’t serving communities, perhaps 
most remarkable in our interview was how eager he was to learn from other experts in the 
field. He was constantly mentioning websites and webinars and conferences. At one point 
he said, “I spend most of my time listening to webinars. I probably attend four to six 
webinars a week.”404 
~ 
Brian Stevens, Former American Public Power Association and Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission. May 9th, 2018: Brian Stevens, a retiree from the 
American Public Power Association (APPA) and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
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Commission (FERC), had regularly attended every city and county meeting regarding the 
CCA. He appeared to be one of the only advocates within the community who was not 
attached to a particular environmental group or currently held a staff position. I reached out 
to Stevens because I wanted to understand his perspective on CCAs, given his past work in 
energy, and because I anticipated that an interview with a non-affiliated advocate might 
yield more candid insights. Over the course of our conversation, Stevens expressed disdain 
for California’s current inefficient regulatory apparatus and argued that the energy system 
would work best with a small amount of oversight. Otherwise, regulators should have faith 
in the market. In terms of program specifics, Stevens advocated for a CCA program that 
offered amenities such as transportation electrification in addition to renewable 
procurement. Still, he remained largely uncommitted to local generation, which could 
jeopardize cost-savings to customers. 
~ 
Sharon Rose and Ken Hough, SBCAN. July 7th, 2018 and August 24th, 2018: 
After the results of the second feasibility study were presented at the Goleta City Council 
Meeting, I spoke with fellow attendee, Sharon Rose. Rose spoke of her connections to 
Goleta’s water sanitation board, to tenants’ rights, and to the Santa Barbara Community 
Action Network (SBCAN). Our brief conversation provided important insights as to the 
behind-the-scenes operations of Goleta City Council Meetings, which will gain more 
prominence in my later work. Moreover, she offered interesting perspectives as to the 
culture of construction and building trades jobs that forced me to reconsider the importance 
of “temporary” construction jobs. This insight, too, will be important in future work that I 
carry out with more of a specific focus on labor and environmentalism. 
 Rose, along with my committee co-chair Dick Flacks, suggested I talk to Ken Hough 
from SBCAN to gain insights as to North County groups’ involvement in the CCA 
movement. I conducted my last interview with Hough, and this conversation was useful in 
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helping me understand the interactions between advocacy groups and city and county 
leaders. Even more useful were Hough’s thoughts on how we can understand people’s 
engagement with oppositional or resistance campaigns and disengagement with liberatory 
or world-building campaigns. In my future work, I intend to examine these insights in light 
of Flacks’s work on resistance versus liberation activism. 
B. Participant Observation: Important Spaces 
Community Choice Energy Forum. June 7th, 2017: I attended this event at the 
suggestion of Michael Chiacos, a key figure at the Community Environmental Council and a 
contact I made through my work with the Climate Justice Project. The event was held at the 
Faulkner Gallery, a community room adjacent to the Santa Barbara Public Library’s 
downtown location. The event was designed to spread information about community choice 
aggregation by inviting spokespeople from CCA movements across the state to speak to the 
benefits of the program. Roughly one hundred people were in attendance. 
~ 
Lancaster, CA. September 20th, 2017: When I traveled to Lancaster, CA, to talk to 
Mary Romano from Lancaster Choice Energy, who I had first heard speak at the forum on 
June 7th, I went into several businesses in Lancaster and talked informally with workers 
there to get a sense of the economic and social impact of the CCA and the green industries 
that had also been advocated by the infamous Mayor Rex Parris. The main takeaways from 
these conversations were that the CCA and other ventures were not appreciably felt by all 
residents and workers in the town. While these insights were not incorporated into this 
work, I will likely use them in future studies of CCAs across California. 
~ 
Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors Meetings. October 3rd, 2017 and 
July 17th, 2018: The two County Board of Supervisors Meeting I attended were both held 
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at the county building in downtown Santa Barbara, though meetings are also held in Santa 
Maria in North County. Both meetings discussed the results of the CCA feasibility studies. I 
was able to gain a sense from observing and participating in these meetings not only the 
kinds of decisions and justifications that were made by the supervisors, but also how CCA 
advocates managed relationships with the study and the supervisors through public 
comments and side conversations. In my later work, I hope to delve more into the 
architectures of power manifested in meeting chambers and how CCAs might cultivate more 
participatory models of engagement. 
~ 
Central Coast Sustainability Summit, UCSB Loma Pelona Center. October 
11th, 2017: This summit featured a full day of presentations and workshops from a wide 
variety of local environmental actors with topics ranging from sea level rise and coastal 
ecologies to bike path plans and electric vehicle promotion to distributed energy resources 
(DERs) and community choice aggregation. There was an entrance fee of $20, ostensibly to 
compensate for the catered lunch. I was able to hear a presentation from Craig Lewis from 
the Clean Coalition at this event, and I witnessed an interesting interaction between Lewis 
and David Turner, a participant from the World Business Academy, on the topic of DERs 
and the contradictions between financing opportunities and small-scale local renewable 
generation. The catered lunch offered opportunities to observe more casual interactions 
among local environmental leaders and catch candid remarks such as “Utilities are like 
cockroaches. They’ll find a way to survive,” and “It’s Jennifer Cregar, the Beyoncé of CCAs!” 
~ 
Santa Barbara City Council Meetings. October 31st, 2017 and July 17th, 2018: 
The Santa Barbara City Council Meetings I attended came on the heels of the County Board 
of Supervisors Meetings regarding the CCA feasibility studies. These city meetings do not 
feature prominently in my work here, since insights gathered at these meetings so closely 
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resemble my observations at the county meetings. The city meetings were less contentious 
than the county meetings, which I attribute largely to the greater ideological homogeneity 
occurring at city level governance when compared to county level governance.  
~ 
Clean Energy Community Meetings. January 31st, 2018 and July 11th, 2018: 
These meetings were open to the public, but required special invitation through clean 
energy listservs and an RSVP. They were pitched toward community stakeholders, in 
practice defined as those with positions in labor unions, on environmental boards, local 
government figures, some academics, and renewable business representatives. Unlike the 
first forum in June 2017, they were not oriented toward the education of the uninitiated. 
For this, and because they were attended by individuals very much in the know, the 
meetings genuinely seemed productive for those in attendance. Also for this, much of what 
was being discussed was extremely technical. Still, these meetings were attended by a 
coalition of the willing who appeared to have respectful relations with each other, with some 
notable exceptions. For example, while catching up with a participant prior to the July 
meeting, a supervisor walked by without greeting them. I heard my participant mutter a 
slur against them before resuming our conversation. 
~ 
350 Santa Barbara Meetings. January 31st, February 12th, March 12th, and 
April 30th, 2018: In addition to the more institutional sites I engaged with, I attended a 
series of 350 Santa Barbara meetings. The first of these events was a viewing of “Fossil Free 
Fast,” a televised program co-hosted by Bill McKibben, at Santa Barbara’s Unity Church. In 
February, I was invited to give a brief presentation on CCAs to 350SB at the Unitarian 
Church in downtown Santa Barbara. In March two 350SB activists on the 100% Renewable 
Campaign who I had worked with gave a PowerPoint presentation on the CCA movement at 
the Eastside Branch of the Santa Barbara Public Library. The final 350SB meeting during 
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my field work was held at the Food and Water Watch office in downtown Santa Barbara. In 
my future work, I intend to analyze these meetings to get a better sense of the character and 
capacity of grassroots environmental activism in Santa Barbara. 
~ 
Goleta City Council Meeting. July 17th, 2018: This Goleta City Council Meeting 
was the third meeting on a single Tuesday in July to determine the future of the CCA in light 
of the new favorable results of the Pacific Energy Advisors feasibility study, following the 
county meeting and the Santa Barbara City Council Meeting. This meeting allowed a 
glimpse into a different governmental meeting structure and culture, and has inspired me to 
examine more closely the interaction between places of governmental decision-making and 
the democratic potential made available by those spaces.  
~ 
Carpinteria City Council Meeting. July 23rd, 2018: The Carpinteria City Council 
Meeting wherein the results of the feasibility study were discussed offered as yet another 
glimpse into the great variety of local governmental spaces. Carpinteria’s City Hall was even 
more casual and open to friendly community discourse than Goleta’s. Moreover, this 
experience was important in helping me understand the various ways that narratives of 
local control may be deployed by a variety of interests to pursue very different agendas: 
during this meeting, “local control” was deployed both in support of the CCA and against a 
statewide affordable housing measure. In my future work, I plan to put this experience into 
conversation with insights gleaned from examining the Lancaster case, both of which 
demonstrate the possible conservative uses of “local control.”  
~ 
Buellton City Council Meeting. July 26th, 2018: My final participant observation 
site was the Buellton City Council Meeting following the results of PEA’s feasibility study. 
This was simply an informational meeting, and the city council was not prompted to vote on 
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whether or not to pursue a joint powers authority. However, this was the only CCA meeting 
held in North County Santa Barbara, and my experience here offered a view of a local 
government’s orientation toward the CCA and local renewables in a much more 
conservative area. This was an important visit for me also because I was able to read a letter 
prepared by Joseph Hayes of IBEW Local 413 in support of the CCA. The Local 413 chapter 
is headquartered in Buellton. It was the first time I felt like I could truly give back to a 
movement that had given me so much. 
